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ABSTRACT 
 
ANDREW COURTWRIGHT: Justice, Health, and Status: Moral Theory and the New 
Epidemiology of Health Disparities 
(Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) 
  
 Health is distributed unequally.  Compared to whites in my home state of North 
Carolina, the infant mortality rate among blacks is 2.4 times greater, Native American 
children are hospitalized for asthma 2.8 times more frequently, and black adults are 40% 
more likely to die from strokes.  Ethical and political discussions of these and other health 
disparities have focused on justice.  The general strategy philosophers like Norman Daniels 
and Jennifer Ruger employ is to identify a certain state of affairs—equality of opportunity 
and equality of capabilities, respectively—and then to argue that health disparities limiting an 
individual’s or group’s access to that condition are unjust, demanding intervention.  The most 
common corrective in this context is to improve access to health care.     
Recent work in epidemiology, however, has highlighted the importance of 
socioeconomic factors outside of access to care in creating health disparities.  I explore the 
ways in which theories of justice have been expanded in light of this information, particularly 
data on the affects of social stigma on health.  I suggest that further work in a broader moral 
territory—including the appropriateness of interpersonal attitudes like disesteem and 
contempt—is required if such theories are to provide an adequate framework for addressing 
health disparities.  I conclude by considering an alternative approach, focused on a normative 
theory of socioeconomic status, for thinking about health disparities outside of the context of 
justice. 
 iii
“To become effective in practice, every universalist morality has to make up for the 
loss of concrete ethical substance, which is initially accepted because of the cognitive 
advantages attending it.” 
 
Jurgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics 
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Chapter I: Introduction to the Health Disparities Landscape 
 
 One evening while I was on call at the hospital where I work, we admitted two very 
different patients in the early stages of heart attacks.1  Mr. Johnson was a sixty-seven year 
old white man with multiple risk factors for heart disease.  His blood pressure and 
cholesterol, however, were well-managed by his primary care physician in Washington, 
D.C., where he worked in a high-level position at the National Institutes of Health.  H
recently developed shortness of breath during a trip to Chapel Hill; his wife, concerned, 
brought him to our emergency room where an electrocardiogram and blood work show
changes consistent with a heart a
e had 
ed 
ttack.   
                                                
Mr. Franklin was a forty-six year old black man with poorly-controlled diabetes and 
high blood pressure.  He worked occasionally for a landscaper.  In his mind, visiting the 
doctor for chronic disease management was an unnecessary luxury.  He had woken up that 
morning with vague chest pain that worsened throughout the day.  In the late afternoon, he 
went to an urgent care near his house; the physician there sent him to our hospital after an 
electrocardiogram showed changes consistent with a heart attack.     
 Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Franklin had severe blockages in the arteries to their heart, 
significant enough that open-heart surgery was indicated.  Both men did well during surgery.  
Their postoperative courses, however, differed dramatically.  Mr. Johnson spent a day in the 
intensive care unit (ICU) recovering from surgery and then moved to a normal hospital bed.  
He was up and walking within 36 hours.  His wife, a nurse, encouraged him to work actively 
 
1 I have modified names and clinical information for these and other patients. 
with physical therapy.  He was discharged after five uneventful days.  His plan was to 
finish recovering in his mountain cabin and then return to his job.  Mr. Franklin, in 
contrast, spent three days in the ICU because of an unanticipated difficulty weaning him 
from the ventilator.  The day after being transferred to a normal unit, a nurse noticed that 
his chest incision was infected, a complication more common among diabetics.  Mr. 
Franklin remained in bed and was uncooperative with physical therapy; he subsequently 
developed pneumonia and had to be reintubated and transferred back to the ICU.  Even 
when he was finally medically stable, his discharge was postponed because the social 
worker did not believe he had adequate support at home, should he have a late 
complication.  The pattern these men represent—especially the connection between race 
and class and cardiac morbidity and mortality—is typical of heart disease in America.2    
More generally, health disparities—defined by the American National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) as “differences in the incidence, prevalence, mortality, and burden of 
disease and other health conditions that exist among specific population groups”—occur 
between races, occupations, ethnic groups, and individuals of differing income in the 
United States.3  For example, the 2005 infant mortality rate for blacks in the United 
States was 13.9 per 1,000 live births versus 5.8 and 5.6 for whites and Hispanics, 
respectively.4  In 2001, the life expectancy at birth for whites was 77.7 years; for blacks, 
72.2.5  American homosexual men are more than 5 times as likely to attempt suicide 
                                                 
2 Scott, 2006, p. 1. 
 
3 National Institutes of Health, 2005. 
 
4 Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2005. 
 
5 Center for Disease Control, 2004, p. 33. 
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compared to heterosexual men.6  Twelve percent of children in the United States living in 
low-income families have an elevated level of lead in their blood, compared with 2% of 
children in high-income families.7  The relative risk of death for individuals from 
households in the United States making less than $15,000 a year is almost 300% that of 
individuals from households making more than $70,000 a year.8   
Compared to whites in my home state of North Carolina, the infant mortality rate 
among blacks is 2.4 times greater, Native American children are hospitalized for asthma 
2.8 times more frequently, and black adults are 40% more likely to die from strokes.9  
The overall health of North Carolinians—measured along a number of dimensions 
including total mortality and premature death—was 5.6% below the national average in 
2005.10  The burden of disease is distributed unevenly between populations.  Given that 
there are steps we could take to reduce these health disparities, is it morally acceptable 
for them to persist?  A common way of interpreting this question is to ask whether it is 
unfair that some groups have better health than others. 
Where fairness is concerned, we often appeal to a theory of justice to help us 
determine what responsibilities (if any) we have to alter the arrangements that produce 
inequalities and which mechanisms are appropriate for instituting these changes.  Among 
politicians, physicians, and philosophers who believe that health disparities are unjust, the 
growing consensus is that we should expand access to medical care as a corrective 
                                                 
6 Paul, et al., 2002, pp. 1338–45. 
 
7 Brody, et al., 1994, pp. 277-83. 
 
8 McDonough, et al., 1997, pp. 1476-83. 
 
9 North Carolina Office of Minority Health and Health Disparities and State Center for Health Statistics, 
2003. 
 
10 United Health Foundation, 2005. 
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measure.  In the political arena, considerations of fairness have been used to argue for 
expanding preexisting programs like Medicaid or implementing large-scale, universal 
health care coverage as changes meant to address health disparities.  Senator Edward 
Kennedy, in concluding a lengthy discussion of health inequalities, suggests that “lack of 
access and low-quality care are two major causes of these disparities.”11 He goes on to 
endorse a proposal to provide universal access to adequate health care.  The Healthcare 
Equality and Accountability Act, which was introduced to the Senate and House in 2005 
and enjoys the support of Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama and current 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, “addresses health disparities by providing quality 
healthcare for minority patients across the country.”12  One of the central aims of this 
legislation is to expand minority medical coverage so as to correct differences in the 
prevalence and outcomes of conditions like diabetes, asthma, and heart disease.  
Similarly, the Healthy People 2010 Initiative and the Office of Civil Rights has made it a 
priority to reduce the unequal burden of disease by addressing “disparities in access, 
quality, and availability of health services.”13 
Medical groups and doctors also associate the (unjust) existence and persistence 
of health disparities with differences in access to care.  For example, the Physicians 
Working Group for Single Payer National Health Insurance writes, 
 “Abolishing financial barriers to health care is the sine qua non of reform.  Only a 
single comprehensive program, covering rich and poor alike, can end disparities 
based on race, ethnicity, social class, and geographic region that compromise the 
health care of the American people.”14  
                                                 
11 Kennedy, 2005, p. 452. 
 
12 Staunton, 2005.   
 
13 Campanelli, 2003, p. 1624. 
 
14 Physicians Working Group for Single Payer National Health Insurance, 2003, p. 801.  
 4
The Journal of the American Medical Association, in a call for papers on health 
disparities and access to health care notes that, “those who lack access to needed care, 
which may include inability to obtain primary care, chronic care, specialist care, or timely 
emergency or urgent care, are at risk for serious health consequences.”15 Antonia 
Novello—the former Surgeon General—quotes Thucydides on justice in her opening 
address to the 2004 conference on Minorities, the Medically Underserved, and Cancer, 
and then argues that differences in health insurance status play a leading role in causing 
health inequalities.16  By far the most cited aphorism in this context, however, is from Dr. 
Martin Luther King, “Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health care is the most 
shocking and inhumane.” 
The philosophical discussion of justice and American health disparities has 
focused on the role of government and private institutions in addressing health 
inequalities.  The strategy of philosophers like Norman Daniels is to identify a certain 
desirable state of affairs and then argue that health disparities limiting access to that 
condition are unjust.  So, for example, Daniels—whose account and subsequent revisions 
I will discuss in more detail later—argues that health disparities that limit equality of 
opportunity are unjust.  And our responsibilities in the face of this injustice?  Daniels 
writes that his approach “supports the provision of universal access to appropriate health 
care—including traditional public health and preventive measures—through public or 
mixed public and private insurance schemes.”17   
                                                 
15 Drummond, 2006, p. 2182. 
  
16 Novello, 2006, p. S7.  
 
17 Daniels, 1985, p. 27. 
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The growing consensus among politicians, doctors, and philosophers who believe 
that health disparities in contemporary America are unjust is that we have a pressing 
obligation to expand access to medical care.  This has certainly been the focus of the last 
four major government initiatives in this area—the Clinton Health Care Security Act, the 
expansion of the State Children Health Insurance Programs, the addition of prescription 
drug benefits to Medicare, and Massachusetts’ mandated health care coverage initiative.   
These efforts make sense if one believes that inequalities in access to care drive 
health disparities, a widespread and not implausible assumption.  Of the approximately 
45 million Americans without health insurance coverage, a disproportionate number are 
also members of groups with worse health.18  Among the uninsured, 14.6% are white, 
19.6% are black, and 32.7% are Hispanic, while these groups make up 75.1%, 12.3%, 
and 12.5% of the total population, respectively.19,20  Low-income families make up 
almost 60% of the uninsured while 40% of people who did not graduate from high school 
lack insurance compared to only 10% percent of those who graduated from college.21  
There appears to be significant overlap between populations without health insurance and 
those with comparatively worse health.  And common sense seems to indicate that, if 
certain groups lack access to medical care, we should expect their health to suffer.   
Ultimately, I will argue that this view is not borne out by current epidemiologic 
research, but there is an intuitive appeal to the idea that if Mr. Franklin had had the 
resources necessary to see a physician, his diabetes and blood pressure would have been 
                                                 
18 DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2003, p. 14.  
 
19 DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2003, pp. 14-5. 
 
20 US Census Bureau, 2001, p. 1. 
 
21 Baker, et al., 2000, pp. 1269-74. Burstin, et al., 1992, pp. 2383-7. 
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better controlled and his hospital course would have resembled Mr. Johnson’s.  He might 
not even have had heart disease in the first place, especially at such a young age.   
Empirical evidence aside, approaching health disparities from the perspective of 
justice may also lead us to emphasize the importance of access to care.  The subject of 
justice is usually taken to be the arrangement of institutions that distribute certain goods 
and resources.  If the poorer health of various groups is unjust, it is therefore important to 
change the institutions that distribute goods so as to reduce health disparities.  The most 
obvious candidates for change, in this context, are the systems—primarily the Federal 
and state government and insurance companies—that determine who has access to health 
care.  Since justice deals with the way that institutions distribute goods, it is not 
surprising that the political, medical, and philosophical work on justice and health 
disparities has demanded the reallocation of health care resources.   
In the chapters that follow, I argue that excessive focus on justice has produced a 
misleading picture of the origins of health disparities and our obligations to reduce them.  
These disparities are not merely the product of institutional arrangements and the 
manipulation of goods and services like health care, but arise out of complex interactions 
including the effects of social stigma, negative interpersonal attitudes, and 
marginalization.  As such, I suggest that an adequate normative approach to health 
inequalities should consider a broader territory beyond the traditional domain of 
distributive justice.  I begin with a more detailed discussion of the ways in which theories 
of justice—particularly John Rawls’—have been applied to the problem of health 
disparities in the United States and other developed countries.  This is the focus of the 
second chapter.  In the third and fourth chapters I examine recent developments in the 
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epidemiology of health disparities, specifically studies suggesting that these disparities 
are rooted in a number of factors beyond access to care.  In the fifth chapter I explore the 
ways in which philosophers have reexamined the requirements of justice in the light of 
these data, becoming more sophisticated in their approach.  I argue in the sixth chapter 
that, thus far, these changes have been insufficient to adequately address the moral status 
of health disparities.  In the seventh chapter I argue that work in a broader moral territory, 
focused on a normative theory of socioeconomic status, is a viable alternative to justice-
based approaches.  I conclude by showing how a specific conception of socioeconomic 
status, generated from Jurgen Habermas’ discourse ethics, can provide recommendations 
for reducing health disparities. 
Chapter II: Justice and Health 
 
 In 1997 Congress authorized spending on the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), a joint federal and state Medicaid-like initiative to provide health care 
access to approximately 5 million children from low-income families without health 
insurance.  Enrollment was initially slow, forcing states to turn to local community 
organizations, which could better identify eligible families and encourage them to participate.  
In 2003 I joined the SCHIP initiative sponsored through the University of North Carolina 
Hospitals’ clinics, working with low-income parents to enroll their children in the program.  
Although these families still faced substantial barriers in access to health care—
transportation, work, and sometimes language-related—the cost of care and prescription 
medication was removed as a significant concern.  During the time I worked in the UNC 
clinics, I saw a dramatic increase in the number of SCHIP children seen for both emergent 
and preventative care.  By 2007, when the SCHIP bill came to Congress for reauthorization, 
over 6.6 million children were enrolled.     
Rather than simply reauthorize the program, however, Congress passed legislation to 
expand SCHIP by between 3 to 4 million participants.  Funding for the expansion was 
provided by a combination of cuts to Medicare Advantage and a 61 cent tax increase on 
cigarettes, which was necessary to raise the 35 billion additional dollars the program would 
require.  Critics of the SCHIP expansion argued that it represented unfair taxation, designed 
to take resources from two groups—the elderly and smokers—and use them to provide 
another good (health care access) to a third group, low-income children.22  Is such an action 
unfair or does justice require the expansion of SCHIP, as the bill’s supporters argued?     
The relationship between health, medical care, and justice is complex.  No theory of 
justice has been explicitly introduced to address health disparities, so most work in this area 
has involved applying preexisting frameworks to questions of health and health care 
distribution.  Norman Daniels has done this with John Rawls’ justice as fairness; the 
epidemiologists Michael Marmot and Jennifer Ruger with Amartya Sen’s justice as equality 
of capabilities.23  Before I turn to these accounts I want to point out several features they 
have in common.24  First, justice approaches begin by identifying a state of affairs as being 
of particular moral importance.  In Daniels’ case, this is fair equality of opportunity; for 
Ruger, it is equality in the space of certain capabilities.  They then argue that access to health 
resources, including public health interventions and medical care, is a necessary step toward 
achieving this condition, concluding that we ought to provide such access.  For these 
theorists, health matters because it leads to some other normatively favorable condition 
(equal opportunity; equal capabilities) and access to health care matters because it leads to 
health.  For example, Ruger writes, “Due to its influence on health, society must guarantee 
healthcare so that health improves overall and health inequalities attributable to health care 
diminish.”25 
                                                 
22 Moffit, R.E. and C. Smith, 2007. 
 
23 Daniels, 1985. Ruger, 2004a, pp. 1092-7.  See also Sen, 1992. 
 
24 Daniels indicates that there is a close conceptual connection between the role disease plays in limiting 
equality of opportunity in his position and the impact of poor health on capabilities within Sen’s account.  The 
emphasis for both authors is on protecting health to establish a space of exercisable opportunities and may make 
the two positions distinct in terminology only.  Daniels, 2001, p. 5-6. Daniels, et al., 2000, pp. 85-94.  Ruger has 
argued that there is a substantive difference between Sen and Rawls on this issue.  Ruger, 2006, pp. 408-10. 
 
25 Ruger, 2006, p. 437. 
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This is not to suggest that health, by itself, is unimportant within their frameworks.  It 
is not even a comment on what sort of value health has in their systems; both accounts are 
compatible with health having non-instrumental value (i.e. being valuable without 
contributing to or producing another condition).26,27  Rather, for both Ruger and Daniels, 
health is a target for justice only insofar as it contributes to another state of affairs, be it 
equality of opportunity or capabilities. 
 Second, because theories of justice cover a range of distributable goods, the direct 
and opportunity costs of pursuing certain health/health care goals have to be weighed against 
policies involving other goods that also contribute to equality of opportunity or capabilities.  
For example, the political and economic capital expenditures required to expand health care 
coverage in contemporary America have to be considered against gains in equality obtained 
through other mechanisms like increasing differential tax gradients or expanding education 
programs.  This is not a criticism of using theories of justice to address health disparities; 
rather, it is a reminder that, where justice is concerned, health is only one variable that 
contributes to (in)equality.28  As such, any theory of justice—including Sen’s and Rawls’—
will make specific recommendations about health care only within the context of distributing 
other goods.        
                                                 
26 The same is not true for most utilitarian philosophers who discuss health disparities.  Within the utilitarian 
system, health only matters insofar as it is an element of another state of affairs (e.g. well-being, absence of 
pain, presence of pleasure) that has value.  In this context health necessarily has non-intrinsic value.  See Stern, 
1983, pp. 339-62.  Savulescu, 2001, pp. 39-41.    
 
27 Ruger suggests that the capabilities approach “values health intrinsically” and criticizes Daniels for treating 
health as a non-intrinsically valuable good.  Ruger, 2004a, pp. 1092-3. 
 
28 The philosophers Sudhir Anand and Fabienne Peter do take this point to be a criticism of Daniels.  Their 
concern is that other aspects of Rawls’ theory will come in conflict with what Daniels sees as the demands of 
the fair equality of opportunity principle with regard to health care.  See Anand and Peter, 2000, pp. 48-52.  
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With these general comments in mind, I want to turn to Daniels’ early discussion of 
justice and health disparities.  I have chosen to focus on Daniels rather than on the political or 
medical debate on these issues because he fully articulates a common way of arguing for 
redistributing health resources.29  He has also worked to refine his theory as new 
epidemiological evidence has become available, a project that will later allow us to examine 
what moves are available when reconsidering the demands of justice in the face of changing 
epidemiological information about health disparities.   
Daniels and Health Care 
In 1985 Daniels published Just Health Care, which was, then, one of the few book-
length treatments of the relationship between justice and health care distribution.  Daniels 
makes two claims: first, a certain subset of health disparities is unjust and, second, we should 
change our institutions to ensure a more equal distribution of health care.  Daniels finds 
support for the first point in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.   It is important, therefore, to 
sketch a brief overview of the Rawlsian framework to explicate Daniels’ starting 
assumptions.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is concerned with the basic structure of social 
institutions that distribute certain types of goods.  In broadest outline, he argues that justice 
as fairness, a conception of justice derived from a contractarian procedure centering on 
hypothetical agreement, generates principles whose application best matches with our 
considered judgments about distributive justice.  Institutions governed by these principles, he 
suggests, would also be plausibly stable if established in a society willing to follow them.   
                                                 
29 The other common approach is simply to assert a right to health care (or, even less coherently, to health) and 
argue that it is inappropriate to treat health care as a commodity where market or ability-to-pay mechanisms 
should determine access.  This approach is unsatisfactory given that rights are not de novo moral entities, 
brought into existence by merely asserting them.  They must be grounded in a framework of principles.  Thus, if 
we are to make sense of rights talk, we must first settle on the appropriate moral principles (e.g. principles of 
distributive justice) and then decide on the existence of subsidiary rights like the right to health care.  See 
Daniels, 1985, pp. 4-9.  For a critique of efforts to ground a right to health care in Rawls’ principles of justice 
see, Flic, 2007, pp. 51-72.  
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Rawls sees the principles of justice needed for determining the fair distribution of 
goods as being generated from an ahisotorical, hypothetical agreement between different 
parties within what he calls the original position.  The original position is, most importantly, 
a device for representing agents as free and equal persons—situated in identical positions of 
power and abstracted from morally irrelevant features—given the goal of understanding the 
substantive results of such a conception.  Some of the most important characteristics of 
agents in the original position include: first, they are behind a veil of ignorance, which 
prevents them from knowing what their place will be in the society ruled by the principles on 
which they agree.  Second, Rawls assumes that they are mutually disinterested with the goal 
of maximizing the amount/number of primary goods for themselves and the generations they 
represent.  Primary goods, as Rawls understands them, fall into four groups: basic rights 
(freedom of speech, assembly, etc.); non-basic rights and prerogatives (especially those 
attached to specific social positions); wealth and income; the social bases of self-respect.  
Third, the contractors are rational in that they have a capacity for a conception of the good, 
which, while it does not have specific content, serves to direct their decisions with respect to 
primary goods.  The primary goods, in turn, are normally useful for pursuing any specific 
conception of the good.  Rationality also implies, according to Rawls, the ability to revise 
one’s conception of the good as well as a commitment to pursuing the necessary means 
toward our ends.  Fourth, Rawls’ contractors are thought to have a capacity for a sense of 
justice (they are “reasonable”), which matters for certain questions concerning institutional 
stability.   
 Given this set of conditions—first, an idea of persons as mutually disinterested with a 
capacity for a sense of justice, a capacity for a conception of the good, and the goal of 
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maximizing their share of primary goods; second, a position in which participants are veiled 
from knowing what place they will occupy in the resulting society—Rawls considers what 
principles for the distribution of primary goods would emerge.  He suggests two, with a 
lexical ordering such that the second does not come into play until the first has been satisfied 
(excepting certain conditions in which there are not enough resources).  The first is the 
liberty principle: each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights 
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all.  The second is the 
equality of fair opportunity/difference principle: social and economic inequalities are 
permissible so long as, first, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of equal opportunity and, second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged.  There is also a lexical ordering between the two parts of this principle. 
 Rawls’ conception of justice is explicitly tailored to set aside issues of health and 
health care, at least at the level of the highest principles.  Partly, this is because he thought of 
health as a natural—as opposed to social primary good—which has different implications for 
its distribution.  Rawls writes, “health and vigor, intelligence and imagination are natural 
goods; although their possession is influenced by the basic structure [of institutions], they are 
not so directly under its control.”30  While Rawls acknowledges the importance of health in 
the pursuit of a conception of the good, because social institutions at best indirectly influence 
its distribution, health was not a focus of his account, at least compared to the social primary 
goods.  As the economist Robert Sugden notes, within the Rawlsian framework, “what has to 
be distributed justly—or fairly—are the benefits and burdens of social cooperation . . . as 
natural primary goods are not the product of social cooperation, the question of whether they 
                                                 
30 Rawls, 1999, p. 54. 
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are distributed fairly or unfairly does not arise within a theory of fair cooperation.”31  In later 
writings, Rawls was concerned that focusing on individuals with poor health or disability 
might “distract our moral perception by leading us to think of people distant from us whose 
fate arouses pity and anxiety.”32  Rawls goes on to suggest that we postpone questions 
involving, for example, special health needs until we address certain higher-order questions 
concerning the principles of justice.33   
For his initial purposes, then, Rawls thought of the contractors as a healthy population 
without disease or significant disability.  The concern with this simplifying assumption, 
however, is that differences in health in our world translate into differences in equality of 
opportunity, even when the other primary goods are distributed fairly.  Or, to put it a 
different way, in ignoring health in constructing his principles of justice, Rawls’ runs the risk 
of generating a theory that fails to account for a central injustice, health disparities.34  The 
most obvious solution to this problem—include health or health care to the list of primary 
goods—has been subject to a number of criticisms, most importantly from the economist 
Kenneth Arrow.35 
 First, Arrow points out that, since the difference principle requires that inequalities in 
primary goods work to the advantage of the worst-off, very sick individuals with chronic 
diseases would be entitled to the resources necessary to keep them alive, even if doing so 
represented a great cost to the interests of others.  This is the problem of the so-called “health 
                                                 
31 Sugden, 1993, p. 1957. 
 
32 Rawls, 1975, p. 96.  
 
33 See Sen, 1982, pp. 367-8. 
 
34 For an extensive development of this criticism, see Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 15-34. 
 
35 Arrow, 1973, pp. 251-4.  For a defense of health care as a primary good see Green, 1976, pp. 111-26 and 
Green, 2001, pp. 22-3.  
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care sinkhole.”36 Second, Arrow argues that any attempt to draw a line in the amount of 
health care to provide would require weighing health against the distribution of other primary 
goods (wealth, income, etc.), necessitating interpersonal comparisons of utility, which Rawls 
hoped to avoid.  A number of responses have been made to Arrow’s second point, and, since 
it rests more on the fact that the list of primary goods contains multiple items and less on any 
specific problem with adding health, it is less relevant to the discussion here.37  Arrow is, 
however, right to insist that, no matter how important health is to our overall well-being, 
adding it directly into the theory as a resource for distribution creates unnecessary problems 
for the Rawlsian approach.  One of Daniels’ central aims in Just Health Care is to 
incorporate health and health care at a different level of Rawls’ framework.       
 Daniels begins his account by distinguishing a certain set of needs that should 
receive priority in any distributory scheme involving social goods.  Such needs must meet 
two criteria: first, they must be objective ascribable in that they are true of an individual even 
if she refuses to recognize them.  For example, it may be true of me that I need cholesterol-
lowering medicine even if I explicitly deny it or have a strong preference to not take such 
medicine.  The second characteristic of Daniels’ privileged needs is that they are objectively 
important—“we attach a special weight to claims based on them in a variety of moral 
contexts.”38  In cashing out this criterion, Daniels rejects a definition of importance whereby 
prioritized needs are those that are required to achieve our specific goals (i.e. things we need 
no matter what else we need).  Instead, he suggests that objectively important needs are those 
required to maintain normal species function over time.  Species typical functioning, in turn, 
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38 Daniels, 1985, p. 25. 
 16
is defined in terms of an evolutionary account of the “design” of human beings including 
facts about our physiology as well as our “acquisition of knowledge, linguistic 
communication, and social cooperation in the broad and changing range of environments in 
which we live.”39 
Daniels’ argument, then, is that those resources necessary for species typical 
functioning ought to be thought of as distinct from other sorts of goods, especially ones 
whose distribution we leave largely in the hands of free-market structures.  What identifies 
these resources as different is that “impairments of normal species functioning reduce the 
range of opportunity open to the individual in which he may construct his ‘plan of life’ or 
‘conception of the good.’”40  Life plans—an idea that Daniels adapts from Rawls—represent 
goals around which we schedule our behavior so as to satisfy a certain range or even all of 
our desires.  When our normal species function is impaired, we are denied the opportunity to 
pursue certain life plans to which we would otherwise be suited.  In other words, restrictions 
in normal species function curtail the normal opportunity range available to us within our 
specific social situation.   
At this point, Daniels and Rawls begin to dovetail.  Recall that Rawls’ fair equality of 
opportunity principle requires institutions to distribute goods in such a way that the 
occupations to which these goods attach are open under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.  As Daniels interprets this principle, its primary purpose is to minimize the 
effects that fortunate accidents of birth have in shaping individual opportunity.  Such 
“natural” advantages include the set of social conditions into which one is born—being a 
White Afrikaan in 1970s South Africa or being a member of the royal family in 17th century 
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40 Daniels, 1985, p. 27. 
 17
Spain—as well as certain genetic facts—one’s height or number of fast-twitch muscle fibers.  
It is not enough, in this regard, to eliminate selection processes that are based solely on, for 
example, race, ethnicity, or gender so as to remove barriers from equal opportunity 
employment.  Adopting such a negative constraint would only meet what Rawls calls formal 
equality of opportunity.  Rather, we are also obligated to adopt institutional arrangements 
that redistribute resources like education, wealth, and income in such a way as to counter the 
disadvantage that social/genetic factors like race, class, family, or physiology can produce in 
a given context.  As Daniels points out, the fair equality of opportunity account does not 
require institutions to level all differences between persons or even to give everyone equal 
shares in the normal opportunity range.  Rather, wherever possible we are to allocate 
resources so as to guarantee that “all persons are equally spared certain kinds of impediments 
to opportunity.”41  Any consequent inequalities based on differences in, for example, talents 
or skills are permissible within the constraints of the difference principle.  That is, 
inequalities that arise from variations in talents or motivations—assuming fair equality of 
opportunity—are permissible within the Rawlsian framework so long as they work to the 
advantage of the least well off. 
Given this account of fair equality of opportunity, if a specific subset of goods is 
necessary to have a chance at achieving certain positions, then they must be made universally 
available within the constraints of the liberty principle.  All that remains to complete Daniels’ 
argument is to establish health care resources as belonging to this special subset of goods.  
He does so by defining health as “the absence of disease,” and disease as “deviations from 
                                                 
41 Daniels, 1985, p. 52. 
 
 18
the natural functional organization of a typical member of a species.”42  Thus diseases impair 
normal species functioning, which, in turn, Daniels argues, limits the range of opportunity.  
Since health is best secured through adequate health care resources, these goods should be 
distributed in such a way as to restore conditions of fair equality of opportunity.  As with 
limitations in our space of opportunity due to racism or classism, fair equality of opportunity 
requires us to restore or prevent disease-caused impairments in normal species function.  
Doing so helps to ensure that we are given the opportunity to pursue certain life plans to 
which we would otherwise be denied because of ill health.   
To summarize: based on the Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity principle and an 
account of the importance of a certain set of goods—which includes health care resources—
for equal opportunity to pursue a life plan within a specific social context, Daniels argues that 
health care ought to be distributed in such a way so as to reduce the unequal burden of 
disease.  Doing so will prevent differences in normal species functioning (i.e. differences in 
health) from being translated into inequality of opportunity.  As already mentioned, he 
concludes that we have an obligation to design institutions that provide universal access to 
appropriate health care, where that includes chronic- and acute-care medicine as well as 
preventative and public health services.   
Criticisms 
 There are three principle areas where critics have pressed Daniels’ argument.  From 
narrowest to broadest they include: Daniels’ definition of disease, his account of equality of 
opportunity, and his use of the Rawlsian framework.  First, Daniels relies on his definition of 
disease along with the assumption about the connection between diseases and health 
resources to place health care goods in a special category for distributive purposes.  Because 
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his account of disease plays such a critical role, it is worth pausing to note just how 
controversial it is.  Daniels understands disease based on the ‘biomedical’ model offered by 
Boorse in a series of articles written in the 1970s and refined subsequently.43  The problem 
with any of these strictly scientific approaches is that they ignore (or, more charitably, 
deemphasize) what many have come to see as an essential component of diseases; namely, 
their evaluative aspects.44  Part of what makes something a disease, the argument goes, is 
that it is an unwanted or undesirable state viewed either in terms of a social or personal 
ju nt. 
 This is not an appropriate venue for taking on the vast and quagmireish literatur
has sprung up around various definitions of diseases, including Daniels’.
dgme
e that 
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of function that does not depend on evaluative judgments, a goal that has also frustrated 
                                                
45  Part of the 
problem is that the whole enterprise seems to be an ill-conceived application of ordinary-
language philosophy where necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept ‘disease’ are
plotted out by repeated rounds of example and counterexample.  At best, this approach has 
revealed our intuitions about what sorts of things are diseases to be immature and confused.  
Assuming, however, that Daniels can defend his strictly scientific approach to disease, and
is hard to imagine anyone still willing to take on that task, there are other problems in his 
definition.  He will, for a start, owe us an account of what it is to be a member of a species, 
no small project considering the ongoing controversy in philosophy of biology as to whether 
there are even such natural kinds as species.  In addition, he will have to generate an acco
 
43 See, for example, Boorse, 1975, pp. 49-68. Boorse, 1977, pp. 542-73. 
 
44 Wakefield, 1992, pp. 373-87. Devito, 2000, pp. 539-67. 
 
45 For an excellent summary, see Peterson, 2001.  
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philosophers of biology.46  Finally, he will have to address a host of questions about the 
relationship between the treatment of disease to restore species typical function versus 
enhancing that function.47 
 These problems are not limited to Daniels’ original work.  In his most recent 
reevaluations of his position, which I will discuss later in more detail, the concept of disease 
still plays an essential role and still looks much the same.  He writes, “Disease and disability, 
both physical and mental, are construed as adverse departures from or impairments of 
species-typical functional organization or ‘normal functioning,’ for short.”48  Whether or not 
Daniels can support this claim, several of his critics have taken its implausibility to be prima 
facie evidence against the position.49    
 The second criticism of Daniels’ project concerns his interpretation of equality of 
opportunity.  An early critique by Allan Buchanan ascribed to Daniels the position that we 
should allocate social resources so as to guarantee the normal opportunity range within a 
social system, regardless of an individual’s skills or talents.50  The worry was that equality of 
opportunity either requires us to bring everyone down to the skill/talent level of the lowest 
member or devote excessive resources toward bringing the most untalented up to everyone 
else.  As I have already indicated, however, Daniels’ extension of the equality of opportunity 
principle applies only to certain impediments to opportunity; namely, the way that disease 
(or poor health) limits normal species functioning, reducing an individual’s normal 
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47 Daniels, 2001, p. 5. Savulescu, 2001, pp. 39-41.    
 
48 Daniels, 2001, p. 3 fn1. 
 
49 Savulescu, 2001, pp. 40-1.  Schaffner, 2001, pp. 26-7. 
 
50 See Buchanan’s discussion of “Principle D” in Buchanan, 1984, pp. 55-78. 
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opportunity range.  Being untalented is compatible with having perfectly typical species 
function; in fact, it is the condition in which most of us find ourselves.  Similarly, it would be 
difficult to argue that unskilled laborers are species atypical or that individuals with ho-hum 
motivational states are malfunctioning from an evolutionary perspective.  To a certain extent, 
this challenge returns to the question of whether being untalented is a kind of disease on 
Daniels’ definition, but on a reasonable interpretation of that view, the impact of talents, 
motivations, or skills fall outside of his purview.  Such characteristics, although they impact 
opportunity, are not, according to Daniels, the proper subject of redistributive aims.  
More recently, Francis Kamm has challenged Daniels’ interpretation of equality of 
opportunity and its utility in addressing health disparities.  Although some of her concerns 
are about the lexical ordering of the equality of opportunity and difference principles—a 
discussion too far a field for the purposes of this chapter—her primary question is whether 
ensuring normal species function (or health) is necessary for equality of opportunity.51  
Kamm begins by arguing that Daniels’ position is compatible with a social system that 
guaranteed equal unhealth to all its citizens; that is, even if everyone had the same range of 
poor species function, they would still satisfy the requirements of equality of opportunity.  If 
this is true, then, using equality of opportunity as a standard, we should be indifferent 
between social arrangements in which citizens are guaranteed equal health or unhealth.  But, 
Kamm argues, our intuitions about justice suggest that the former is preferable.  Insofar as 
Daniels’ account fails to meet this expectation, it shows the inability of equality of 
opportunity to adequately address health disparities. 
 The problem with Kamm’s argument is that it misplaces the reason why health 
matters within Daniels’ scheme.  As the discussion of Buchanan’s “leveling down” objection 
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illustrates, Daniels’ concern is with whether institutions should allow certain factors to 
influence our ability to pursue life plans.  Ideally for Daniels—and Rawls, as Daniels 
understands him—our skills, talents, and motivations determine the kind of person we 
become, not discriminatory practices in hiring or education (as would exist without formal 
equality of opportunity) or the absence of compensatory redistributions for certain kinds of 
historical discrimination (as would exist without fair equality of opportunity).  The argument 
is that equality of opportunity is established when ill health (among other variables) ceases to 
be an impediment to our normal range of species function, a standard based on our 
membership in a certain natural kind, not our specific social context.  In a society bent on 
egalitarian unhealth, we would all be equally unable to secure that range because we were not 
functioning within our normal species range.  This is, however, not the same thing as having 
equality of opportunity.  Rather, Daniels’ account would require us to redistribute health care 
resources so as to ensure—as far as possible and consistent with the liberty principle—that 
the citizens of that society enjoy the same range of species typical function.  Or, to put the 
point slightly differently, equally absent from disease.         
 Third, a number of philosophers have challenged the appropriateness of the Rawlsian 
framework for addressing health disparities.  These have included communitarians, who have 
argued for distribution schemes based on shared local values,52 libertarians, who focus on 
free-market mechanisms to satisfy preferences for varying degrees of health care,53 and 
Aristotelians, who emphasize the importance of virtues outside of justice in confronting 
inequalities.54  The most persistent objection to Daniels’ project, however, has come from 
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philosophical proponents of the “decent minimum” approach to health care.  Several authors 
have thought that the chief aim of health care ethics should be to articulate and defend a right 
to a decent minimum of medical care rather than examine the effects that health has on a 
condition like equality of opportunity.55  Daniels, in contrast, explicitly denies that his 
argument establishes a universal right to health care, at a minimal level or otherwise.56   
Allen Buchanan offers three reasons why we should prefer the decent minimum 
approach.  First, a decent minimum of health care is society relative; that is, the 
demandingness of the right varies with the resources available in a specific social context.  
This allows the content of the right to be determined depending on the environment in which 
it is established.57  Second, a decent minimum avoids the problem of trying to guarantee 
access to the best health care available.  It assures a certain level of health services but allows 
citizens to purchase care given their preferences.  Third, the idea of a decent minimum 
encompasses enough health care to support a tolerable life within one’s specific social 
context.  To this list, we might also add a political consideration; namely, rights to health or 
health care are entrenched in popular discourse through documents like the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights.  A defense of a decent minimum of health care would be able 
to draw on this background in generating support for its practical realization.58 
The two primary arguments for a right to a decent minimum have come from 
utilitarians like Julian Savulescu, and from Buchanan, who has offered a pluralistic approach 
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to deriving the right.  Savulescu’s arguments turn on his contention that the goal of medical 
services is well-being and not to cure disease or promote health (normal species functioning) 
as Daniels and others have thought.  Health care is important because it is necessary to 
achieve a minimally decent life (i.e. one with a certain level of well-being).  Given the 
centrality of health and health care for our well-being, Savulescu argues, medical resources 
should be distributed so as to ensure that the maximum number of people have a decent 
minimum of care.  To put this idea in more traditional utilitarian terms, we should allocate 
health care resources so as to maximize the number of people who enjoy a decent level of 
well-being.  Further differences in well-being are tolerated, on Savulescu’s view, so long as 
they do not interfere with maximizing the decent minimum.    
There are two primary problems with this account.  First, Savulescu confuses an 
outcome of medicine—it promotes well-being—with its goal.  If the purpose of medicine 
were to advance patient well-being, then doctors would be obligated, among other things, to 
find dates for their patients.  This is too expansive.  Even if we accept that the goal of 
medicine is not to cure disease, it must be more circumscribed than Savulescu acknowledges 
to avoid collapsing the distinction between health care and other services.  A more 
sophisticated account might argue that the purpose of medicine is to promote patient well-
being over a certain range of hindrances (i.e. diseases) although I suspect that this will bring 
us uncomfortably close to Daniels’ position.  If the hindrances in question are those that 
inhibit species typical functioning, then the only difference between the accounts will be 
Daniels’ focus on the ability to pursue one’s life plan versus Savulescu’s focus on procuring 
a life of minimally decent well-being. 
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A separate worry with Savulescu’s account is that it fails to support a universal right 
to a decent minimum.  Given that the goal of his account is to maximize the number of 
people who enjoy a decent level of care, this leaves open the possibility that not all citizens 
will have this minimum.  This is a specific instance of a more general problem with 
utilitarian derivations of rights; namely, they cannot account for the fact that rights seem to 
exist, in part, to protect us from certain utilitarian calculations.  If an individual has a right to 
a decent minimum of health care, this is commonly thought to entail that his health care 
ought not to be sacrificed for the sake of establishing a decent minimum for some larger 
aggregate of others.  The force of this criticism largely depends on how committed Savulescu 
is to the language of rights; his project is still coherent without the attempt to derive a right to 
a decent minimum of health care and he articulates it, in at least some places, without 
explicitly doing so.59      
Allen Buchanan rejects Rawlsian and utilitarian approaches to justifying a decent 
minimum in favor of grounding the right in a collection of distinct principles.60  First, under 
the principle of reparation, he notes that some groups (African Americans, Native 
Americans) are due a decent minimum of health care because of past harms/injustices.  
Individuals who have been harmed by the government or corporations may be similarly owed 
health care along with individuals, including soldiers, who have made sacrifices for the 
general social welfare.  Under the principle of preventing harm, Buchanan argues that 
traditional public health services ought to be universally available as a corrective for the 
harms (e.g. poor sanitation and infectious disease) that occur when groups of people live 
together.  Under a principle of prudence, Buchanan notes that it is in the interests of a social 
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system to have more productive citizens, both for economic and defense purposes, and that a 
decent minimum of health care is important for such a goal.  Finally, Buchanan notes that, if 
we consider health care to be a public good, a principle of enforced beneficence would be 
justified to introduce taxation with the goal of providing a decent minimum of care for all 
citizens.   
Putting aside the question of whether health care is a public good, whether it is 
actually in the economic interests of a social system to provide a decent minimum of health 
care, and the conditions under which it is permissible for states to enforce moral duties of 
beneficence, the most general problem with Buchanan’s approach is its mixed derivation.  He 
employs a selection of principles that include both negative and positive duties—obligations 
not to interfere/harm and to help/benefit, respectively—where the former are traditionally 
understood to be stronger than the later.  Given limited medical resources, we require a 
prioritization scheme between various citizens whose rights are derived within different 
contexts.  For example, if a limited resource is necessary for a minimally decent life—for 
example, neonatal erythromycin eye drops to prevent vertically-transmitted, Chlamydia 
trachomatis-associated blindness—should it go to the children of soldiers or to those who 
contribute to the enforced beneficence scheme?  By deriving the right to a minimum of care 
from multiple sources, Buchanan will have to supplement his account with a weighing 
mechanisms for when the demands of his subsidiary principles conflict.  This may be 
achieved, but it complicates both the philosophical and practical picture significantly.  All 
else being equal, a position with a single starting place—like Daniels’—may be preferred, 
even if it means leaving behind the decent minimum framework.   
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Despite these objections to his approach, Daniels’ account has remained a touchstone 
for the philosophical debate over the requirements of justice in addressing health disparities.  
In 2001, however, he offered a modified version of his position in the article “Justice, Health, 
and Healthcare,” which was subsequently expanded into a new book on the topic, Just 
Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly.  The impetus for his revisions was not any definitive 
argument against the Rawlsian approach; rather, developments in the epidemiology of health 
disparities had called into question the relationship between access to medical care and the 
persistence of health inequalities.  In order to understand and assess Daniels’ revised 
position, it is necessary to review this epidemiological research, a task to which I turn in the 
next chapter. 
Chapter III: The Social Determinants of Health 
 I began the last chapter with a discussion of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) and recent Congressional efforts to increase the number of enrollees.  
Opposition to SCIP expansion focused on whether it represented a step toward government-
funded universal health care and, if so, whether that was an appropriate role for the state to 
take.  Daniels, we can surmise, would support such a move.  The SCHIP program seems 
designed to promote equality of opportunity by providing American children from low-
income families similar access to health care as their higher-income counterparts.  Critics of 
the program, however, contended that health care access should be determined within a free 
market system even if that means some individuals would be without insurance.  The central 
question in the debate was whether it was fair for government institutions to redistribute 
resources in the form of tax dollars so as to provide another good—health care—to people 
with less resources.  Few commentators, however, asked what the expected impact of the 
SCHIP expansion would be on the health burdens that American children from low-income 
families face later in life. 
One of the central questions in recent public health research has been whether 
inequalities in access to medical care drive health disparities.  The implementation of 
universal health care programs, particularly in Europe, has created a kind of social 
experiment to evaluate changes in health disparities with more equal medical access.  
Research in this area has suggested that there are a number of factors that contribute to health  
disparities beyond access to care.  These include health behavior; absolute, relative, and 
overall distribution of income; genetic differences in disease susceptibility; available 
social capital; and racism, classism, and other -isms.  In this section I want to review 
some of the data concerning the broader determinants of health.   
Let me begin with a few notes about the research on which I am focusing.  First, 
the disparities that concern me are those that occur in the developed world.  There is no 
question about the importance of access to health care and adequate public health 
measures in the developing world.  I will argue, however, that, beyond a certain point, 
access to health care ceases to drive disparities when compared with broader social 
determinants.  Thus, while improved (or any) public health or health care would 
dramatically influence the health disparities between the world’s richest and poorest 
nations, the effect on the difference between the uninsured and the insured in, for 
example, the United States would be much less significant. 
Second, I will generally focus on studies whose emphasis is on all-cause 
mortality rather than inequalities in specific diseases, which often have unique 
explanations for why they are more common among certain groups.  For example, the 
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT) reports that men from higher income 
areas have an increased relative risk of dying in flying accidents compared to lower-
income men.61  This is not surprising given that air travel is an expensive undertaking 
and itself follows an income gradient.  In contrast, the relative risk of developing stomach 
cancer for low-employment-grade Britains approaches twice that of the upper grades.62  
The primary etiological agent of stomach cancer—Helicobacter pylori—is acquired more 
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frequently and earlier in life among lower-grade families, which largely explain the 
differential rate of this disease.   
Focusing on trends in all-cause mortality helps to wash out the differences that air 
travel or H. pylori infection produce, allowing us to consider the broader patterns of 
health inequalities.  One exception to this general point is coronary heart disease (CHD or 
CAD).  In addition to being a leading cause of mortality in the United States and world-
wide, there are known physiologic risk factors (smoking, dyslipidemia, hypertension, 
family history, age, and diabetes) and medical interventions (medication, stenting, 
bypass, etc.).  This means that CHD is an ideal target for assessing the role that 
expanding access to care—in terms of public health measures designed to address 
modifiable risk factors as well as traditional medical care in the form of pharmacologic 
and surgical interventions—has on inequalities in the incidence, prevalence, morbidity, 
and mortality from the disease.  
Third, my main focus will be on the Whitehall I and II studies in Great Britain 
and similar studies in the United States, where available.  The Whitehall studies, which 
were conducted on members of the British civil service, are notable in several respects: 
first, they were large-scale, prospective, and longitudinal, with Whitehall I following over 
10,000 men for a decade and Whitehall II following over 10,000 men and women for 
eleven years.  Second, the population investigated had universal access to medical care 
through the United Kingdom’s National Health Insurance.  Third, participants were 
essentially pre-stratified by education and income in virtue of their position (grade) in the 
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civil service structure.63  Finally, data from these studies have shown that health 
inequalities correlate with the civil service hierarchy such that any given individual has, 
on average, better health than someone immediately below him in the hierarchy and 
worse health than a person just above.  In other words, while there is a marked difference 
in health between the top and the bottom—between the haves and have-nots—there is 
also a step-wise gradient in health for all levels in between.  Absolute deprivation may 
translate into poor health, but so does relative deprivation compared to other social 
groups.  Evidence exists for a social gradient in health in a number of countries, including 
places thought to be more broadly egalitarian than Great Britain, such as the United 
States.64  All of these factors make the Whitehall studies an important tool for analyzing 
the relative impact of conditions outside of access to medical care on health. 
Finally, a few comments about the statistics found in this chapter.  In general, I 
will be relying on data that report relative risk of disease and mortality for different 
members of the socioeconomic strata.  One caveat on relative mortality risk, which is the 
ratio of the incidence of death in a population exposed to a risk factor (e.g. lacking health 
insurance) to incidence of death in an unexposed population (e.g. having health 
insurance): it is usually important to also know the absolute risk of death for the overall 
population.  If the absolute risk (or the incidence) is low, then the relative risk measures 
may not reflect a substantive clinical difference.  For example, a 289% increase relative 
risk of death may sound impressive unless it really translates, in the context of a very low 
                                                 
63 Of the five social classes, Grade I includes professionals; Grade II, managerial and technical occupations; 
Grade III, skilled manual and non-manual occupations; Grade IV, partly-skilled occupations; Grade V, 
unskilled workers. 
 
64 See, for example, McLeod and Kessler, 1990, pp. 162-72.  Marmot and Smith, 1989, pp. 1547-51.  
Kawachi, et al., 1999. 
 32
absolute risk, into 289 less seconds of life.  Information on the absolute risk of death for 
various diseases in different countries can be found through the World Health 
Organization.  I will not be reporting 95% confidence intervals along with relative risk; 
that information is generally available in the primary sources.  Finally, this chapter is not 
intended as a formal review paper or meta-analysis of the broader determinants of heath.  
I have no explicit search strategy or methodological criteria for included some papers and 
not others, although I have tried to rely on peer-reviewed, anthologized studies.  My goal 
is to give an overall impression of the current state of research in this area. 
Access to Health Care 
Let me begin, then, with data on the relationship between increased access to care 
and the reduction of health disparities.65  There are three lines of evidence that universal 
access to medical care is inadequate to address health disparities.  First, disparities persist 
in countries that adopt even the most generous government-sponsored medical coverage.  
For example, research on relative differences in mortality between non-manual and 
manual male workers ages 45-65 in various European countries has shown that, despite 
extensive health coverage networks, manual workers in the Nordic countries have 
between a 1.33 and 1.52 increased relative risk of death compared to non-manual 
workers. 66 Furthermore, Finland has a higher relative inequality in death rates between 
manual and non-manual workers (relative risk 1.52) than countries like England and 
Wales (relative risk 1.45) that have a less extensive national health service.  European 
health disparities—and not just in mortality but in all-cause morbidity and self-reported 
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health as well—reappear when different indicators for socioeconomic status besides 
occupation are used, including income, housing and unemployment rates, and 
education.67  Morbidity data consistently show similar degrees of relative health 
disparities throughout Europe, regardless of health care system.  Countries that enact 
legislation expanding health care access across their populations continue to have marked 
health inequalities.  Even Japan, which has an expansive health care system and whose 
citizens enjoy one of the highest age-adjusted life expectancy on Earth, has a significant 
degree of health inequality.  The lowest income class is 1.54 times more likely to report 
poor health compared to the highest class; the second lowest, 1.22 times.68 
Second, health gradients in Western European countries are as steep as or steeper 
than those in countries with less extensive coverage, like the United States or Russia.  For 
example, a cross-sectional study comparing the relative risk of death from heart disease 
in men in manual versus non-manual occupations showed a relative risk of 1.50 for 
English men between the ages of 45-59 and 1.25 for American men in the same age 
group.69  In other words the relative morality rate from ischemic heart disease in these 
populations was twice as high in Britain—which had universal health care access—as in 
the United States.  Similar differences in relative risk of death have also been identified in 
post-Soviet Russia, which is somewhere in between the United States and Britain with 
regard to medical coverage within its health care system.  For example, Russian men age 
25-64 who have only completed primary school are 1.23 times more likely to die from 
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68 Shibuya et al., 2002, pp. 16-9. 
 
69 Kunst, et al., 1999, pp. 47-53. 
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cardiovascular disease than university educated men, adjusting for age, smoking, total 
cholesterol, systolic blood pressure, frequency of drinking, and body mass index.70  
Similar disparities have been reported for Russian men of lower compared to higher 
income.71  These data suggest that health disparities are as significant in countries 
without universal health care as in those with such systems.72   
73.2.76  In the United States, it increased from 70.0 to 72.3.77  Given similar 
                                                
Third, inequalities in all-cause mortality have also increased over time—despite 
overall improvements in population health—in countries with universal health service 
like the United Kingdom.  Between 1972 and 1992 the difference in male age-adjusted 
life expectancy between the highest and lowest social classes in England and Wales 
increased from 5.5 years to 9.5 years.73  Between 1990 and 1999, the British relative 
index of inequality—the relative mortality rate of the (hypothetically) poorest person 
compared to that of the (hypothetically) richest one—increased from 1.68 to 1.85.74  In 
the United States, between the years 1960 and 1986 the difference in mortality between 
the most and least educated men ages 25-64 doubled.75  From the years 1980-1992, the 
overall male age-adjusted life expectancy at birth in Britain increased from 70.8 to 
 
70 Malyutina, et al., 2004, pp. 244-9. 
 
71 Nicholson, et al., 2005, pp. 2345-54. 
 
72 There is a separate question as to whether universal access to health care is important for better absolute 
population health (i.e. age-adjusted life expectancy of the population as a whole), which may improve even 
while the degree of health inequality stays constant.  See the Black Report, 1992. 
 
73 Drever and Whitehead, 1997: pp. 1-257.  
 
74 Smith, et al., 2002, pp. 434-5.  Part of the explanation for the widening gap may have to do with 
increased smoking cessation in the highest classes compared to the lowest during this time period.   
 
75 Pappas, et al., 1993, pp. 103-9. 
 
76 National Statistics Online. Great Britain, 2007.  
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improvements in British and American population health and similar rates of expansio
in disparities in all cause mortality, it is difficult to conclude that the universal health care 
available in Great Britain has served as a corrective to the growth of health disparities. 
It is important, however, not to overstate the case against expa
n 
nding access to 
care.  F
s for some 
er 
e 
 
 
 
despite identical coverage under the same single-payer health system.81   
                                                                                                                                                
irst, there are data to suggest that regional expansions of health 
insurance/coverage translate into modest reductions in health inequalitie
diseases.78  For example, Federal and state broadening of Medicaid programs to cov
antiretroviral therapy for low-income HIV patients has been credited with decreasing th
rate of AIDS-associated opportunistic infections.79  The key point, however, is that, 
contrary to the aim of most American political efforts in this area, merely expanding 
health care access will not alleviate health inequalities, nor will it prevent them from 
worsening.80  In this regard, however, we should be careful not to confuse access with
utilization, especially since persons with poor health prior to the expansion of coverage
may be in a worse position to take advantage of it.  For example, low socioeconomic 
status Canadians are less likely to use specialist services than those with higher status,
 
77 National Center for Health Statistics, 2002. 
 
-7. 
on of health care can create incentives for poor health 
ehavior (so-called moral hazards) such that people may take up risky or imprudent behaviors once they 
n 
cant 
ors 
78 Veugelers and Yip, 2003, pp. 424-8. 
 
79 Center for Disease Control. 1997, pp. 861
 
80 Geoff Brennan has suggested that the expansi
b
are guaranteed medical care.  If poorer, less educated individuals were more likely to act on these 
incentives then it would appear that health disparities persist in the face of equal access to health care eve
though expanding access—considered independently of its effects on moral hazards—has a signifi
impact on these disparities.  This should be kept open as a theoretical possibility, although it is difficult to 
argue that individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum would take up poor health behavi
so as to exactly balance (or somewhat worsen) health disparities that would have otherwise decreased.   
81 Veugelers and Yip, 2003, pp. 424-8. 
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In this case, the persistence of health disparities even in the face of adequate 
access to care might be explained because of different preferences or abilities to receive 
that car
rts, but 
 
nd the 
poor in
h care 
ess 
                                                
e.  Data from the Whitehall II study, however, suggest that South Asian 
(predominately Indian) civil servants receive more cardiovascular care (in the form of 
resting electrocardiograms and coronary angioplasty) than their white counterpa
are still at a two-fold higher risk of coronary-related morbidity and mortality.82  Other 
studies concerning health-seeking behavior among British South Indians report that they
are more likely to seek care for (hypothetical) anginal symptoms than whites.83   
There is also a question regarding the quality of care low status individuals 
receive.  A commonly-cited Institute of Medicine study suggests that minorities a
 the United States who have access to care receive worse chronic and acute 
disease treatment as well as lower-quality diagnostic care.84  This effect persists when 
adjusting for disease severity, patient age and gender, type of health system in whic
was received, co-morbid disease, and type of insurance/payment for care.  Thus, even 
within a universal health care framework, some patients may receive worse care than 
others, which could also explain the persistence of health disparities.  Although the 
utilization and quality of care data are limited in scope, the points about expanding acc
are still highly relevant.85 
 
82 Britton, 2004, p. 318.  
 
83 Chaturvedi, et al., 1997, pp.1578-83. 
 Institute of Medicine Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
o American College of Cardiology Foundation, 2002.  
portant to note that, even if expanding access to health care did, in fact, significantly reduce health 
 insofar as they determined the willingness of a society to provide 
qual access to care in the first place, might still deserve moral attention.  For example, Kawachi and 
al, 
lth.  If this is right, 
 
84
Health Care, 2001. See als
85 It is im
disparities, other socioeconomic factors,
e
Kennedy, 1999, pp. 215-27 have argued that relative income inequality erodes social cohesion and capit
which affects the willingness of countries to introduce safety nets in areas like hea
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Health Behavior   
An alternative explanation for health disparities other than differential access to 
ior.  Former Senator William Frist, a physician, writes, in the context 
of racia
e 
ely 
part 
choices—for example, by smoking or refusing to take exercise—then it is difficult to 
nt that society has to pick 
up the costs of such choices, there may still be a case for trying to change the 
made, the complex factors that lead the poor to persist in these behaviors, and the 
        
care is health behav
l and class health inequalities, “[patients] must stop smoking, eat right, exercise, 
take their medication, and monitor their blood sugar, based on their own volition and 
usually outside of the clinical setting.  Public policies must encourage patients to embrac
personal responsibility.”86  As Senator Frist correctly points out, the poor are more lik
to lead a sedentary lifestyle, to be obese, to smoke regularly, to be regularly drunk, and to 
use illicit drugs than the middle-class and wealthy.87  They also have a worse diet.  
Should we be surprised, given this accumulation of risk factors for disease, that they have 
worse health?  Data like these are cited in a number of contexts, most commonly as 
of an argument that, because poor health behavior is a matter of personal choice, 
correcting the resulting disease disparities is an inappropriate target for social resources.  
For example, Rudolf Klein, a British political scientist, writes: 
“If differences in health status are the result of individuals making autonomous 
argue that this can be described as inequitable.  To the exte
behaviour of those individuals, but it cannot be argued on equity grounds.”88 
 
Putting aside the issue of the social and genetic context in which these choices are 
philosophical relationship between desert, responsibility, and the distribution of social 
                                                                                                                                         
age.    
999, p. 240-255. 
 Klein, 2000, p. 569. 
regardless of that policy’s specific effect on health disparities, we might have an obligation to redistribute 
income so as to make it more likely that our social system would take steps to provide universal cover
 
86 Frist, 2005, p. 447. 
 
87 Jarvis and Wardle, 1
88
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reso ute to 
health disparities.  For example, the Whitehall I study indicates that, while higher 
employment grades have lower mortality from coronary heart disease (CHD), this effect 
persists, although not as dramatically, when controlling for the chief risk factors for CHD 
(relative risk of 1.77 between the lowest and highest grades).  Taking plasma cholesterol 
concentration, blood sugar, systolic blood pressure, height, and smoking into account, the 
lower employment grades have a 50% higher mortality rate from CHD (relative risk of 
1.50, reduced from 1.77) than those at the highest employment grade.   Almost two-
thirds of the difference in mortality between the highest and lowest employment grades 
remains unaccounted for when the above factors are controlled.    
The British Regional Heart Study (BRHS) reported a less significant residual 
disparity in age-adjusted CHD between manual and non-manual class men—20% or a 
relative risk of 1.20—after controlling for cardiac risk factors including blood 
cholesterol, blood pressure, body mass index, cigarette smoking, alcohol, physical
activity, height, and lung function.   Among the explanations for the different residual 
relative risks (1.50 vs 1.20) between the BRHS and Whitehall studies is that the latter 
used a more finely-graded hierarchy, which allowed them to further identify CHD 
disparities among non-manual workers, producing a higher relative risk from top to 
bottom.  In both cases, however, a significant difference in mortality was due to factors 
                                                
urces, there is still a question as to how much health behaviors actually contrib
89
90
91
  
92
 
89 Van Rossum, et al., 2000, pp. 178-84. 
 
 Emberson, et al., 2004, pp. 289-96. Coronary heart disease was defined in this study using a composite 
ocardial infarction or coronary death in contrast to the Whitehall studies, which 
cused on CHD-related mortality alone.   
90 Marmot, 2004, p. 44. 
 
91 Marmot, 2004, p.44. 
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endpoint of non-fatal my
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outside of health behavior and access to care (which all subjects in the studies had).  
Furthermore, to put a 20% contribution in context, consider that smoking—the single 
most important contributor to the global burden of disease—accounts for only 12.2
lost disability-adjusted life years (DALYS) in the developed world.
% of 
ch 
a 
 and 
sociated with increased mortality in 
the stud
l 
e 
 
When looking at the relationship between income and health disparities, it is 
important to identify several different ways in which income may affect health, including 
93  High blood 
pressure accounted for 10.9%; alcohol use for 9.2%. 
The Longitudinal Study on Socioeconomic Health Differences (LSSHD), whi
stratified 27,070 Dutch men and women by education, reported a hazard ratio of 1.64 (
statistical measure similar to relative risk) for all-cause mortality between the most and 
least educated.94  Controlling for alcohol consumption, smoking, body mass index,
physical activity—the four behavioral factors most as
y population—resulted in a 53% reduction in hazard ratio (to 1.30), leaving half 
of the mortality difference unexplained.  Other studies looking at the relationship 
between health behavior and health disparities in the United States have reported residua
disparities in ranges similar to the Whitehall and LSSHD data.95  The take-home messag
is that, while poor health behavior is associated with lower socioeconomic status and with 
worse health, adjusting for its effects leaves a significant difference in mortality between
the top, middle, and bottom unexplained.   
Income Inequality 
                                                 
93 Ezzati, et al., 2002, pp. 1347-60.  
 Schrijvers, et al., 1999, pp. 535-40. Level of education was broken down into four categories and 
Lantz, et al., 1998, pp. 1703-8.  Sorlie, et al., 1995, pp. 949-56. 
 
94
calculated adjusting for age, gender, marital status, religious affiliation, and degree of urbanization. 
 
95
 40
differences in absolute income, percent of income spent on health care, relative income, 
the form income takes, and overall inequalities in income distribution.  First, GDP per 
capita does not correlate well, beyond possessing a basic minimum, with standard 
measures of population health like life expectancy or infant mortality.96  For example, the 
y rate in the United States, whose GDP per person was $40,100, was 
6.5 dea  
is 
ture 
  
2004 infant mortalit
ths/1,000 live births.  The 2004 infant mortality rate in Japan, whose GDP per
person was $29,400, was 3.26 deaths/1,000 live births.97 Considering developed 
countries more generally, the correlation between per capita GDP—converted at 
purchasing power parity to allow comparison of absolute wealth—and infant mortality 
weak (r=0.08).98  This may not be surprising given that GDP, by itself, does not cap
how wealth is distributed in a nation.  Having a very high GDP is compatible with a 
country having a large impoverished population, which, in turn, would increase infant 
mortality rates despite a significant GDP.   
Second, the percent GDP spent on health care does not correlate well with 
standard population health measures.  In 2004 the United States, with a life expectancy of 
77.7 years, spent approximately 14% of its GDP on health care while Japan, with a life 
expectancy of 81.1 years, spent less than 10% of its GDP.99  In 2001, the United 
Kingdom spent 7.5% of its GDP on health care and had a life expectancy of 77.9 years; 
                                               
 
n r value of zero implies no correlation; negative r values (0 to -1), 
direct correlation; positive r values (0 to 1), direct correlation. 
96 United Nations Development Programme, 2003. 
  
97 CIA World Factbook, 2005a. 
 
98 Wilkinson, 1997, pp. 591-5.  A
in
99 CIA World Factbook, 2005b. 
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German ument 
 
 
P 
ealth.  
an $70,000 per year.  Households 
making
102  
alth 
                                                
y spent 10.8% with a life expectancy of 78.0 years.100  Importantly, this arg
assumes that health expenditures in different countries are equally proportioned between 
administration and actual health care; in other words, that percent GDP spent on health 
actually goes to medical care.  There is evidence that the United States spends a 
significantly greater amount of its health budget on administrative costs compared to 
other countries.101  Physicians in America also have a higher salary (and higher 
malpractice insurance rates) than other countries, factors that may decrease the fraction of
the health-related GDP that actually goes toward patient care.  Even correcting for these
‘overhead’ expenditures, however, the return in American life expectancy on GD
investment in medical care is comparatively poor. 
Third, relative income within a country does seem to have an impact on h
For example, in the United States, household income correlates with relative risk of death 
after stratifying for age, sex, race, family size, and time period.  As noted in the first 
chapter, households making less than $15,000 per year have a relative risk of death 
almost 3 times that of households making greater th
 between $50,000 and $70,000 are at a 1.34 increased relative risk of death.  
Stratification for education reduces the steepness of the difference, but a significant gap 
remains between each group and between the highest and lowest income households.
In England, almost 40% of the poorest quintile of 50-54 year old men report poor he
 
004. 
echnology Assessment, 1994. 
2 McDonough, et al., 1997, pp. 1476-83. 
100 World Health Organization, 2
 
101 United States Congress, Office of T
10
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compared to less than 10% of the richest quintile, an effect that reoccurs in older age 
groups.103   
Fourth, differences in the form income takes as a household asset—for example, 
whether money earned is held as cash or invested in stock or mutual funds—may 
translate into differences in health.  United States Census Bureau data from 1990 indicate 
that bla
 to 
06, 
 
a different marker than relative income, as 
discuss  
you have compared to other people, income inequality measures how big the gap in 
                                                
ck Americans are significantly less likely than whites to have their assets in a 
financial institution, own stock, or have an IRA account, which affects their ability
translate income into commodities like home ownership.104  In 1990, 67.3% of white 
households owned their own home, compared to 43.8% of black household.105  By 20
those numbers were 75% and 47%, respectively.106  Home ownership, in turn, is an 
important determinant of environmental exposures—including lead and air pollution—
that contribute to health status.  In this context, it is not just how much income you have 
that matters, but what form it takes.  
A different idea is that income inequality as such is creating health differences 
such that what matters is not so much absolute deprivation or wealth, but the magnitude 
of the relative differences.107  This is 
ed above.  Here, the focus is on the degree of difference between the richest and
poorest members of society.  If relative position in an income hierarchy tells how much 
 
Oliver and Shapiro, 1995. 
6.  
7 See, for example, Wilkinson, 1996. 
103 Marmot, et al., 2002.  
 
104 For a review of this data see 
 
105 Wilkerson, 1990, p. A1 
 
106 U.S. Census Bureau, 200
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income is between the top and the bottom.  Since it is possible for someone to have the 
same relative income in two societies with very different degrees of income inequality
this is a different candidate for explaining health disparities.  In this context, a country’s 
Gini index, a measure of income inequality between zero (total income equality) and 
(total income inequality; i.e. one person with everything), does inversely correlate w
its life expectancy at birth, an effect that persists when controlling for total income level, 
education, and savings level (r=-0.45).
, 
one 
ith 
 in 
 income that must 
be tran ish 
ality 
                                                
108  These data, however, have recently been 
challenged; the inclusion of Gini index scores for a larger number of countries than in the 
original study decreased the strength of the correlation (r=-0.09).109   
Within the United States, studies have shown that, adjusting for differences
absolute income, income inequality accounts for approximately a quarter of the 
difference in age-adjusted mortality rates between states.110  The Robin Hood Index—a 
measure of income inequality representing the proportion of aggregate
sferred from households above the mean to those below the mean so as to establ
perfect equity—is strongly correlated to state by state variation in all-cause mort
(r=0.54).111  The mechanism by which income inequality generates health disparities is 
unclear.  Some commentators argue that relative inequality erodes social cohesion and 
capital, which affects the willingness of countries to introduce safety nets in areas like 
health.112  Others believe that declining social capital directly affects health.113  In 
 
108 Wilkinson, 1996. Wilkinson and Pickett, 2005, pp. 412-7. 
 
.1491-8. 
1 Kennedy, et al., 1996, pp. 1004-8.  
2 Kawachi and Kennedy, 1999, pp. 215-27.  For a critique of the social-capital-as-cause-of-health-
d Lynch, 1999, pp. 59-81. 
109 Lynch, et al., 2001, pp. 194-200. 
 
110 Kennedy, et al., 1996, pp.1004-8.  Kennedy, et al., 1997, pp
11
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disparities project, see Muntaner, et al., 1999, pp. 699-732.  Muntaner an
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contrast, Angus Deaton, an econometrician, has argued that income inequality and health
disparities are merely correlated; social systems that tolerate a substantial inequality in 
income are likely to take a similar view of health disparities.
 
h 
cussion of the Institute of 
it does not, by itself, offer a compelling explanation for health 
disparit
h a 
 
e to 
 “-
                                                                                                                                                
114 
Other Candidates 
Another factor thought to influence health disparities relates to various prejudices 
on the part of health care providers, including racism, sexism, and classism.115  Althoug
this is likely a real phenomenon—as I indicated in the earlier dis
Medicine review—
ies.  For example, an American College of Cardiology meta-analysis of racial 
differences in cardiac interventions found that minority patients are somewhat less likely 
to undergo percutaneous cardiac angiography or coronary artery bypass surgery even 
after adjusting for age, insurance, co-morbidities, and/or disease severity.  Althoug
number of factors underlie these differences, discrimination may be a contributor.116  
Low income patients are less likely to have blood pressure or cholesterol checked by their
primary care providers, which may be evidence of class bias, although it may also hav
do with the quality of physicians that care for financially poor patients.117  The various
isms” may have more of an effect on health disparities via the way they shape 
 
 
or, 2006, pp. 55-72.  
 See, for example, van Ryn and Burke, 2000, pp. 813-28.  
 Schulman, et al., 1999, pp. 618-26. 
6-309.  Unfortunately there are little reliable data available on the quality 
f care rich vs. poor or urban vs. rural or Medicare vs private insurance patients receive.  If there is a 
at serve these populations, it may again 
mphasize the point that expanding access to medical care cannot alone reduce health disparities.  
113 For a review, see Berkam and Melchi
 
114 Deaton, 2003, pp. 113-58. 
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117 Das and Gertler, 2007, pp. 29
o
significant difference in the quality of health care providers th
e
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institutional arrangements rather than through the attitudes and actions of health 
professionals.  At this higher level of abstraction, however, the specific effect of 
prejudices can be difficult to entangle from the more general ways that social 
arrangements—without being overtly bigoted—lead to health disparities. 
Finally, there is research indicating that variables like education; employm
status; job stress; neighborhood and housing conditions; low birth weight; earl
environmental exposures to lead, allergens, and infection; use of city space
ent 
y 
s, including 
recreati
te to 
c 
t to 
d 
So far, the theories I have been considering use various features of the 
socioeconomic hierarchy—income, differences in health care access, etc.—to explain 
why there is a corresponding gradient in health.  I want to conclude this chapter by 
onal areas and forms of transport; family structure; patient preferences for 
intervention; and health and religious beliefs about the nature of disease contribu
health disparities.118  Most—if not all—of these factors distribute along a socioeconomi
gradient, although their relative contribution to health differences has been difficul
accurately measure because of confounders like income.  Some of them—neighborhoo
conditions and available recreation space, for instance—act partially through behavioral 
risk factors and are, as such, already reflected in the earlier discussion.  For example, 
predominately black American neighborhoods are less likely to have recreational 
facilities and grocery stores and more likely to have fast food restaurants, which 
discourages certain health behaviors.119   
Reverse Causation 
considering an alternative theory.  Do people with worse health fall to the bottom of the 
                                                 
118 For a discussion of most of these factors, see the papers in Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999. 
911  Morland, et al., 2002, pp. 448-62. Popkin, et al., 2005, pp. 603-13. 
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hierarchy or is there something about being there that affects their health, as I hav
far suggested?  Several authors have argue
e thus 
d that low status groups are in that position 
oor health, which prevents them from achieving upward social 
mobilit e are 
 
r 
sed to 
l, 
re 
stably located in the highest social class (based on occupation) were 30% less likely to 
                                                
because they have p
y.120  And the same argument can be made for high status groups.  Ther
several lines of evidence that lead away from this conclusion.  First, premature death 
(<65 years old) of one’s parents is generally considered a marker of susceptibility to
disease as well as early life exposure to certain risk factors (e.g. second-hand smoke, poo
diet, etc.).  If this is true, and if one’s background health/disease risk determine social 
class, then populations whose parents did not die prematurely should show relative 
uniformity in disease morbidity and mortality.  In other words, if you were not expo
genetic or environmental health risks via your parents, then you should not, in genera
face health-related impediments to higher social status.  Data from the Whitehall studies 
show, however, that the social gradient in CHD is as steep among individuals whose 
parents did not suffer premature death.121  This provides some evidence against health-
related mobility. 
Second, while it is true that individuals who move up the social gradient are 
healthier than other members of the groups they leave behind, they are still less healthy 
than people in the class they join.  For example, epidemiologists Mel Bartley and Ian 
Plewis looked at changes in social class and health status between 1971 and 1991 in a 
sample of 1% of the English and Welsh male population ages 15-40. 122  Men who we
 
120 West, 1991, pp. 373-84. 
121 Marmot, et al., 2001, pp. 301-7. 
2 Bartley and Plewis, 1997, pp. 376-86. 
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report limiting long-term illness (LLLT) than men upwardly mobile into that social clas
The same is true i
s.  
n reverse for those who fall.  Men who were downwardly mobile into 
the low e 
 of 
 
take 
 or 
poor health?  Does lower education in adults predict worse health because of its effects 
 medical literacy or do people fail to achieve better education because of childhood 
                                              
est social classes were still 40% less likely to report LLLT then men who wer
stable in those groups.  Blane et al. preformed a similar study using data on the social 
mobility and health of over 46,000 English men ages 45-65.  Approximately one-third
their population experienced a change in class over the time period.  Men who were 
upwardly mobile (moved from lower to higher social classes, again based on occupation)
had a 1.15 hazard ratio of mortality compared to those who remained stable in the higher 
class.123  Similar data have emerged from research done on social mobility from 
childhood onward.124  Together these studies suggest that, if anything, health-related 
social mobility acts to constrain the health disparities between socioeconomic classes.  
The fact that men who change classes end up with mortality rates intermediate between 
the class of origin and the one they join suggests that a diluting effect takes place when 
considering the overall difference in mortality between classes.   
 I have barely scratched the surface of the epidemiological research on health 
disparities.  Looking at all of this information, one may despair at finding a unifying 
explanation or point of intervention.  For every potential contributor we hold up—
wealth and education, for example—we have to consider whether it is actually a cause
merely a correlative of health disparities.  Do the financially poor have worse health 
because of their poverty or is poverty a marker for some underlying factor that leads to 
on
   
123 Blane, et al., 1999, pp. 59-70. 
 
124 Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 50-74. 
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nt factors.  In the next 
illnesses, which themselves also affect adult health?  The answers to these questions may 
require multiple explanatory frameworks, each focusing on differe
chapter, however, I will examine one potentially unifying theory, centered on the 
relationship between autonomy and health. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: Autonomy and Health 
In 2001 the Annals of Internal Medicine published an article examining the 
relationship between winning an Academy Award and longevity.125  The study authors 
compared the age at death for actors and actresses who had won an Academy Award to two 
groups: gender-matched individuals who had appeared in the same movie and had not been 
nominated and other actors and actresses who had been nominated for a different film but 
had not won.  After adjusting for birth year, ethnicity, birth country, name change, age at first 
film, and total films in career, individuals who had won an Academy Award lived almost 
four years longer than those who had been merely nominated and those not recognized at all; 
individuals who won multiple times lived six years longer.      
The Academy Awards phenomenon illustrates a health gradient: winners of multiple 
awards lived longer than those who had only won once, who lived longer than those merely 
nominated and those not recognized at all.  As I noted in the previous chapter, health 
gradients are a pervasive feature of developed countries with and without universal health 
care.  When stratifying individuals by occupation, income, or level of education, each person 
has, on average, better health than someone immediately below him and worse health than a 
person just above.  Health disparities between the riches and poorest represent the extremes 
of a phenomenon identified in the Whitehall studies, the step-wise social hierarchy of health.  
The British epidemiologist who led the Whitehall research, Michael Marmot, is more 
concerned with how regional disparities like, for example, those between whites and blacks  
                                                 
125 Redelmeier and Singh, 2001, pp. 955-62. 
in North Carolina fit into this larger pattern of health inequalities.  He writes, “There is a 
social gradient in health in individuals who are not poor: the higher the social position, the 
better the health. I have labeled this ‘the status syndrome.’”126   
Under the status syndrome, the problem of why North Carolina’s poor die younger 
than its rich turns out to be the same as why Academy Award winners live longer than 
nominees and why people with PhDs live longer than those with Master’s degrees.127  This 
is, Marmot acknowledges, a surprising conclusion, but he believes he can provide a unifying 
explanation.  More important than, for example, a person’s access to health care or health 
behaviors is his or her autonomy.  He writes, “The lower individuals are in the social 
hierarchy, the less likely it is that their fundamental human needs for autonomy and to be 
integrated into society will be met.  Failure to meet these needs leads to metabolic and 
endocrine changes that in turn lead to increased risk of disease.”128  The poor, ethnic 
minorities, and people with Master’s degrees have less autonomy and are less integrated into 
society than those with PhDs and so have worse health. 
Marmot draws on an extensive epidemiologic literature—some of which I touched on 
in the previous chapter—to argue for autonomy and social participation as causes of the 
status syndrome.  His interpretation of these data has been challenged elsewhere.129  
Although much turns on the empirical debate, there are several conceptual points that need 
clarification.  Here, I will focus primarily on the relationship between autonomy and health 
                                                 
126 Marmot, 2006, pp. 1304. 
 
127 Erikson, 2001, pp. 211-27. 
 
128 Marmot, 2006. pp. 1304. 
 
129 Among the principle challenges is whether low control causes poor health or if poor health produces low 
control.  See Wang, et al., 1999, pp. 281-98. 
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with less emphasis on the role of social participation.130  This discussion is especially 
pressing given Marmot’s recent call for the American medical profession to take aim at 
health disparities by championing policies—“education, skills training, better working and 
living conditions, and support for older individuals”—to improve patient autonomy.131   
Autonomy 
It is important to distinguish Marmot’s explanation for the status syndrome from a 
more widely-held theory that traces health disparities to differences in socioeconomic status 
(SES).  For example, one might think that poverty causes a subset of North Carolinians to 
have worse health.  Without money to pay for medical care, drugs, better food, or to protect 
them from harmful environmental exposures, the poor end up with worse health.  Marmot 
explicitly denies this idea.  He writes, “The social gradient in health is not due to differences 
in medical care, or primarily to differences in health behaviors, or to differences in material 
circumstances.”132  In support of this claim, Marmot notes that within groups low on life 
stressors and social isolation education no longer correlates with mortality.  The same is true 
for groups high on life stressors and social isolation.133  For Marmot, the traditional 
determinants of SES like income, education, or occupation merely correlate with better or 
worse health.  What underlies health disparities is differences in status simplicitur.   
Initially, this is a difficult claim to understand.  SES—or relative social position, a 
term Marmot uses synonymously—is just a conglomeration of factors like distributable, 
material goods; our place, time, and location of birth; our grammar and accent; our gender; 
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the house and neighborhood we live in; the attitudes that others adopt toward us; the color of 
our skin, our general appearance, and the clothes and accessories we wear; our talents; our 
education; the kind of job we have and how well we perform it; whether and who we marry 
and, if we have children, how they turn out.  So what causal (or explanatory) power does SES 
have independently of these components?  SES, it turns out, is just useful shorthand for 
talking about what all these elements have in common; namely, their ability to promote our 
autonomy.  Being well-educated, having a good job, and possessing material goods do not 
themselves directly contribute to better health; rather, Marmot argues, they promote the 
autonomy of the person who has them, which, in turn, leads to health.  So better SES 
correlates with improved health because it is a marker for greater autonomy.  It is, however, 
important to note that, while Marmot’s goal is to explain the ultimate causes of health 
disparities, his practical recommendations for changing gradients in autonomy will be very 
similar to those of a person who believes that such disparities are mediated through SES.  
This is because SES is a proximate cause for Marmot and one that is more easily adjusted 
than autonomy.134  At the end of the day, even if Marmot is wrong about the relationship 
between autonomy and health, it may still be true that differences in SES are a leading 
contributor to health disparities.  
That said, Marmot’s link between autonomy and health travels via the neuroendocrine 
pathophysiology of the sympatho-medullary and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axes, an 
extended discussion of which is too far afield for my purposes.135  Instead, I will focus on the 
role autonomy plays in his framework.  Despite—or maybe because of—being a central 
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135 See, for example, Marmot and Brumer, 2005, pp. 251-6. Marmot, 2004, pp. 104-37. Hemingway, et al., 
2005, pp. 3071-7. 
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talking point in biomedical ethics, moral psychology, and normative and metaethics, 
autonomy remains a slippery concept.  In a recent survey of the autonomy literature, the 
philosopher Nomy Arpaly identifies at least eight different uses of the term.136  The concern 
is that agreement or disagreement with Marmot’s position may occur because of grammatical 
similarity with whatever idea of autonomy the reader already possesses.  Equivocation, 
intentional or not, is a significant worry in this context.   
Some Candidates 
Marmot’s definition of autonomy is “how much control you have over your life.”137  
If addressing individual autonomy is going to drive our approach to health disparities, this 
definition requires clarification.  Most importantly, we need to know what sort of control 
Marmot has in mind.   
Control as Desire Congruence 
On a common view in philosophy, having control over your life means being 
motivated by or acting on only desires that you reflectively endorse.138  The absence of 
control occurs when we find ourselves being motivated by desires that we do not want to 
have.  For example, the addict who sees his desire for drugs as alien yet nevertheless shoots 
up lacks control in this first sense.  The addict could reasonably insist that he is not being 
himself—that he is out of control—when he uses drugs.  The closeted religious leader who 
has sex with other men despite his alienation from this desire may feel a similar absence of 
control.  The writer, Tom Wolfe, describes a character, Charlotte Simmons, who lacks this 
kind of control, finding her life stressful and complicated when she cannot bring herself to 
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love the man, Adam Gellin, she believes is right for her.  Wolfe writes, “The truth was 
Charolotte wanted to fall in love with Adam.  If only she could!  How much tidier life would 
be! . . . And she wanted to want Adam!  She wanted to kiss Adam good night in a deeply 
committed way.”139  Incongruence between one’s first and second order desires can lead to 
increased stress and neuroendocrine activation, as happens to Charlotte, making this type of 
control a possible candidate for Marmot’s definition.  On this position, then, having maximal 
control means acting (or being motivated) only by those desires that you want to have.  Call 
this type of control desire-congruence.   
Control as Independence of Mind or Independence of Means 
Consider the philosopher Thomas Hill’s description of the Deferential Wife, 
“This is a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband.  She buys the clothes he prefers, 
invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the mood . . . she tends 
not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and, when she does, she counts them as less 
important than her husband’s.”140 
 
Let us suppose that the Deferential Wife has never made an explicit decision to subordinate 
her projects to her husband’s.  She was raised in a social system in which she is simply 
fulfilling the expected role for women.  In this context, the Deferential Wife is not in control 
of her life.  She may have perfect desire-congruence control—she may want to want to serve 
her husband—and may be happy doing so.  But, insofar as her husband runs her life, telling 
her who to see, what to do, and what to believe, she lacks independence of mind.  It is easy 
enough to imagine a feminist encouraging the Deferential Wife to seize control of her life; to 
reevaluate her commitment to her husband’s desires and to give some priority to 
(developing) her own projects.  Being maximally in control, in this context, means 
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developing and exercising one’s capacity to think for oneself, where that includes deciding 
what things to value and to what degree without undue outside influence.  Call this type of 
control independence of mind.   
A related understanding of control is independence of means.  In this sense, you are in 
control of your life if you are self-sufficient.  The elderly couple that has saved wisely for 
their retirement and is able to live on their own has independence of means.  The cancer 
patient who is confined to bed because of intractable bone pain lacks control; he is dependent 
on others to fulfill his most basic needs.  The parents who encourage their adult child still 
living at home to get a job and go out on his own are promoting his self-sufficiency.  Like 
independence of mind, however, independence of means or self-sufficiency is separate from 
the structure of one’s desires.  You may or may not want to be dependent on others and you 
might not identify with what you want.  Central to independence of means, however, is 
whether, within your specific context, you are able to accomplish your goals with minimal or 
no support from others.         
Control as Freedom 
On another view, control means having the resources and ability to get, in the 
broadest terms, what you want.  This is control as freedom.  There are several ways in which 
a person might exhibit this type of control, depending on how we cash out “what you want.”  
At the broadest level, we can imagine an individual—call her Lynn—who has the resources 
and ability to turn any of her desires into reality.  Whenever Lynn desires something, she is 
able to get it.  If she wakes up and the room is too cold, she can make it warmer.  If she 
misses an exhibit from her favorite artist, she can have the museum reopen the galleries, or, 
better yet, arrange for a private showing.  More dramatically, if she wants it to stop raining, it 
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does, and if she needs an extra hour of sunlight, she gets it.  From moment to moment, 
throughout her life, Lynn has the resources and abilities to obtain what she desires.  
According to psychologist Ellen Skinner, this type of control, which is commonly employed 
in the empirical literature on self-efficacy, “refers to the extent to which an agent can 
intentionally produce desired outcomes and prevent undesired ones.”141  Of course, how 
believable Lynn is as an actual person depends on what she desires.  Unless she maintains a 
very practical set of desires, having this type of control over her life will require extra-human 
abilities. 
A more narrow type of freedom would involve the kind of control that comes with the 
ability and resources to turn one’s projects into reality.  Let me pause to broadly distinguish 
projects from desires.  First, although our projects are often a subset of the things we desire, 
we are more deeply committed to our projects.  This commitment is illustrated in the way 
that we identify ourselves wholly or partly with our projects, in contrast to our less central 
desires.  I do not think of myself as someone who likes coffee, although this is true of me.  I 
am a runner and someone who wants to learn to play Chopin Preludes perfectly; these things 
are among my projects, not just passing desires.  They form part of my conception of who I 
am.  I would lose a part of my identity if I stopped running, but not if I gave up coffee.  
Second, we organize our other, less central desires around our projects.  We are more 
concerned with fulfilling them than our passing fancies.  For example, a desire for bourbon 
might strike me late at night while I am working on my project of becoming a doctor.  I 
consider how going out for a drink will affect my ability to finish studying that evening.  I 
stay home.  We sacrifice or postpone fulfilling our immediate desires when they come into 
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conflict with our projects.  When we act on a desire that threatens our projects, we feel 
regret; we may believe we have made a poor decision.  
If we have the resources and ability to fulfill our projects then we are able to exercise 
a certain kind of control over our lives.  Consider Scott as an exemplar of this type of control.  
Unlike Lynn, Scott cannot obtain the object of every desire that he has.  There are no gallery 
re-openings or late sunsets in his life.  There are things he wants but does not get.  Instead, he 
is able do those things necessary to complete his projects.  Suppose that Scott has always 
wanted to be a mechanical engineer.  This is one of his projects and it is part of his identity; 
he thinks of himself as someone who wants a career in engineering.  Because he has the 
resources and ability to achieve his projects, he is able to do well in high school, enter 
college, finish his coursework, and get a job with an engineering firm.  Along the way, he 
always has money for tuition, the kind of intelligence and drive necessary to pursue 
mechanical engineering, and the personality traits needed to work on complex projects with 
others.  Sometimes there are vacations he wants to take but does not have the time or money; 
there are houses he wants but cannot afford; from time to time he wishes he were in a band, 
nothing serious, just something to do on the weekends.  But Scott does not adopt these things 
as projects; they are passing desires and he lacks the kind of control over his life to make 
them a reality.  Like Lynn, however, Scott’s plausibility as a real person largely depends on 
the kinds of projects he has.  If his life-goal is to be the first person to land a spaceship on the 
sun, he will require the same extra-human abilities as Lynn in order to maintain the kind of 
control—the ability to fulfill his projects—we imagine him having.       
Both Scott and Lynn exhibit a kind of freedom that allows them to translate certain 
internal states—projects and desires—into reality.  There are other variations on this theme; 
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perhaps the resources and abilities to obtain those things necessary for further fulfillment of 
one’s desires represents another kind of control.  A different possibility might involve having 
the resources and ability to get what one values, if that is a distinct category from one’s 
projects and desires.  Another sort of freedom, however, has to do with control over certain 
external exposures.  There are some people who have the resources and ability to structure 
their lives such that they avoid a range of negative experiences without any explicit desire or 
project to do so.  As such, they exhibit have a different kind of freedom than Lynn and Scott.  
During the course of our lives we are exposed to a number of environmental changes.  
Most of these are small—is it raining today?  Is the pool going to be open an hour later?  
Should I bring a salad for lunch because the microwave in my building is broken?—but we 
can also run up against larger events—a hurricane that destroys our house, a gram of heroin 
laced with talc, a drunk driver on a Friday night.  The resources and abilities we have 
available to us over the course of our lives determines, to a significant extent, what changes 
we encounter.  While we may intentionally structure our lives to avoid or ensure certain 
exposures—I choose this school because of the quality of the faculty; I go to that market 
because the tomatoes are always fresh; I stay away from his house because the floors are 
sticky—we also avoid many events as a byproduct of our choices and not because of any 
specific desire in this regard. 
For example, I might have the money and financial savvy necessary to live in the 
suburbs, thereby avoiding the higher crime rates in the city, but I might choose to live in the 
suburbs because I like the idea of having a front yard.  In this case, the desire that motivates 
me to enter a particular environment means that, as a side-effect, I avoid a certain exposure 
(being robbed, etc.), even if doing so never explicitly enter my calculus.  I exhibit a kind of 
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freedom in this regard that is not present in someone who lacks the resources to move out of 
a high-crime area.  In this case, the advantage of having resources is not that you get what 
you desire or fulfill your projects—although this may be true as well—but that your life is 
structured so that you do not have certain negative experiences.   
In a similar vein, one of the historical prerogatives of wealth has been a relative 
insulation from infectious diseases (polio being a notable exception).  The basic 
infrastructure present in most of the United States means that, in virtue of being born into a 
certain life, Americans are not exposed to yellow fever or cholera.  We live our lives in such 
a way that—without ever having specific desires related to avoiding these diseases—we are 
not subject to them.  What makes living in the developing world so treacherous from an 
infectious disease standpoint is that it is relatively impossible to structure one’s life in such a 
way to avoid these exposures; this is one reason why visitors have to get so many vaccines.     
 Imagine two contemporary residents of Wilmington, North Carolina: Adele and 
Charles.  Adele is an upper-class socialite who summers in the costal city, pursuing a season 
of beach-related parties and events.  Charles, who has been in and out of prison because of a 
crack-cocaine habit, is a year-round resident of Wilmington, living in crowded housing in the 
poorest section of the city.  Charles contracts tuberculosis (TB) because of his multiple 
incarcerations and living conditions—both risk factors for the disease.  Adele’s worse 
medical problem is mild hayfever.  Charles, unlike Adele, lacks the resources and abilities 
necessary to avoid exposure to TB.  What makes Adele different from Charles is not a 
question of desire fulfillment.  Neither of them has any explicit desires related to avoiding 
TB.  In fact, they do not even know that it still affects people in the United States.  Adele has 
the freedom to lead a life structured in such a way that she never encounters TB; Charles 
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does not.  Being unable to determine the events to which one is exposed is a significant 
limitation to having control over one’s life. 
Importantly, control as a species of freedom—on any of the above definitions—is 
independent of higher-order psychological states.  Looking back at Lynn, her control is over 
the fulfillment of her first-order desires; she may, for example, wish that she was not always 
asking for more sunlight.  But Lynn does not have the resources or abilities to alter what she 
desires to desires.  That would require a different kind of control.  Similarly with Scott, who 
may not want to want to be a mechanical engineer.  Like the addict, having the resources and 
abilities to get what we want is independent of whether we want to want those things.       
Additionally, you can have the kind of control that comes with freedom in one of two 
ways.  You may be able to get what you desire, fulfill your projects, determine your 
environmental exposures, etc because no one interferes with you or you may be able to do 
those things because of support from others.  In the first case, which might be thought of as 
negative control, what allows you to get what you want is the fact that others are not 
preventing you from doing so.  They are not helping you achieve your ends; rather, they are 
merely staying out of your way, whether intentionally or because their own pursuits do not 
hinder yours.  For example, Adele is able to structure her life because no one else is forcing 
her to behave in a certain way.  If her husband demanded that she take a trip to Thailand, 
where she was exposed to TB, this would represent a reduction in the negative control she 
has over her life (i.e. the control she has because others do not interfere with her).  
In the second case, if you have freedom because of support from others then you 
exhibit positive control.  What allows you to get what you want is the fact that others are 
assisting you.  This may be through direct contributions to your ends—parents allowing a 
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grown child to live at home while he looks for a job—or through indirect mechanisms like 
relying on Social Security or other tax-funded government programs for a regular source of 
income.  For example, if Scott can only become a mechanical engineer because of federal 
student loans, then he would have positive control over his projects.  This, incidentally, 
means that people who have positive control necessarily lack independence of means.  They 
require help from others to get what they want.   
Finally, it is important to distinguish control as freedom from control as independence 
of mind.  The Deferential Wife, as long as she has the resources to do what her husband 
wants, has control in the freedom sense, even if she lacks independence of mind.  If his 
desires are hers, if his projects are hers, and she is able to fulfill them, then she has a kind of 
control (freedom) over her life.  In all of these scenarios, she has control in the freedom 
sense, even if she is not involved in deciding what desires, projects, or events to pursue.    
Moral Autonomy 
In this brief survey, I have left aside a number of more technical definitions of 
autonomy, especially those used in the normative context of “respecting autonomy.”  Most of 
these—for example, autonomy as self-legislation—are used in Kantian-style arguments 
connecting practical reason and morality or in various forms of action theory.  For example, 
Thomas Hill describes Kantian autonomy as, “a property of the wills of all adult human 
beings insofar as they are viewed as ideal moral legislators, prescribing general principles to 
themselves rationally, free from causal determinism, and not motivated by sensuous 
desires.”142  Autonomy, in this largely non-empirical sense, is almost universally possessed 
and is not distributed according to a social gradient.  Given that the property of self-
legislation does not vary widely between persons, it is an unlikely candidate for a principle 
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cause of health disparities.  This should, however, serve as a reminder that autonomy is a 
morally loaded word.  Merely demonstrating that someone is more or less autonomous on a 
descriptive understanding of that concept—for example, more or less independent of 
means—is insufficient to establish any specific normative conclusion.  We require an 
additional argument for why we should value that kind of autonomy and work toward its 
redistribution.       
Marmotian Control 
That said, which idea of control—and corresponding understanding of autonomy—is 
closest to Marmot’s?  Consider his paradigmatic cases of absence of control: a petty officer 
of the Royal Navy who succumbs on an Artic expedition “lacked control over his own 
destiny”; a factory worker in rural Massachusetts who may be fired because of a shift to 
overseas operations is subject to forces “totally outside of her control”; a foreman with a 
damaged car lacks “the resources to take control of the situation rather than have events 
control him.”143  These examples indicate that Marmot is not primarily concerned with 
motivational states.  His characters are not torn between what they desire and what they want 
to desire.  Desire-congruence is not part of his concept of control.   
Marmot notes that autonomy matters because it determines whether people are “able 
to lead the lives they most want to lead.”  This is a difficult phrase to parse, but it seems to 
locate the central question as whether people are able to get what they want.  This is, I think, 
closest to understanding control as a matter of freedom.  What characterizes Lynn, Scott, and 
Adele is their ability to have what they want in their lives.  But is Marmot concerned with 
getting what one desires, fulfilling one’s projects, or controlling one’s exposure?  First, there 
is little suggestion that Marmot’s characters lack control because they are unable to fulfill 
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their projects.  Although the foreman might not be able to get to work given the absence of 
reliable transportation, he is not worried about being unable to complete his central projects.  
He is not threatened with a loss of identity in the way that a concert pianist might be if she 
began going blind; the foreman’s concerns are much more about being able to complete 
certain mundane daily tasks.   
Instead, what unites Marmot’s characters is that they are exposed to certain events 
outside of their control, and, once they enter these situations, they are unable to have them 
resolve as they desire.   His characters lack a certain ability to navigate the world, both in 
terms of avoiding particular kinds of exposures—being conscripted to go to the Artic; being 
affected by shifting factory work overseas—and in being able to respond to those 
exposures—lacking the money to pay for car repairs; not having the training to find a new 
job quickly.   
Control, for Marmot, ends up being a combination of the lives lead by Adele and 
Lynn.  What marks someone as having control is the extent to which she can avoid certain 
exposures, and, when they happen, whether she can determine how those events turn out.  
The lower down a person is in the status gradient, the less likely it is that he will have the 
resources and abilities to control his exposure to stressful life events and the less likely it is 
that he will be able to dictate the outcome.  He will be conscripted into an Artic expedition 
and then die of exposure when the trip goes badly.  She will be fired from her job when the 
market shifts and then be unable to work because she has limited skills.  A person with 
higher status—who possesses the goods and abilities that come with elevated social 
position—is better able to control and adjust to his environmental exposures.  He will form 
an expedition to the Artic and then bravely make it out alive when things go badly.  When his 
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factory becomes unprofitable due to market changes, he can move it oversees, maintaining 
his income.  He can lead the kind of life he wants to have, thus avoiding the ill health effects 
of chronic neuroendocrine activation. 
Is there anything more to Marmot’s definition of autonomy beyond this type of 
control?  First, as a practical point regarding independence of means, we might wonder 
whether it really is possible for a person to lead the life he wants if he is entirely dependent 
on the resources of others.  People get tired of giving, are not always available, or refuse 
certain requests.  Even individuals who bear a special relationship to us—families and 
friends, for example—may be unwilling to take full responsibility for giving us everything 
we want.  Theoretically, however, since independence of means is not necessary to control 
the events to which one is exposed or to dictate the outcome of such exposures, I will assume 
that promoting Marmotian autonomy does not include that aspect of control.  
Now consider the Deferential Wife.  There is a sense in which, so long as she is able 
to do everything her husband wants, she is leading the life she most wants to lead.  Parsing 
the idea of “the life she wants to lead” differently, however, might encourage us to conclude 
that, because the Deferential Wife is laboring under a kind of ‘false consciousness,’ she does 
not really have the life she most wants.  We might argue that it is not the life she wants to 
lead; it is the life her husband or some larger, patriarchical system wants her to have.  Just 
like the petty officer who dies in the Artic, there is a real sense in which the Deferential Wife 
lacks control over her destiny.  She does not decide what happens to her nor does she 
determine how her life changes in response to these events.  Her husband does.  The question 
is whether, in order to count as having control in Marmot’s sense, a person not only has to 
get what she wants but also has to have some involvement in what it is that she wants. 
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It is hard to know what Marmot would say about the Deferential Wife.  On the few 
occasions he talks about individuals in similar situations—for example, office workers who 
are entirely under the thumbs of their bosses—he makes it clear that their health is worse 
because they lack the kind of control necessary to avoid dull, demoralizing, and repetitive 
work.  In contrast, it is precisely because the Deferential Wife lacks independence of mind 
that she is not particularly stressed, and stress is the pathophysiological link that Marmot 
needs to connect lack of control with poor health.  Let us suppose, then, that, for Marmot, the 
kind of control that comes with autonomy is understood to only include the kind of freedom I 
have been discussing.  Independence of mind is not necessary for autonomy on this account.   
Promoting Marmotian autonomy is, therefore, compatible with a world in which 
people find themselves alienated from their first-order desires (lack desire-congruence), are 
largely or entirely dependent on the resources of others (lack independence of means), and 
are able to get what they want but are minimally involved in setting their ends (lack 
independence of mind).  This list is not intended as a criticism of Marmot’s account, only to 
highlight the type of autonomy he sees as linked to health.  While lacking autonomy in these 
other senses may also contribute to poor health, they are not at the center of his attention.  It 
is also possible, of course, that there are other grounds on which we should promote the 
different kinds of control represented in these cases, but these recommendations cannot be 
generated out of Marmot’s focus as it stands.        
Given the way that Marmot defines autonomy, it is important to note that his other 
candidate for a principle determinant of health—degree of social participation—will be 
encompassed as one of the exposures to which individuals may have more or less control.  
Individuals with a high degree of autonomy in their lives will have the ability to shape their 
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social participation and access to social capital, which, in turn, will give them more resources 
for dealing with negative exposures than someone with less control.  Marmot acknowledges 
this point, writing “autonomy includes opportunities for social participation and the filling of 
social roles.”144  Given that social participation will ultimately be meditated through 
autonomy, our primary focus should be on this factor. 
The Illusion of Control? 
 
 Before I turn explicitly to the relationship between Marmotian autonomy, a 
descriptive concept, and a normative approach to health disparities, I want to discuss the 
relationship between health and the belief that one has autonomy versus the actual possession 
of autonomy.  If we are to intervene, should we focus on increasing the control low status 
individuals have over their lives or should we instead try to instill the belief that they have 
control?  Take two men, George and Franklin, both of whom earn similar wages working for 
a small construction company.  They both finished high school, but not beyond.  They used 
to smoke, but stopped recently because of small children at home.  George’s wife is trying to 
get him to cut back on drinking; Franklin’s wife thinks he should probably eat less red meat.  
On the weekends, the two men get together with their families to grill at one or the other’s 
house, both located in a small, low-crime neighborhood.  When they talk, George always 
seems stressed: he is worried about gas prices; their company does not provide health 
insurance and the children have to have regular pediatric visits; he has trouble making 
minimum payments on his credit card debt.   
Privately, George admits that his life is not turning out how he wanted.  If he just had 
a little more money or was able to take night classes at the community college and become a 
supervisor, things might be different.  As it is, he is worried that one or two unexpected costs 
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will put him in a really bad position.  Franklin, who has similar problems, is, by 
temperament, less worried.  He just cannot bring himself to get worked up in the same way 
as George.  Sure, he does not have everything that he wants, and sometimes he and his wife 
have to think hard about their budget when something unexpected happens, but he would 
generally describe himself as satisfied.  Franklin even has vague plans to move to a 
neighborhood with better schools once the children get older.   
The scope of George and Franklin’s autonomy is limited to the same degree.  They 
have similar abilities and resources available to avoid certain exposures—they live in low-
crime neighborhoods; have steady employment—and respond to unforeseen circumstances—
a broken down car might be equally problematic—but only George appreciates his absence 
of control.  Franklin, in contrast, thinks of himself as being able to exercise a fair degree of 
control over how his life goes.  Will this difference be reflected in their health?  More 
generally, although the degree of class-related health inequality is at least as pronounced in 
America as in developed other countries, Americans are less likely to see themselves as 
belonging to a lower class even if, objectively they do.  Most Americans below the poverty 
level view themselves as either having just left the middle class or about to join it.  They 
believe that they are more autonomous than they may actually be, considering, for example, 
their education, job status, and income.  Does this belief insulate these Americans from the 
stressors that would come with confronting the reality of their situation? 
Almost all of the epidemiologic studies that have been done on the relationship 
between differences in control and health disparities have focused on control beliefs.  For 
example, in a Dutch study of men and women age 57 and older, lower socioeconomic groups 
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were 1.42 times more likely to suffer from heart disease.145  Adjusting for control beliefs—
measured through questions like “sometimes I feel that I am being pushed around in life”—
reduced the relative risk of death by a third, to 1.30.  The authors suggest that control beliefs 
account for a significant degree of the difference in heart disease incidence between low and 
high status individuals.  Other studies have shown similar results.146 
Marmot, while acknowledging the difference between perceived versus actual 
autonomy, tends to emphasize the latter.147  For example, in discussing the relationship 
between work environment and health, Marmot writes, “If [an employee] has a high degree 
of control over work, it is less stressful and will have less impact on health . . .high-status 
civil servants have a high degree of control over their work.”148  He also emphasizes that his 
approach is not merely about what people believe they can do with what they have but what 
they are actually capable of doing.  Finally, Marmot’s proposed interventions for reducing 
health disparities—adopted largely from the Acheson Independent Inquiry into Inequalities 
in Health—focus on promoting actual control.  They recommend “reductions in poverty in 
women of child-bearing age”; “promoting management practice that lead to an increased 
level of control . . . in the workforce”; “policies which will promote the material well-being 
                                                 
145 The 1.42 RR is adjusted for classical cardiac disease risk factors, including hypertension, diabetes, obesity, 
exercise, and smoking, and represents a 4% reduction from baseline risk of 1.45.  Bosma, et al., 2005, pp. 737-
45.  
 
146 For a review of these data along with recommendations for intervention, see Bosma, 2006, 153-66.  For an 
argument that control beliefs do not contribute to health disparities see Smith and Harding, 1997, pp. 1369-70. 
 
147 Marmot, 2004, pp. 124-5.  Marmot notes that both employee beliefs about the control they exercise in their 
work environments and employer rankings of the amount of control different jobs provide correlate with self-
reported health and with each other. 
 
148 Marmot, 2004, pp. 123. 
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of older people.”149  Few, if any, of the Acheson recommendations focus on developing 
control beliefs as opposed to redistributing the resources necessary for actual control.  
Of course, this is not a zero-sum game.  Interventions that promote actual control 
among low status persons through, for example, the redistribution of income or increasing 
educational opportunities probably improve beliefs about control.  And encouraging positive 
control beliefs probably empowers individuals to improve their actual control.  Nevertheless, 
Marmot’s primary interventions are aimed at reducing differences in the resources and 
abilities that cause disparities in control and health.  We are not to encourage people to think 
that they are able to lead the life they most want to live but to work to make them actually 
able to do so.   
We are now in a position to state how Marmot understands the empirical connection 
between autonomy and the status syndrome.  The relative ability of an individual to actually 
shape the events to which she is exposed as well as dictate the outcome of these exposures is 
a leading cause of differences in relative health.  Put differently, the greater the difference in 
autonomy between the highest and lowest members of a society, the larger the degree of 
health inequality.  Ultimately, we can remain agnostic regarding Marmot’s connection 
between actual autonomy, the neuroendocrine systems, and health disparities. 150  The 
determinants of socioeconomic status may work through a common mechanism (i.e. 
autonomy) or, as I suggested in the previous chapter (and find more plausible), cause 
disparities through separate pathways.  In either case, if we are able to affect the distribution 
                                                 
149 Marmot, 2004, pp. 260, 261, 265. 
 
150 Although it matters for Marmot’s normative approach—based on Amartya Sen’s theory of justice—to the 
social determinants of health that they are mediated through autonomy and do not work through separate 
pathways. 
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of the resources and abilities that shape SES, whether or not they function by changing 
autonomy, should we?  And, if so, on what grounds and to what extent?   
Chapter V: Status 
I began this dissertation with an overview of contemporary health disparities in the 
United States, which exist between racial and ethnic groups and between individuals with 
different types of occupation and levels of income and education.  The political, medical, and 
philosophical response to this issue has focused on expanding access to health care as a way 
to correct what has been perceived as an unfair distribution of disease.  The philosopher 
Norman Daniels, in particular, has argued that, because health disparities create inequalities 
in opportunity, they are unjust.  This way of conceptualizing the moral status of health 
disparities suggests that inequalities come from an unfair allocation of resources.  
Unsurprisingly, Daniels has concluded that we have an obligation to ensure access to medical 
resources to reduce the impact disease has on equality of opportunity. 
  Recent research in epidemiology, however, has called into question the connection 
between health disparities and access to health care.  A number of factors—the broader 
determinants of health—help to create, maintain, and worsen health disparities.  In fact, the 
epidemiologist Michael Marmot has argued that these determinants work through a common 
mechanism; namely, neuroendocrine responses to the diminished autonomy produced by low 
socioeconomic status (SES).  In this context, Marmot understands autonomy as the relative 
ability of an individual to actually shape the events to which she is exposed as well as to 
dictate the outcome of those exposures.  Up until this point, however, the discussion of these 
epidemiological facts has been entirely descriptive.  The task, then, is to connect the broader 
determinants of health— whether mediated through autonomy or otherwise—with a  
normative framework that can make recommendations as to how we should change their.  
There are a number of ways to approach this project.  First, we might treat the current 
application of theories of justice as involving a flawed piece of instrumental reasoning: while 
the conclusion is correct—health disparities are unjust—the corrective means—equalize 
access to health care—are not.  The solution is to insert the appropriate methods of 
alleviating health disparities into the equation.  For example, we might maintain that health 
disparities are unjust and that we should focus on redistributing the broader determinants of 
health as a way of remedying these inequalities.  Here, the unjustness of health disparities 
does the normative work with manipulation of the broader determinants simply as a means to 
achieving more equitable health.   
Second, we might look outside theories of justice for suggestions as to why and how 
we should redistribute the broader determinants of health.  For example, a welfare utilitarian 
might argue that the steep gradients in SES that produce health disparities are detrimental to 
the maximization of well-being and so ought to be reduced.  Here, as in the first approach, 
reducing health disparities would be a way of attaining another normatively desirable goal 
and redistributing the social determinants of health would be the mechanism for enacting that 
change. 
A third way is to focus, not on the unfairness of health disparities, per se, but on the 
relative unfairness of the processes that generate them.  The so-called indirect approach, 
which has been developed by the philosopher Fabienne Peter, does not argue that health 
disparities demand intervention because, for example, they limit fair equality of 
opportunity.151  Rather, Peter suggests that, insofar as an unjust social process—for example, 
persistent inequality in income distribution—produces health disparities and, insofar as we 
                                                 
151 Peter, 2004, p. 79. 
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are called on to correct these processes, we have grounds on which to correct health 
disparities.  Here, the reduction in health inequalities is a byproduct of achieving a 
normatively desirable state of affairs (reduction in other, unjust social processes) and not the 
reason why we are instituting change in the first place.   
A final and related approach to the new epidemiology of health disparities is to argue 
that SES is itself morally important such that we should direct our efforts at promoting a 
more equitable distribution of it.  As with the indirect approach and in contrast to the first 
two cases, where equalizing the broader determinants of health was seen as a means to 
achieve another goal (the elimination of an unjust state of affairs, improving overall welfare, 
etc.), here it is the primary end.  In contrast to the indirect approach, however, the issue is not 
whether differences in SES or control are unjust, but that being able to exercise a certain 
amount of control over one’s life is morally important enough to serve as independent 
grounds for reducing SES gradients.  Ultimately, I will be arguing that a variation on this 
fourth approach should be our preferred normative approach to health disparities.  It provides 
a broader context for thinking about SES and health disparities outside the standard domain 
of distributive justice.  Before I turn to this point, however, I want to locate Daniels’ position 
within this framework and discuss its relative merits.  
Daniels Redux 
The first approach is most similar to Daniels’ original arguments connecting the 
unjustness of health disparities to inequality of opportunity with expanding access to health 
care as the mechanism for correcting this state of affairs.  Given the new epidemiology of 
health disparities, a modified version of Daniels’ account might read: first, health disparities 
are unjust because they limit equality of opportunity, which is a requirement of justice.  
 74
Second, gradients in SES produce health disparities.  Therefore, we should design our 
institutions so as to reduce these gradients.  The focus now is on the broader determinants of 
health rather than merely access to care.  As I already mentioned, Daniels has made a similar 
response to the new epidemiological data.   
In a recent series of papers and in his book, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs 
Fairly, Daniels has argued that the Rawlsian approach must be modified to focus more 
broadly on educational opportunities, social cohesion, and income redistribution in addition 
to questions of health care access when addressing health disparities.152  He writes, “Our 
health is affected not simply by the ease with which we can see a doctor—though that surely 
matters—but also by our social position and the underlying inequality of our society.”153  In 
his approach to the public health literature, Daniels has tended to emphasize the effects (or 
correlations, as he is apt to call them) that SES—as determined by income, income 
inequality, participation in political activity, and social capital—has on population health.  
He writes, “We should be looking as well to improve social conditions—such as access to 
basic education, levels of material deprivation, a healthy workplace environment, and 
equality of political participation—that help to determine the health of societies.”154 
Recall that Rawls’ contractors are concerned with the distribution of primary goods: 
basic rights, prerogatives, wealth/income, and the bases of self-respect.  Included among 
these are some of the principle socioeconomic determinants of health: access to education 
and the quality of that education, wealth, income, and the responsibilities that come with 
certain positions/jobs.  Rawls’ two principles, which the contractors are supposed to accept 
                                                 
152 See Daniels, 2001, pp. 3-15. Daniels, et al., 1999, pp. 215-51. Daniels, 2007, pp. 1-150. 
 
153 Daniels, 2001, p. 6. 
 
154 Daniels, et al., 2000, p. 4.  
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given the other features of the original position, establish the framework for allocating these 
goods.  Since, according to Daniels, these goods are driving health disparities, the principles 
of justice that govern their distribution also provide a normative structure for addressing the 
non-access causes of health disparities. 155  Daniels concludes that, “We should view health 
inequalities that derive from social determinants as unjust unless the determinants are 
distributed in conformity with [Rawls’] principles.”156  In other words, health disparities in 
our society are permissible only if they would still exist in a world where primary goods (i.e. 
the social determinants of health) are properly distributed according to the two Rawlsian 
principles and whatever secondary rules are generated therein.157  But how and to what 
extent would these principles reduce health disparities?  
                                                
First, recall that the fair equality of opportunity principle holds that socioeconomic 
inequalities are only permissible if the offices and positions to which they attach are open to 
all under conditions of equal opportunity.  As I noted in the second chapter, this requires not 
just formal equality of opportunity—for example, eliminating race-based discrimination in 
hiring practices—but institutional changes designed to reduce the effects of certain 
contingencies on opportunity.  In Daniels’ original argument, the central contingency of 
interest was differences in disease (or health), a focus that he still maintains, writing, “the 
equal opportunity principle also requires extensive public health, medical, and social support 
 
155 See also Caputo, 2003, pp. 85-112. 
 
156 Daniels, 2001, p. 6. 
 
157 It is important to note that primary function of the Rawlsian distributory scheme is to provide fair resource 
allocation along a number of dimensions, with health being only one aspect of that.  It would be a mistake to 
suppose that Daniels is arguing that we should manipulate the principles such that they generate the distribution 
that maximally removes health disparities.     
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services aimed at promoting normal functioning for all.”158  In his more recent work, Daniels 
has argued that things like public education, day care, and early childhood intervention 
programs are also supported under the equal opportunity principle.  Such programs, which 
would be targeted so as to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in, for example, educational 
attainment, would also reduce the health disparities predicated on these inequalities.  
Second, the Difference Principle, as Daniels envisions it, would limit disparities in 
health produced from inequalities in income and wealth.  Recall that the Difference Principle, 
which is lexically second to the fair equality of opportunity principle, permits resource 
inequalities so long as such inequalities make the worst off as well off as possible.  Daniels 
interprets this principle as providing grounds for reducing gradients in income and wealth.  
Given that, in a hierarchy, there is always a group that is least well off, the difference 
principle calls for continued redistribution so as to control the steepness of the gradient from 
top to bottom, placing “significant restrictions on allowable inequalities in income and 
wealth.”159          
The Rawlsian principles thus speak to the redistribution of several key socioeconomic 
determinants of health.  Daniels suggests that the Rawlsian system would, “probably flatten 
the socioeconomic gradient even more than we see in the most egalitarian welfare states of 
northern Europe.”160  And, as a result, would significantly reduce the steepness in health 
gradients.  To summarize, one response to the new epidemiological data is to use the same 
normative framework, centered on Rawlsian distributive justice, but insert a different 
empirical premise concerning the causes of health disparities.  On this account, justice 
                                                 
158 Daniels, et al., 2004, p. 79. 
 
159 Daniels, et al., 2004, p. 79. 
 
160 Daniels, 2001, p. 8. 
 77
requires that we not only provide more equitable access to health care but that we also 
redistribute the socioeconomic factors that help shape health.  Is this adjustment adequate?   
The Nature of Socioeconomic Status 
 For Marmot, SES matters because the things that it encompasses are what generate 
autonomy.  Higher SES individuals have the resources and abilities necessary to shape the 
events to which they are exposed as well as dictate the outcome of these exposures.  As a 
result, they have better health than lower SES individuals; the greater the difference in 
autonomy, the greater the health disparities.  Daniels, in response to these data, has suggested 
that Rawls’ account can guide us as to how to redistribute some of the key determinants of 
SES and thereby reduce gradients in control and the corresponding health disparities.  The 
best way to evaluate the adequacy of Daniels claim is to examine the nature of SES and what 
it encompasses.  Are there forces that shape SES and control that fall outside of the 
traditional domain of distributive justice but nevertheless demand our intervention?  If so, we 
may have grounds to question the adequacy of Daniels’ normative approach.  This will be my 
focus for the remainder of the chapter.161  
Let me start with the suggestion that to have a certain status is to have a kind of value 
in the eyes of others.162  SES, in this context, is the value we have in the eyes of others based 
                                                 
161 Other challenges to Daniels’ new approach as well as a reply from him and his co-authors can be found in 
Cohen and Rogers, 2000.  In particular, Marsha Angell (pp. 42-7) and Steffie Wollhandler and David 
Himmelstein (pp. 79-82) argue that absolute deprivation in material goods rather than degree of overall 
inequality should be the central focus for intervention; Michael Marmot (pp. 37-41) suggests that Sen’s 
capabilities approach to distributive justice should be the preferred normative framework, a point that I address 
in Chapter 6; Barbara Starfield (p. 67) questions some of Daniels’ (and Marmot’s) empirical assumptions, 
suggesting that the primary way to reduce health disparities is to expand access to primary care.  
 
162 I am using the term ‘value’ here and throughout in a relatively loose sense.  I intend this account to be 
compatible with a number of ways of specifying what it is to value something including having a pro-attitude 
toward it, believing that there are reasons that make it choice-worthy, believing that your ideal self would want 
it, etc.  Importantly, I am interested in maintaining a close conection between the idea of valuing a person and 
adopting specific interpersonal attitudes (especially esteem) toward him or her.  See Frankfurt, 1988, pp. 80-94. 
Mele, 2001, pp. 112-27. 
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on our social and economic properties.163  I mean this as an entirely descriptive claim, 
without yet commenting on the sorts of things that people should care about.  One’s 
socioeconomic value in the eyes of others—or SES—is largely context dependent, resting on 
possession of whatever factors matter within a given group.  As I noted in the previous 
chapter, the social and economic features that determine SES amongst contemporary 
Americans typically include: distributable, material goods; characteristics of an individual’s 
parents; her place, time, and location of birth; her grammar and accent; her gender; the color 
of her skin and her general appearance; her friends, acquaintances, and contacts; the attitudes 
that others adopt toward her; where she goes to school and how educated she becomes; the 
kind of job she has and how well she performs it; whether and who she marries and, if she 
has children, how they turn out.164   
We can be valued because our social or economic properties are useful to other 
people: for example, having a high level of income means that we buy many goods and 
services, which works to the advantage of people selling those things; being well-educated 
means that we may have helpful species of knowledge, as is the case with physicians who 
use their expertise to treat patients.  The converse is also true such that people can be 
disvalued for properties that make them useless or harmful to others: for example, people 
with low income who depend on social assistance may be disvalued as ‘nonproductive’ 
members of society; having children that grow up to be criminals may lead people to 
disvalue an individual insofar as this reflects on her parenting skills.  In these cases, what 
                                                 
163 Notice that these are not judgments about the value of persons qua persons, only about their value given who 
they are socially and economically.  Since I am just interested in SES in this dissertation, when I discuss our 
‘value’ in the eyes of others, I am only referring to socioeconomic value.  I briefly touch on how the kind of 
value we have in virtue of our rationality might inform our socioeconomic value in Chapter 7. 
 
164 Race and ethnicity are not usually thought of as part of one’s SES but since these are social characteristics of 
persons, I will be discussing them under that general rubric. 
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determines our (dis)value in the eyes of others is how (un)helpful our properties are to them.  
We can, however, be valued for social or economic properties that are not specifically useful 
to others: being attractive, being born in New England, or having a particular racial or ethnic 
background.  These characteristics do not do anything for other people but nevertheless can 
mark us as having a certain SES.   
Perhaps the best illustration of SES comes from popular depictions of social divisions 
in high school.  The entire plot of the 2004 movie Mean Girls focuses on the daughter of 
zoologists who, after being home schooled for a number of years, is able to successfully 
transition to high school because she recognizes its similarities to the social status hierarchies 
of chimpanzees, which she has studied extensively.165  The teenagers with the highest SES 
possess and do the things that matter most to their peers: they wear the right clothes, drive the 
right cars, know and associate with the right people, participate in the right activities.  Being 
of high SES allows them both to determine certain exposures—the head cheerleader has 
options when it comes to choosing her prom date—and more easily react to any negative 
events they might encounter—if the head cheerleader’s prom date breaks up with her, she 
can always find someone else.    
 It is important to note that an individual may be of high SES within one group but 
nevertheless be of low SES given a broader comparison class.  To return to the high school 
example, the president of the audio-visual club may have the best recording equipment in 
town and be well-respected by other club members but still be of lower status than the 
quarterback of the football team.  While it may be difficult to make fine distinctions in SES 
given a sufficiently large population—does the AV club president have higher status than the 
                                                 
165 Mean Girls, 2004.  This analogy is only somewhat glib; studies among non-human primates have shown 
differences in health that correspond to primate social hierarchies.  See Spolsky, 2004, 393-418.  
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lead in the high school play?—there are still broad divisions like total income or highest level 
of educational attainment that are meaningful.  And, in fact, the epidemiological research 
discussed in Chapter 3 used such broad distinctions—between for example, individuals with 
no education, high school, college, and advanced degrees—to capture SES across large 
populations.  In general, an upper class, be it cheerleaders in high school or those at the top 
of the British civil service, will have more or a better mix of the factors that are important to 
the other members of their socioeconomic structure.   
Status gradients do not end once we leave the high school cafeteria, although they 
may become more subtle, partly because one’s SES in contemporary society is not static over 
time.  This was not always the case, especially in socioeconomic systems where the position 
into which one was born—nobility or the peasant class, for example—cemented, for better or 
worse, one’s social standing.  Limited upward or downward mobility meant that SES was 
relatively fixed, although a person could certainly rise or fall within his specific social 
sphere.  Given, however, that many of the things on the above list are subject to change—
whether chosen by an individual or not—contemporary SES gradients are more fluid.166  
SES varies as trends pass and the perceived value of places, other people, things, and 
connections change.  Individuals—academics, politicians, businesswomen, etc.—rise and fall 
within SES hierarchies depending on their ability to adjust to variations in what matters 
within and outside of their respective spheres.   
                                                
A central theme in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace is the way that political change and 
personal action can alter our SES.  The protagonist, the white Afrikaner David Lurie, is a 
well-respected professor of Romantic literature in South Africa; following the post-Apartheid 
 
166 For a discussion of the change from a hereditary system of establishing SES to a meritocracy and the impact 
that has had on contemporary society, see de Botton, A, 2004.  
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formation of Mandela’s government, his university is redesignated as a technical college and 
he is forced to teach courses in communication skills.  Divorced, increasingly irrelevant to 
his colleagues, lecturing on a subject he perceives as beneath him, David begins to visit a 
prostitute, but even she eventually refuses to see him.  An ill-advised sexual affair with one 
of his students is discovered by the university and his department, full of indignation over his 
behavior, forces him to leave.  David feels that his status has fallen so far that, were he to run 
into one of his colleagues, they would shudder, “as one shudders at a cockroach in a 
washbasin in the middle of the night.”167  Eventually he moves to a farm with his daughter, 
Lucy.  When he and Lucy are the victim of an assault, the local police are unable or 
unwilling to pursue the attackers and his own efforts are useless.  David’s daughter advises 
him to accept the humiliation.  He should learn to accept that they have nothing and are 
nothing: “no cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.”168  By the end of the 
novel, David has come to occupy the social position of black South Africans under 
Apartheid. 
My concern at this juncture is not whether it is appropriate for an individual’s SES to 
rise or fall based on, for example, his race or sexual indiscretions; rather, I am interested in 
SES gradients as a purely descriptive phenomenon.  As the above examples illustrate, SES is 
determined by a wide range of factors, varies depending on the comparison group, and can 
change significantly over time.  It should be granted that many of the things that work to 
establish SES in contemporary cultures are included amongst the primary goods, especially, 
as Daniels has emphasized, income (relative and absolute), educational attainment, and 
occupation.  In redistributing these factors (or creating equality of opportunity to access 
                                                 
167 Coetzee, 1999, p. 8. 
 
168 Coetzee, 1999, p. 205. 
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them), we would, undoubtedly, flatten SES gradients.  If everyone in high school had the 
same amount of money to spend on a car then it seems likely that vehicles would fall out of 
the equations that govern relative SES within this group.  School uniforms might be 
understood partly as an attempt to end status differentiation based on clothing.  By iterating 
this effect over the whole spectrum of primary goods—and in groups beyond teenagers—we 
would presumably flatten the SES gradient.  Given what we know from the epidemiological 
data, we might also expect a reduction in health disparities.  And this is exactly what Daniels 
has in mind.   
Such an approach, however, fully addresses health disparities in the developed world 
only if we assume that the distribution of primary goods is the sole determinant of the 
socioeconomic hierarchies that underlie these disparities.  There are, however, many other 
factors on the above list that go into shaping an individual’s SES and thus contribute to her 
health.  I want to focus on interpersonal attitudes as an example of one of these forces.  I will 
suggest that the health disparities these attitudes generate through their effects on SES 
hierarchies are unjustified.  They are not, however, adequately addressed by theories of 
justice, at least in their current form. 
Interpersonal Attitudes     
What motivates individuals to seek higher SES or to acquire the social and economic 
characteristics that would lead others value them more highly?  A number of evolutionary 
biologists have claimed that we are, in some sense, programmed to constantly reassess our 
status in relation to others and seek better status, when possible.169  We do not, however, 
have to go so far as to embrace nativism about status-seeking in order to explain the 
                                                 
169 See, for example, Barkow, 1992, pp. 627-38. Miller, 2000. Marmot, 2004, pp. 88-95. 
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phenomena; elevated social standing conveys significant benefits that would be appealing 
even outside of evolutionary impulses.  The goods (income, education, etc.) and 
opportunities (business contacts, invitations, etc.) that characterize higher SES individuals 
are useful both in and of themselves—a house in the suburbs reduces exposure to inner-city 
crime—and as resources to enhance one’s ability to obtain further SES—a house can be 
mortgaged to provide funds for one’s children to go to Harvard, which would raise one’s 
prestige.170  These goods create space for leisure as well as the pursuit of projects and 
interests beyond what is necessary for daily subsistence.  At the same time, however, 
individuals continue to acquire these resources even when they already have more than 
would be needed for several life-times worth of projects.  This suggests that there is 
something beyond material goods or opportunities that makes high SES valuable.  As Adam 
Smith has phrased the issue,  
“What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power and pre-
eminence?  Is it to supply the necessities of nature?  The wages of the meanest labourer 
can supply them.  What then are the advantages of that great purpose of human life 
which we call bettering our condition?”171   
 
The answer that Smith gives is that, more important than the material or intellectual 
benefits of high SES, is the attitudes others adopt toward those at the top.  He writes, “To be 
observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, compliancy, and 
approbation, are all the advantages we can propose to derive from [bettering our 
condition].”172  The philosopher Alain de Botton notes that being of high SES means that, 
“Our presence is noted, our name is registered, our views are listened to, our failings are 
                                                 
170 I am not adopting the relatively implausible thesis that a desire for higher status motivates all (or even most 
of) our actions; rather, I am suggesting that material goods can be used in the pursuit of higher status, if that is 
one’s goal.  
 
171 Smith, 1817, p. 77. 
 
172 Smith, 1817, p. 78. 
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treated with indulgence and our needs are ministered to.”173  Some of these benefits take the 
form of actions—being on the guest list of the most exclusive restaurants in town—but the 
central point of emphasis is that high SES individuals are approached with a certain set of 
attitudes including sympathy, deference, respect, admiration, and esteem.  I want to focus on 
the last of these, esteem, as an illustration of the relationship between SES and interpersonal 
attitudes, although I intended my remarks to apply to the other attitudes as well. 
The economist Geoffry Brennan and the philosopher Philip Pettit broadly characterize 
esteem as an attitude that involves a positive assessment of a person.174  They identify three 
characteristics of esteem: first, it is evaluative, ranking individuals in various respects.  These 
can be egoistically centered—I esteem her more than him because of what she does for me—
or they can simply be judgments of merit—I esteem her for being a smart person.  Esteem 
can be focused on people for having character traits like kindness, or for having positional 
properties like being the most honest person in the room.  In the context of the present 
discussion, an individual with high SES is esteemed because she possesses the right mix of 
social and economic properties within her group.  Second, Brennan and Pettit suggest that 
esteem is a comparative attitude in that it is dependent on relative rather than absolute 
standards.  Just because someone ranks low on a particular scale—say education—does not 
necessarily determine whether or not I esteem him.  There is an essential social context 
involved, for, although he may rank poorly on the absolute scale of education, relative to the 
community he may be fairly well-educated, and so I would esteem him given the comparison 
class.  This feature of esteem should not be particularly surprising in the context of SES 
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174 Brennan and Pettit, 2004, p. 15-23.   
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hierarchies, where, as I pointed out earlier, an individual’s relative position depends on the 
social group in which she is being evaluated. 
Third, Brennan and Pettit argue that esteem is a directive attitude, in that it is largely 
focused on evaluating areas that the subject of esteem is thought to be able to control.175   
This is in contrast with an attitude like awe, which responds to certain characteristics like 
beauty not directly under the control of those who possess them.  Esteem, on the other hand, 
is closer to being a reactive attitude like resentment.176  It is formed in response to 
circumstances in which what has happened (or how the individual was disposed to behave) 
was perceived to be under that agent’s control.177  Esteem is also directive in the sense that it 
can encourage people to make adjustments to the characteristics or actions under their control 
that are the target of esteem.  In this context, esteem can encourage individuals to acquire the 
traits or abilities that would be useful in obtaining high SES.  Understanding esteem as a 
directive attitude helps explain the way in which it motivates people to achieve higher 
SES.178    
To summarize, high SES individuals are approached with certain attitudes.  Among 
the most important of these is esteem.  We evaluate others with regard to specific features—
in this context, the same social and economic factors that make them of high SES—and adopt 
an approving attitude.  SES seekers are motivated to establish and maintain this approval. 
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The benefits of being esteemed are such that individuals will aim for higher SES even if the 
goods that accompany such a position are not, as Smith noted, necessary for mere survival.  
Of course, not all attitudes—for example, jealousy or envy—directed toward those with high 
SES are positive.  But even an attitude like jealousy can be affirming insofar as it reinforces 
that one’s position or possessions are significant enough for someone else to want them.    
The converse point regarding esteem is that part of what makes being of low SES so 
miserable is that, beyond material deprivation, one is potentially subject to the negative 
attitudes of others.  If the benefits of high SES include respect, sympathy, admiration, and 
esteem then the costs of being low SES include contempt, disdain, scorn, disesteem, and 
condescension.  As John Adams, the second American president, noted, “The desire of the 
esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger—and the neglect and contempt of the 
world as severe a pain as the gout or stone.”179  Although perhaps overdramatized, Adams’ 
analogy is particularly telling insofar as it connects the afflictions of disesteem with poor 
health.    
The effects of disesteem are not limited to those with the very lowest SES; it is a 
recurring literary theme that people with newly acquired wealth are not accorded the same 
esteem as old money.  The whispered gossip, the contempful dismisals, and the disdainful 
looks express attitudes whose purpose is to reinforce the divide between money and money 
properly aged.  Both F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Jay Gatsby and Henry James’ Daisy Miller are 
ruined, in part, because of these attitudes.  Their wealth is not sufficient to obtain the respect 
or acceptance of the upper class.  Their reactions—especially Gatsby’s self-destructive 
pursuit of wealth to impress Daisy Buchanan—illustrate the effects that the attitudes of 
others can have on our actions.  Just as SES is not an all or none phenomena, but exists as a 
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graded hiearchy, esteem and disesteem can be targeted at individuals just above or below 
oneself in the gradient.     
If disesteem is the dark mirror of esteem, then, when we adopt this attitude toward 
other people based on their social and economic characteristics, we are judging that 
disapproval is the appropriate response to someone in their position.  Individuals with low 
SES are disesteemed or held in contempt because of the factors that make them low SES, 
whether this is race, enthicity, education, class background, or income.  Another common 
literary theme, found in books ranging from Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (again) to Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez’s Love in the Time of Cholera to Nicholas Sparks’ The Notebook is the love 
between a high status woman and a poor suitor, who is held with disregard by her family.  In 
each of these cases, being the subject of disesteem motivates the lead male character to 
“better himself” and improve his SES.     
It is tempting to think that attitudes like respect and esteem or disrespect and 
disesteem are entirely reactions to the perceived SES of an individual.  We consider what she 
owns, her place in the world, how others respond to her, etc and then determine whether she 
is worthy of our esteem.  On this view, the attitudes we adopt depend on an individual’s 
preexisting SES.  One thing that has been generally missed in the discussion of attitudes and 
SES seeking, however, is that exposure to positive or negative attitudes is not merely an 
outcome of one’s position in the social hierarchy; these attitudes also work to establish our 
SES. 
First, ‘having been subject to negative attitudes’ is itself a characteristic that can 
determine our SES.  People react to the attitudes that others adopt toward us.  If I am 
regularly treated with esteem, it is more likely that people who observe this will treat me with 
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esteem (and vice-versa).  Thus, esteem or disesteem from others can become a self-fulling 
prophecy whereby, because we have been treated or thought of in a certain way in the past, it 
is more likely that people will approach us with similar attitudes in the future.  Second, the 
internalization of positive or negative attitudes can make us more or less likely to seek other 
characteristics that might improve our status.  Consider, for example, the situation of 
Southern blacks under Jim Crow laws.  In reaction to certain features—being poor, rural, but 
most importantly, simply being black—white Southerners adopted a set of attitudes—
dismissal, condescension, contempt—that produced a climate in which it was impossible for 
blacks to see themselves as anything like equals.   
Marginalization did not occur merely through deprivation of resources; it also 
required a set of attitudes to undergird relative social standing.   Consistent with the previous 
discussion, these attitudes were a response to the perception of blacks as being of low SES.  
Along with legal sanction and outright force, attitudes like contempt perpetuated the status 
quo by actively discouraging blacks from pursuing a better life.  The repeal of the Jim Crow 
laws and the cultural changes that took place with the civil rights movement made significant 
inroads in dismantling the legal framework of segregation and, to a lesser extent, changing 
the public perception of what attitudes were appropriate to have toward blacks.  Even if, 
however, blacks were no longer directly exposed to disesteem or contempt, the ways in 
which these attitudes were internalized served to reinforce their social.  
In this context, negative attitudes are initially a reaction to the perceived 
socioeconomic value of an individual (his or her SES).  Over time, a person who is the 
subject of these attitudes may come to believe that they reflect an accurate assessment of his 
value.  In this way, negative attitudes initiate a self-fulfilling process whereby individuals 
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internalize the external assessment of their value and do not seek a higher SES—the 
characteristics that would give them a higher value in the eyes of others—because they are 
convinced that they deserve low SES.  This phenomenon, whereby what an individual 
expects/desires from his life adjusts to his low social position, has been widely studied in 
economics where it has been labeled ‘adaptive preferences.’180  As the philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum notes, “We are especially likely to encounter adaptive preferences when we are 
studying groups that have been persistent victims of discrimination, and who may as a result 
have internalized a conception of their own unequal worth.”181   
The character Uncle Tom in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin is a classic 
illustration of the effects of adaptive preferences.  Although significantly more complex as 
Stowe originally portrayed him, Uncle Tom now stereotypically represents an African-
American who is satisfied with his low SES, believes that he deserves it, and does not take 
steps to better his position because of this belief.  The internalization of negative attitudes 
and its relationship with perpetuating SES levels is also well-documented outside of 
literature.  For example, in a 2003 study, researchers took high and low SES white and black 
first graders and had them rank the prestige associated with various occupations.182  Black 
children viewed jobs with only African-American workers as being of lower status than 
identical occupations presented with only white European workers, an effect that persisted 
when adjusting for SES.   
From a young age, these children learned to associate being black with having low 
social SES, presumably not through any explicit channels—both black and white children in 
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the study said that blacks and whites should equally be able to do whatever jobs they want—
but through the internalization of implicit social cues.  Included in the social environment 
that might produce the association between low SES occupations and being black are the 
attitudes that have characterized race relations in the United States for the better part of two 
centuries.  As one of the study author notes, these implicit or unconscious associations 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the jobs that minorities take “may, across time, be 
viewed as lower in status simply as a function of the race of the worker, and consequently 
show decreasing levels of pay and prestige.”183  
The larger philosophical point is that our evaluation of our own worth, the worth of 
our projects, and our place in a social system is affected, in part, by other’s assessment of 
these things.  When negative judgments are made—and the corresponding attitudes of 
disesteem, contempt, disdain, scorn, or condescension are adopted—our SES can suffer.  We 
react to these attitudes.  In some ways, they are as significant in determining what individuals 
can do to shape their lives and how they react to negative events as having the necessary 
resources.  Attitudes like contempt can reinforce and solidify self-perceptions of what we are 
capable of doing and how we understand our place in the world, creating the same kinds of 
constraints as poverty or lack of education.184     
More generally, if contempt is a fixed feature of our world or if we come to believe 
that contempt toward us is justified or deserved—that it reflects an accurate assessment of 
our worth—we will be less likely to strive for the things that might give us higher SES.  We 
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lower our expectations and a kind of defeatism settles in along with the belief that it is 
inappropriate for us to ask for a better life.  If opportunities for advancement are offered we 
may hesitate to take it advantage.  We will be less likely to demand our fair share of 
resources having been convinced that we are not worthy of them.  Our SES is not determined 
merely in virtue of what we possess but also by our ability to acquire the social and economic 
characteristics that generate higher SES, an ability that can be significantly constrained by 
our beliefs about what we are capable of achieving.   
One potential criticism of this account is that it fails to distinguish two potentially 
separate responses that society might have toward low SES individuals: contempt or neglect.  
If we merely ignore those with low SES and fail to respond to them with any attitudes 
(positive or negative), then it may be hard to see how negative interpersonal attitudes could 
work to affect SES.185  For example, servants in Victorian Britain were largely invisible to 
members of the upper-class, barely registering on the social radar.  Under conditions of status 
neglect rather than contempt, it may be hard to argue that servants had part of their SES 
determined by the attitudes of their employers.  I have three responses to this suggestion: 
first, neglect may simply be an extreme form of contempt, reinforcing the idea that one’s 
status is so low that one does not even register.  Second, while neglect may have been the 
most common day-to-day experience British servants, if a member of the household were to 
fail to perform a required task or act in a way ‘inappropriate’ for their social class—attempt 
to join a dinner party rather than serve the food—it seems likely that their employers would 
direct hostile attitudes toward them.  Third, even if the highest members of a social structure 
never adopted negative interpersonal attitudes toward the lowest individuals, persons in 
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intermediate social positions might.  Since status is a graded phenomenon, there may always 
be someone close enough to us in status to treat us with contempt rather than neglect.  Thus, 
negative interpersonal attitudes are likely to be a salient determinant of low SES, even if they 
are not directed ‘from the top’ so to speak.     
The internalization of positive attitudes can also affect SES.  While it may be true that 
higher SES individuals have further to fall, the fact that they have been respected throughout 
their lives can provide a psychological cushion that may make it easier to rise again in SES 
gradient or at least to believe that such a change is possible.  Illustrations of this phenomenon 
abound in the popular media.  For example, in an episode of the television show, The 
Simpsons, entitled “The Old Man and the Lisa,” one of the secondary characterize, an elderly 
millionaire named Mr. Burns, loses his fortune and is forced to live in a retirement home.186  
He befriends another character, Lisa Simpson, who encourages him to collect recyclables as 
a way to start rebuilding his fortune.  Over time, Mr. Burns modifies Lisa’s idea and gets the 
capital—based on his old reputation—to start a recycling plant (that doubles as a fish 
cannery) and once again becomes the richest man in town.  Of the several advantages that 
Mr. Burns has over an individual who has never been high SES is the fact that he has years of 
experience of being esteemed by others, which reinforces his belief that he can react well to 
negative events in his life.  In other words, exposure to those attitudes helps give him a sense 
of control.  
I have emphasized interpersonal attitudes because the responses that others have 
toward us, especially contempt, disdain, condescension, disrespect, or scorn, can play the 
same role in determining our SES as depriving us of material goods.  As William James 
noted, “If every person we met ‘cut us dead,’ and acted as if we were non-existent things, a 
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kind of rage and impotent despair would before long well up in us, from which the cruelest 
bodily torture would be a relief.”187  Two centuries earlier, Bishop Butler wrote, “There is 
such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another that 
disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much 
desired as any external goods.”188  Being the object of disesteem over long periods of time 
may be a significant enough blow that, even if we are no longer subject to the attitude, its 
effects persist.  We remain convinced that we are of low SES and should not try to improve 
our position. 
In case the connection between attitudes, status, and health seems too theoretical there 
are also empirical data suggesting a relationship.  Recent studies have argued that changes in 
the attitudes that supervisors have toward employees can have a positive influence on 
workers’ long-term health.189  The most significant improvements in health outcomes occur 
when supervisors “consider their employees’ viewpoint and are able to suppress personal 
biases.”190  Furthermore, studies have shown that workplace bullying, which includes co-
workers or supervisors who adopt attitudes designed to isolate or exclude others or “to 
torment, wear down, or frustrate,” increases rates of sick absence, depression, and heart 
disease among bullied staff.191  The internalization of negative racial attitudes has been 
correlated with higher rates of substance abuse192 and depression193 among American 
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blacks.194  Studies of black Caribbean women have shown a relationship between indices of 
internalized racism and abdominal obesity and insulin resistance that persists even after 
adjusting for potential confounders.195  
Similar studies on the internalization of negative social attitudes amongst gays and 
lesbians have shown a close correlation between the degree of internalized homophobia and 
rates of alcohol and drug use,196 high risk sexual activity,197 and suicide.198  Controlling for 
perceived discrimination significantly attenuates differences in psychiatric morbidity and 
mortality between heterosexuals and homosexuals.199  To put these data in Marmot’s terms, 
the attitudes of others help determine our SES, which, in turn, predicts how much autonomy 
we have and how healthy we will be.  Insofar as interpersonal attitudess shape our SES, they 
help determine the events to which we are exposed as well as our ability to dictate the 
outcome of those exposures.  Individuals and populations subjected to negative attitudes lose 
or fail to attain higher SES and their health suffers accordingly. 
Implications for Daniels 
What are we to say about those who have part of their SES (and health) determined in 
virtue of the attitudes of others?  As Daniels notes, when primary goods are distributed 
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appropriately, any residual health disparities are permissible.  The implication is that, if a 
person is of low SES in a society that bases SES on education and income but has an unfair 
distribution these goods, something should be done to address his worse health.   
Specifically, we should arrange institutions to allocate education and income more equitably, 
thus flattening the SES gradient and adjusting the corresponding differences in health.  If, 
however, that same person is of low SES because of the negative attitudes that other citizens 
have adopted but has a fair share of primary goods, there is nothing else to say about his 
worse health.   
This seems too contingent a fact on which to rest our judgment about these cases.  If 
anything, health disparities that find their origin in the negative attitudes of others are less 
justified than those that result from differences in income or education.  A social system that 
creates significant disparities in the possession of material goods may be unjust, but there is 
something especially pernicious about arrangements in which higher SES individuals adopt 
attitudes designed to convince the less fortunate that they deserve their deprivation.   In this 
context, the use of negative attitudes is a factor that shapes SES, autonomy, and health but 
but appears to fall outside of the traditional domain of distributive justice.  Insofar as it is 
morally impermissible to allow such attitudes to generate health disparities, however, we 
may have grounds to question the adequacy of Daniels’ normative approach.  
 How might Daniels respond to this challenge?  Are there resources within Rawls’ 
account to address the impact that attitudes have on our SES and health?  If not, are there 
other theories of justice that are broad enough to support interventions aimed at changing 
interpersonal attitudes or do we require a different kind of moral approach altogether?  These 
will be the central questions of the next chapter.  
Chapter VI: Justice and Status 
 
 Of the advances made in Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) prevention over the 
past twenty years, one of the most important has been the reduction of social stigma 
surrounding infection with the disease.  It has been well-documented that the stigma 
associated with HIV discourages individuals from being tested for the virus, and, once it has 
been diagnosed, from seeking adequate treatment.200  In the United State, the negative 
attitudes surrounding HIV are related, in part, to its association with marginalized groups like 
gay men and intravenous drug use.  In the developing world, stigmitization springs from the 
perceived relationship between HIV and promiscuity or prostitution.  In both cases, the 
medical consequences of having AIDS are compounded by the social stigma of the diagnosis.  
For example, one in three HIV positive men and women in Cape Town, South Africa 
reported feeling dirty, ashamed, or guilty because of their HIV status and internalization of 
stigma has been associated with increased risk for depression among this population.201  
 The relationship between social stigma and the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS 
again illustrates the impact that attitudes like disdain or contempt can have on our health.  In 
the previous chapter I argued that, while these attitudes can directly affect health, as is the 
case with HIV, they may also indirectly do so as one of the broader determinants of 
socioeconomic status (SES).  I suggested that Daniels’ Rawlsian approach may be unable to 
account for the intuition that it is morally unjustified for attitudes to play this role in  
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generating health disparities.  In this chapter, I will consider what resources are available to 
Daniels and to theories of justice, considered more broadly, to address this challenge. 
Status and Self-respect 
The first response is to insist that Daniels’ approach is sufficient, in its current form, 
to address interpersonal attitudes as a determinant of SES.  For example, one might note that 
principles of justice are founded on a concept of persons as free, equal, and worthy of 
respect.  The state has a duty to treat people accordingly, an obligation that is discharged, in 
part, by adopting principles that distribute primary goods fairly.  For example, Rawls writes 
that, “A desirable feature of a conception of justice is that it should publicly express men’s 
respect for one another.”202  The political philosophers Ronald Dworkin and Elizabeth 
Anderson also emphasizes the connection between principles of justice and the obligation of 
the state to treat its citizens with respect; Anderson writes, “Goods must be distributed 
according to principles and processes that express respect for all.”203  Such principles reflect 
an underlying concern, not just with the goods themselves, but also with respecting 
persons—an attitude opposed to contempt or disdain.  In adopting the principles of justice 
and implementing policies based on them, the state expresses respect for its citizens.  Since 
the just state displays the same attitude toward all persons, it might be thought that this would 
dilute the effects that other attitudes have on SES hierarchies.  If the state respects me, the 
thought might go, what does it matter if others hold me in contempt? 
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 The problem with this argument is that the attitudes in question are primarily between 
citizens, not between the state (or social institutions) and its citizens.204  In the examples 
above, it is the beliefs of individuals and groups that create and reinforce the attitudes that 
influence SES.  There is no guarantee that a state whose policies reflect respect for its 
citizens will be populated by individuals who display respect for one another.  In fact, 
individuals who believe that the respect shown by the state to certain groups is unwarranted 
may harden their own negative attitudes.  For example, the initial resistance to desegregating 
Southern schools was not just based on the belief that it was inappropriate to educate blacks 
alongside whites, but that it was wrong for the federal government to impose its vision of 
equality on what was perceived as a clearly inferior group.  This is not to dismiss the 
importance of what state policies express, only to suggest that more is required if our concern 
is with interpersonal attitudes.  As Anderson insists, there is something deeply disturbing 
about social institutions that distribute goods fairly, but view the recipients of goods, for 
example, the disabled or untalented, with pity or condescension.205  Nevertheless, respect on 
the part of the state will not be sufficient to adjust SES gradients in the absence of a 
mechanism for addressing the attitudes between citizens that create and reinforce SES. 
 The second approach to the problem of SES and attitudes is to fall back on something 
like Rawls’ discussion of self-respect as a primary good.206  As Daniels notes, “Without self-
respect, however, it is difficult for individuals to use their capabilities as individuals and 
citizens; since social structures critically support or undermine self-respect, Rawls includes 
                                                 
204 There are some notable exceptions to this point, including the marriage rights of gays and lesbians in the 
United States.  In the developing world, where state-sanctioned discrimination of certain ethic or racial groups 
is far more common, I suspect that changing the attitudes that government policies express toward these citizens 
would have a more significant impact on their relative status. 
 
205 Anderson, 1999, pp. 305-6. 
 
206 Rebecca Walker initially suggested this argument as a possible reply for Daniels. 
 99
the social basis of it on the index.”207  Thus, in addition to redistributing the determinants of 
SES that are connected to the other primary goods, justice as fairness would also require us 
to evaluate and reduce socioeconomic gradients that undermine self-respect.  How might this 
help us address the role that interpersonal attitudes play in producing relative SES?  Self-
respect, according to Rawls, involves, “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure 
conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.”208  It 
allows us to move forward with our projects, freeing us from certain kinds of self-doubt and 
affirming our worth.   
And this seems like exactly the sort of armor that might protect us from the attitudes 
of others.  If I am confident in my life plan then perhaps the approval or disapproval of others 
will not—as they do in the earlier examples—affect my ability to carry it out.  Daniels does 
not make this argument but it might fit within his larger framework: the two principles of 
justice not only distribute the liberties, material goods, and opportunities that construct social 
status, but, by apportioning (the social bases of) self-respect, they create the conditions 
necessary to protect us from the unwelcome attitudes of others.  In so doing, they reduce the 
role these attitudes play in generating SES hierarchies.      
There are two things to say about this argument.  First, Rawls does not talk about self-
respect as a good whose distribution the state is to direct in a manner similar, for example, 
wealth.  Nor does he apply the two principles to self-respect in the same way as other 
primary goods such that societies might achieve fair allocation by adjusting pools of 
available self-respect in a manner analogous to material resources.  Instead, his discussion of 
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self-respect, which takes place largely in Part III of A Theory of Justice where the concern is 
the stability of justice as fairness, turns on the ability of the two principles, when fully 
realized, to create the conditions necessary for self-respect.  His emphasis is on the role that 
respect from the state has in fostering its citizens’ self-respect with the idea that institutional 
respect will help to generate self-respect.  Rawls writes, “The basis for self-respect in a just 
society is . . . the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties.”209  If the 
state were to treat some people as less equal in this regard, providing only limited rights, the 
results would be potentially damaging to those individuals’ self-respect.210   
For Rawls, the attitudes that public institutions express are essential for assuring 
citizens of their own worth.  These attitudes are also necessary to assuage the drive for higher 
relative position that might otherwise destabilize the well-ordered society.  In such a state, 
“the need for status is met by the public recognition of just institutions.”211  This recognition, 
Rawls suggests, would help to prevent the formation of socioeconomic status gradients—
particularly in income—that we see, for example, in the contemporary United States.  In this 
context, self-respect does not provide a shield against the unwelcome attitudes of others but 
helps ensure the stability of a society already ordered by the two principles.212  Self-respect is 
such an important good that individuals who have it are unlikely to engage in behavior that 
might jeopardize the political structure that has provided it.   
If, however, self-respect can only be realized within an environment governed by the 
two principles, it is difficult to understand how societies like ours might make use of it to 
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reduce SES gradients.  It is easy enough to see that incremental changes in, for example, the 
distribution of wealth in contemporary America, might affect relative SES, but it is unclear 
how manipulating a good that we cannot access now or in the foreseeable future might do the 
same.  Self-respect, at least as Rawls envisioned it, is not accessible to us when surveying 
those things we might leverage in our society to affect the steepness of SES gradients and, 
thereby, health disparities.  It is not helpful in this context to point out that self-respect helps 
check the growth of SES hierarchies in a hypothetical society without an account of how we 
might establish it in a very different environment.    
Even given such an explanation, however, there is a deeper problem with any 
approach that relies solely on self-respect to address SES differences created by interpersonal 
attitudes.  These accounts must rely on self-respect having an unrealistically strong ability to 
resist the attitudes of others.  Without some external confirmation of our worth or that of our 
projects, even the most self-assured would find it difficult to continue affirming the value of 
either, especially in the face of hostile attitudes like contempt.  Rawls recognized this point, 
writing that, “Our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others.  Unless we feel 
that our endeavors are respected by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain 
the conviction that our ends are worth advancing.”213  Although undoubtedly important, by 
itself, self-respect is not sufficient to counteract the effects that interpersonal attitudes have 
on SES.  Uncertainty about our value creeps in and, faced only with the denigrating attitudes 
of others, we begin to suspect that their assessments are correct.  We are of lower status; 
internal ‘bucking-up’ may not be enough to convince us otherwise.   
Rawls’ has two solutions to this problem.  First, he argues that, in a society structured 
by the two principles of justice, there will be communities made up of individuals with 
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similar projects and goals.  These associations will help to assuage self-doubt amongst their 
members and reinforce the sense that what they are doing is worthwhile.  In other words, 
they represent groups of people whose attitudes will help ground our self-respect and 
potentially resist the negative attitudes of others.  Like self-respect, however, these 
associations are not available outside of a society ordered by the two principles and so cannot 
be utilized as a mechanism for reducing the SES gradients that confront individuals in 
existing social systems.  Furthermore, even granting that an individual’s community will 
esteem her, there is still the question of how the negative attitudes that one association has 
toward another would affect the SES of these groups.  An individual might be highly 
esteemed within her association, but, if other communities disesteem that association, her 
overall SES would still suffer (e.g. the AV club president and the quarterback of the football 
team).       
Rawls’ second solution to the inadequacy of self-respect in confronting the attitudes 
of others is to argue that the contractors in the original position would endorse a duty of 
mutual respect.  Because their “self-respect and their confidence in the value of their own 
system of ends cannot withstand the indifference much less the contempt of others,” the 
contractors would support an obligation to treat other members of the well-ordered society 
with the “respect which is due to [them] as moral beings.”214  Mutual respect, in this context, 
includes a willingness to give reasons for actions that affect others, take up the situation from 
their point of view, and maintain an awareness of their feelings and aspirations.  Having 
other citizens who adopt this attitude will bolster our self-respect, allowing us to conceive of 
our projects as worthwhile.   
                                                 
214 Rawls, 1999, pp. 297. 
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A few comments on this argument: first, as with his discussion of self-respect, Rawls 
is more concerned with the way in which a duty of mutual respect would work to stabilize 
the well-ordered society.  Second, it is unclear whether the contractors would, in fact, adopt a 
duty of mutual respect, given that they start from the position of mutual disinterest.  Finally, 
and most importantly, although the duty of mutual respect is generated in a similar manner as 
the two principles, it is not an obligation we have to one another because of considerations of 
justice.  There is, in fact, a separate natural duty of justice focused on supporting just 
institutions and working to develop them where they do not otherwise exist.  The duty of 
mutual respect, in contrast, is something we owe to one another because we are moral beings 
(i.e. we each have a sense of justice and a conception of the good).  Thus, while a duty of 
mutual respect may significantly alleviate the effects of interpersonal attitudes on SES, it can 
only be invoked from a framework concerned with issues beyond the traditional scope of 
justice, a point I will emphasize later in this chapter and the next.  Thus, the Rawlsian well-
ordered society may take into account interpersonal attitudes, but only because of 
considerations outside of justice.      
A final way in which Daniels might expand his Rawlsian approach to address 
interpersonal attitudes is by considering whether they might be taken into account at a 
different stage of Rawls’ political structure.215  So far, my discussion of Rawls has focused 
on the most abstract level of justice, where the two principles are formulated from the 
original position.  In the second part of A Theory of Justice, Rawls lays out a four-tiered 
structure to help determine how the principles might apply given increasing information 
                                                 
215 Thomas Hill initially suggested this as possible reply for Daniels. 
 
 104
about the empirical circumstances in which we find ourselves.216  For example, he suggests 
that during the legislative (third) stage we are to evaluate laws and policies both with 
reference to the two principles and to the procedures decided in the constitutional (second) 
stage.  It is possible that the legislature might adopt policies designed to limit the impact that 
negative attitudes have on SES.  In this way, they could work to address all of the broader 
determinants of health as more empirical information became available in a way that still 
starts from the overall Rawlsian approach.  For now, however, this is a placeholder for a real 
argument.  In the absence of further specification in this area, the mere possibility that 
another argument may be available for Rawls/Daniels does not establish that the position can 
adequately address the effect of interpersonal attitudes on health.  Finally, it is important to 
note that Rawls specifically excludes interpersonal attitudes from the focus of his work in A 
Theory of Justice, writing, “We also call the attitudes and dispositions of persons, and 
persons themselves, just and unjust.  Our topic, however, is that of social justice [emphasis 
added].”217  Social justice, which centers on the basic structure of society, has, at best, a 
derivative concern with interpersonal attitudes.  
Insofar as these replies on behalf of the Daniels/Rawlsian project are insufficient 
there are, as I see it, two options.  The first is to continue to explore the requirements of 
justice so as to broaden its domain to cover the relevant socioeconomic determinants of 
health, including interpersonal attitudes.218  The second is to look outside of justice for 
grounds on which to evaluate the moral permissibility of SES gradients.  If we go the first 
                                                 
216 Rawls, 1999, pp. 171-6. 
 
217 Rawls, 1999, p. 6. 
 
218 For a survey of how various theories of justice might, in their current form, approach the epidemiological 
data cited here see Marchand, et al., 1998, pp. 449-67.  
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route, which will be the topic of the remainder of this chapter, we may have to look to 
conceptions of justice other than Rawls’.  For example, Marmot’s preferred normative 
framework for understanding the relationship between socioeconomic status, autonomy, and 
health disparities comes from the economist Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to justice.  
As with Rawls, it may be helpful to briefly sketch Sen’s general position before explicitly 
focusing on its application to health disparities.   
Capabilities and Status 
Sen’s primary concern is equality in the actual freedom that an individual has to 
choose between the alternative lives she could lead.219  He argues that a person’s life is made 
up of a collection of activities and doings that he labels functionings.  His examples of 
functionings include “being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable 
morbidity and premature mortality . . . being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life 
of the community.”220  When grouped together a collection of functionings makes up a 
particular life.  For example, the life of a physician consists, in part, of performing physical 
exams or interventional procedures; recognizing specific diseases; having certain equipment 
available for these tasks; identifying the appropriate medication, etc.  The life of a journalist 
consists, in part, of identifying stories; interviewing witnesses and participants; taking notes 
and reconstructing them as a written narrative.  There are, of course, certain functionings that 
will be part of most lives—having adequate food and water; communicating; having social 
relationships—and others—taking a patient’s pulse; applying mens rea; working with 
bronze—that are more specialized.  Basic and specialized functionings are closely 
interrelated and build off one another; interviewing a patient requires communicating and a 
                                                 
219 Sen, 1990, p. 114. 
 
220 Sen, 1991, p  39. 
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successful interview with a patient can translate into income that can be used to obtain 
adequate food and water.        
Sen, however, is not concerned with just any sort of being; his focus is on well-being.  
In this regard, he argues that not all lives are equally instances of well-being.  For example, 
picking locks, cracking safes, escaping from the police, etc. are functionings that would, in 
part, constitute the life of a successful thief, but the mere fact that a set of functionings can be 
brought together to form a life does not determine whether we should support someone 
obtaining or having access to those functionings.  Some functionings, he argues, have an 
intrinsic value that makes them worth pursuing.221  These specific functionings form a life of 
well-being.   
Sen does not suggest, however, that there is only one kind of life that constitutes 
being well; there is a plurality of options that people may pursue and their goals may change 
over time as they rethink the kind of life they want.  Sen thus emphasizes the role of choice 
in deciding which set of intrinsically valuable functionings one should try to achieve.  In this 
regard, he defines an individual’s capabilities as the set of lives—or groups of 
functionings—among which she can pick in deciding what particular life she wants to 
attempt to lead.  For example, in order to be capable of becoming a physician, a person must 
be able to achieve a wide range of functionings including having basic needs met—food and 
water, adequate housing, good health—participating in political processes—having freedom 
                                                 
221 The nature of this value is somewhat obscure.  At points, Sen seems to suggest that it springs from basic, 
cross-cultural human needs.  See Sen, 1991, pp. 39-42.  In other places he cashes it out in terms of functionings 
that we would have reason to value, writing “In the capability-based assessment of justice, individuals claims 
are to be assessed . . . in terms of the freedoms [individuals] actually enjoy to choose between different ways of 
living that they can have reason to value.” Sen, 1990, p. 115.  Martha Nussbaum, in developing a variant of 
Sen’s position, argues that a particular set of functionings should be preferred if they can be agreed upon as part 
of an “overlapping census” among individuals who otherwise have significantly different positions on the good 
life for humans.  See Nussbaum, 2000a, p. 124.  
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of speech and freedom from discrimination and violence—accessing non-basic resources—
education, income, medical schools and hospitals—to name a few of the preconditions.  If we 
limit an individual’s access to certain functionings by, for example, denying her the ability to 
participate in political processes or become literate, we significantly restrict the lives she is 
capable of leading and thereby reduce her opportunity to achieve well-being.  In this way, a 
person’s capability set represents her actual freedom to choose between the alternative lives 
she could lead.222  A narrowed capabilities set means that an individual is unable to function 
in ways required to lead certain lives.  Just institutions, Sen argues, should work to establish 
equality in capabilities by supporting access to intrinsically valuable functionings, which 
helps provide everyone the same opportunity to obtain well-being.223   
There are two crucial points of contrast between Sen’s and Rawls’ conceptions of 
justice.224  The first has to do with the basic structure of their theories.  Rawls is interested in 
a contractualist approach to justice.  His goal is to identify fair procedures for how to 
distribute certain resources while remaining neutral between the different conceptions of the 
good life these resources might be used to support.  Recall from Chapter 2 that the 
contractors in the original position have a capacity for a conception of the good as well as the 
ability to revise that conception (they are rational).  They do not, however, endorse any 
particular idea of the good life; the primary goods they acquire are used to support whatever 
                                                 
222 Freedom comes into play at two points in Sen’s theory: first, the capabilities set is an expression of the 
freedom to choose among alternative lives.  Second, Sen argues that freedom to choose is itself an intrinsically 
valuable functioning.  Exactly how these two senses of freedom (and the nature of their values) relate to one 
another is a complicated issue within the theory.  See Sen, 1991, p. 49-51. 
 
223 Nussbaum’s interprets this kind of equality of opportunity as requiring the just state to ensure that its citizens 
stay above a certain threshold of capability.  Nussbaum, 2000a, p. 124. 
 
224 In general, the capabilities approach is thought to represent a conception of justice somewhere between the 
economist Paul Samuelson’s revealed preference utilitarianism and Rawls’ justice as fairness. See Samuelson, 
1947.  Sen rejects both revealed preference utilitarianism and its modern welfarist counterparts.  See Sen, 1973, 
pp. 241-59. 
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life plan they have once the veil of ignorance is lifted.  Sen, in contrast, offers a substantive 
theory of human good, which he believes should direct our actions when determining what 
functionings/capabilities we should support.  He is not primarily interested in fair procedures 
or processes but endorses a ‘metaphysical’ conception of human well-being, as laid out in his 
set of intrinsically valuable functionings, which serves as a normative guide when we are 
assessing the relative injustice of various states of affairs.225 
The second difference between Sen and Rawls, and the more important one where 
health disparities are concerned, is the scope of their respective approaches.  Rawls is 
concerned with the equal distribution of primary goods, resources that provide the means for 
an individual to pursue a specific conception of the good.  In contrast, Sen is interested in the 
actual capabilities into which these resources translate for specific individuals.  Merely 
having equality in resources, Sen suggests, is not sufficient to establish equality in what 
people are capable of doing with those resources.  This is because specific characteristics of 
an individual may make it more or less difficult for her to translate primary goods into 
functionings and thus into an adequate capabilities set.  For example, given the basic function 
of surviving, a patient in congestive heart failure will require significantly more resources to 
achieve this function than one with sinusitis. Supposing equal resources (or even 
significantly more for the heart failure patient), there will still be marked inequality in 
capabilities between these two individuals.   
                                                 
225 Sen had argued that he is not providing a comprehensive doctrine or substantive idea of the good insofar as 
“capability reflects a person’s freedom to choose between alternative lives . . . it’s value need not be derived 
from one particular “comprehensive doctrine” demanding one specific way of living.”  Insofar as Sen restricts 
the set of valuable functionings it is hard to see how he can avoid a commitment to a substantive idea of the 
good even if he leaves up a wide-range of options within that idea.  Sen, 1990, p. 118.  Unlike Sen, Nussbaum 
acknowledges that she is laying out a comprehensive doctrine, but also suggests that insofar as Rawls focuses 
on a specific set of resources in identifying the primary goods, he is doing so as well.  See Crocker, 1992, p. 
599. 
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For Sen, Rawls focuses on the “means to freedom, rather than on the extent of the 
freedom that a person actually has,” while he (Sen) is also concerned with, “the relevant 
personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods into the person’s ability 
to promote her ends.”226  It is worth stressing that this is not necessarily a criticism of Rawls.  
Given his starting point—exploring fair procedures for distributing goods without 
presupposing a particular conception of human well-being—it may emerge that there are fair 
procedures that, when implemented, generate inequalities in capabilities.  Insofar as Sen’s 
project is broader in aim, it may be able to speak to these inequalities, but it is not a criticism 
of Rawls’ approach if it was never designed to address questions regarding the way that 
resources translate into capabilities.       
 In summary, Amartya Sen offers a theory of justice centered on a conception of 
human well-being.  There are certain intrinsically valuable functionings that can be combined 
in different ways to generate a group of possible lives.  Among these functionings are some 
that relate to Rawls’ primary goods (having self-respect and acting freely) as well as 
functionings based on properties that Rawls did not directly consider (having good health).  
The functionings to which we have access establish what we are capable of becoming or, in 
different terms, our opportunity to obtain a life of well-being.  Justice, Sen argues, is 
concerned with equality in capability sets such that states should work to ensure their citizens 
have access to the functionings necessary to achieve this equality.227  The scope of Sen’s 
capabilities approach raises the possibility that he may have more to say about the broader 
                                                 
226 Sen, 1991, p. 81. 
 
227 Importantly, states are not to force their citizens to choose one particular group of intrinsically valuable 
functionings.  The emphasis in Sen’s account is on promoting capabilities.  Perfectionist theories of justice, in 
contrast, argue that the state should promote particular ways of functioning in a more narrow sense than Sen 
permits.  See Arneson, 2000, pp. 37-63. 
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determinants of health than Daniels.228  And, in fact, Marmot argues that the appropriate 
normative framework for thinking about health disparities is through their impact on 
capabilities. 
Like Daniels, Marmot approaches health disparities by way of their relationship to a 
normatively desirable state of affairs, in his case, equality of capabilities.  Recall that 
Marmot’s central thesis is that position within a socioeconomic status (SES) gradient is a 
marker for autonomy.  Having more or less autonomy, in turn, causes neuroendocrine 
changes that lead to health disparities between higher and lower status individuals.  At the 
same time, Marmot also suggests that differences in SES translate into inequalities in 
capabilities.  He writes, “What matters is the degree to which inequalities in rankings [SES] 
lead to inequalities in capabilities—being able to lead the lives [we] most want to lead” 
(Marmot 2004, 240).  Marmot is not, however, introducing a fourth idea here—capabilities—
in addition to SES, autonomy, and health disparities.  Instead, he takes his definition of 
autonomy to be synonymous with Sen’s definition of capabilities.  Marmot understands the 
actual freedom that an individual has to choose between the alternative lives she could lead 
(i.e. her capabilities) to be the same thing as the kind of control that allows an individual to 
determine what exposures she encounters over the course of her life as well as dictate the 
outcome of any negative events that happen to her (i.e. her autonomy).  He writes, “A more 
just distribution of capabilities—control and social engagement—will lead to a more equal 
distribution of health” (Marmot 2004, 249).  Lacking an adequate capabilities set—not being 
able to lead the lives we most want to lead—causes neuroendocrine activation, which 
                                                 
228 It is worth reiterating that Daniels sees the difference between the Rawlsian and capabilities approaches as 
merely terminological, given that the emphasis in both accounts is on protecting health to establish a space of 
exercisable opportunities.  Given that Sen’s approach may allow us to take into account a broader range of 
factors that affect health than Daniels allows, however, there may be a more substantial difference between the 
two positions.  See Daniels, 2001, pp. 5-6. 
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produces poor health.  A more just distribution of capabilities will, therefore, reduce health 
disparities. 
If you can determine your exposures and how well events go for you, you will be able 
to choose among many different possible lives.  You will, according to Marmot, have both 
significant autonomy and a broad capabilities set.  By arguing that equality in capabilities is 
equivalent to achieving equality in autonomy and that it is inequality in autonomy that 
generates health disparities, Marmot is able to connect the epidemiological literature on the 
broader determinants of health with a normative foundation for how to think about the 
permissibility of health disparities. 229  Justice requires equality in capabilities, which is 
equivalent to equality in autonomy.  And, if we equalize autonomy, we will reduce health 
disparities.  In order to achieve this end, we will have to improve access to the broader 
determinants of autonomy, functionings like education, income, vaccination, housing 
environment, etc.  
The philosopher and epidemiologist Jennifer Ruger has also worked to apply the 
capabilities approach to health disparities.  Unlike Marmot, Ruger is not convinced that the 
broader determinants of health work through a single mechanism like autonomy.  Instead, 
she emphasizes that being healthy is an intrinsically valuable functioning and should be 
available within a capability set.  She argues, therefore, that reducing health disparities would 
help create greater equality in capabilities.  She writes, “public policy should focus on the 
ability to function, and health policy should aim to maintain and improve this ability by 
meeting health needs.”230  She is open to the possibility that there are multiple variables that 
                                                 
229 I actually do not think that Marmot’s version of autonomy as control maps on to Sen’s capabilities approach, 
preventing Marmot from drawing normative conclusions from his epidemiological data.   
 
230 Ruger, 2004b, p. 1075. 
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impact health needs, possibly through different mechanisms.  Thus, while Ruger does 
emphasize the impact of employment, education, and participation in social life on health, 
since her focus is on health as a kind of functioning, if it turns out that there are other, more 
important determinants, she can refocus her account on whatever factors the epidemiological 
literature produces. 
There are two other features of Ruger’s extension of Sen that are worth highlighting 
here.  First, while she is interested in the importance of health as a way of functioning, she 
acknowledges that there are other areas in which social change might be enacted that would 
also improve equality of capabilities.  Thus we must weigh the political, social, and 
economic costs of reducing health disparities with other potential interventions that might 
improve equality in the space of capabilities (e.g. income redistribution).  She is also 
concerned not to subsume all redistributive efforts under the rubric of health policy, as she 
believes is the case in Daniels’ work.  Ruger writes, “[My] approach is also cautious about 
extending the traditional boundaries of health policy to include all policy domains that affect 
health.”231  By preserving separate spheres for different functionings, Ruger acknowledges 
that we have to weigh the gains in equality from reducing the impact that different levels of 
health have on capabilities has to be weighed against other changes that might show a larger 
equalization of capabilities.   
Second, because she is concerned with whichever factors go into shaping health, she 
is also open to the possibility that the most effective mechanism for reducing health 
disparities might involve something other than government-directed redistribution of certain 
resources or opportunities (a point of emphasis in Daniels and Marmot).  She writes, “the 
capability perspective also recognizes the importance of . . . including non-governmental 
                                                 
231 Ruger, 2004a, p. 1095. 
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actors and market forces to achieve public policy objectives . . . the movement in global 
health toward better public-private partnerships reflects this view.”232  This opens up a larger 
space for thinking about how to reduce health disparities, whether it turns out that they are 
the result of unequal distribution of primary goods or gradients in socioeconomic 
status/control.  Given the current political climate, which is marked by significant 
disagreement between public versus private approaches to health care provision, 
acknowledging the availability of multiple government and non-government options may be 
the first step toward political progress in this area. 
Capabilities and Attitudes 
Importantly, neither Marmot nor Ruger (nor the Acheson Recommendations) 
specifically address the role that interpersonal attitudes can play in shaping socioeconomic 
status and control.233  But can the capabilities approach be expanded to account for this 
relationship?  One might, in this regard, draw inspiration from Elizabeth Anderson’s use of 
Sen’s framework as part of what she calls democratic equality.  Anderson begins by noting 
that, historically, inequality was not understood so much as to involve an unfair distribution 
of resources but as unequal relationships between higher and lower individuals in a social 
order.  While those of superior rank may have had more goods than the people below them, 
the true mark of inequality, according to Anderson, has to do with the nature of the 
relationship between those to groups.  In an unjust system, “those of superior rank were 
thought entitled to . . . exclude or segregate [inferiors] from social life, to treat them with 
contempt, to force them to obey, work without reciprocation, and abandon their own 
                                                 
232 Ruger, 2004a, p. 1097. 
 
233 Although Ruger notes that, “the capability perspective emphasizes the empowerment of individuals to be 
active agents of change in their own terms,” a phrase that might be interpreted to address the way that 
interpersonal attitudes can disempower individuals.  Ruger, 2004a, p. 1094. 
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cultures.”234  The appropriate aim of justice is to oppose hierarchies that endorse and 
perpetuate this sort of social relationship whereby “some people dominate, exploit, 
marginalize, demean, and inflict violence on others.”235 
From these passages, it should be obvious that Anderson is concerned, in part, with 
whether certain interpersonal attitudes like contempt are appropriate ways for individuals in 
different social strata to relate to one another.  She argues that it is unjustified for contempt 
and hostility to limit, for example, whether gays and lesbians can publicly reveal their 
identities and suggests that attitudes like pity are inappropriate ways for the more fortunate to 
relate to the less fortunate.  She also emphasizes the effect that the internalization of certain 
negative attitudes can have, noting that norms of femininity encourage “self-abnegation, lack 
of confidence, and low self-esteem” and reinforce the lower SES of women, even in the face 
of access to similar resources as men.236  On what grounds, however, are we to judge 
whether a certain attitude or way of relating to an inferior is unjust?  At this point, Anderson 
draws on Sen’s capabilities approach to argue that social relationships that result in redu
in equality in the space of capabilities are unjust.  
ction 
   
                                                
Anderson identifies two sets of functionings that are of greatest concern in this 
context.  First, she suggests that individuals should be able to access functionings that would 
enable them to avoid the effects of oppressive social relationships.237  This is a negative goal 
insofar as it works to prevent one group of people from interfering with another in certain 
 
234 Anderson, 1999, p. 312. 
 
235 Anderson, 1999, p. 313. 
 
236 Anderson, 1999, p. 319. 
 
237 This may be a circular argument if oppressive social relationships are just defined as those interactions that 
reduce equality in capabilities.  At some points, Anderson writes as if the wrongness of oppression exists 
independently of its impact on equal freedoms (capabilities), but, insofar as this is true, she will need a different 
framework to justify our attention toward oppression, which she does not provide.      
 115
ways.  The functionings that Anderson has in mind here include living one’s life without 
excessive domination in personal relationships (as, she suggests, happens to women in some 
developing nations), having certain psychological resources like a sense of self-respect and 
self-esteem, and acting with confidence in one’s affairs.  The importance of these 
functionings, Anderson argues, means that others should not adopt attitudes that would 
threaten to undercut their development. 
The second group of functionings Anderson identifies is those necessary for 
participating as an equal citizen in the state.  This is a positive goal insofar as it requires more 
than just non-interference but active steps to support an individual’s involvement in certain 
social and political processes.  More specifically, Anderson argues that we are obligated to 
provide access to functionings like voting in a fair political process, engaging in free speech, 
petitioning the government, participating in the economy, thinking for oneself, freely 
associating with others, and using public spaces, insofar as involvement in these areas is 
necessary to stand as an equal citizen.238 
Although Anderson focuses on a broad range of functionings, there are some that she 
excludes from being an appropriate focus of justice.  For example, she argues that society is 
under no obligation to ensure that everyone could function as a good card player, if he or she 
so desired.  This is because being bad at cards neither makes one oppressed nor determines 
one’s place in civil society in the way that, for example, being black in the 1930s rural South 
did.  More generally, Anderson is not interested in comprehensive equality in the space 
capabilities, but only equality in the functionings necessary to avoid oppressive social 
                                                 
238 It is important to note that the goal of democratic equality is not to guarantee everyone the same actual level 
of functioning, but equal access to that level.  She writes, “Individuals are free to choose to function at a lower 
level than they are guaranteed.”  Furthermore, she argues that institutions are permitted to make access to 
certain functionings (e.g. income) contingent on appropriate behaviors on the part of a citizen (e.g. working). 
Anderson, 1999, p. 318. 
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relationships and participate in the state as an equal citizen.  In this regard, Anderson’s 
approach may be both broader—insofar as it takes into account the role of interpersonal 
attitudes in shaping status—and narrower—insofar as it addresses only those aspect of 
control that are stunted by oppressive social relationships or unequal civil participation—than 
Marmot’s position. 
 Ruger, Marmot, and Anderson all rely on Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to 
justice in evaluating certain states of affairs (health and health disparities for the first two 
authors; the foundations of democratic equality for the last).  Given that they are engaged in 
somewhat divergent projects, is there a unifying account that might illustrate how the 
capabilities approach would approach health disparities in the developed world?  While 
Marmot’s arguments most directly connect capabilities and health disparities, the approach 
with the least empirical assumptions would be to focus, like Ruger, on being healthy as an 
intrinsically valuable functioning.  Given the goal of equality in capabilities, we are obligated 
to ensure a certain level of healthy functioning.  And, as there are multiple other functionings 
that work to produce health—including, as Anderson suggests, avoiding negative 
interpersonal attitudes—we should also work to ensure that these functionings are also 
available within a capabilities set. 
Criticisms 
I want to identify three general concerns with the capabilities approach before I 
consider its specific merits in addressing health disparities.  First, even if we disagree with 
Rawls that a theory of justice should refrain from endorsing a particular comprehensive 
doctrine or substantive position on human well-being, we might have specific worries about 
the group of functionings that Sen identifies as intrinsically valuable.  Why these 
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functionings?  Why not picking locks or getting away with murder?  The concern is that 
Sen’s list just represents the norms (having self-respect; being literate) of the Western 
cultural tradition and has no more substantial claim to objectivity than that.  It is difficult to 
decide exactly how to phrase this objection (and how seriously to take it), but the territory—
cultural relativism, anti-universalism, etc—is familiar enough.239  Concerns about the 
‘objectivity’ of any particular idea of human well-being are a well-rehearsed complaint 
against the capabilities approach.  Both Sen and his collaborator, the philosopher and 
classicist Martha Nussbaum, have provided arguments regarding the culture-transcendence or 
universality or reason-giving force of the functionings that each defends.240  I mention this 
issue here only to note that there is a significant meta-ethical debate to be settled over the 
possibility of an ‘objective’ list of functionings (or transcultural theory of human well-
being).241 
Second, even granting that there are intrinsically valuable, non-parochial functionings 
it is unclear why we should aim for equality in capabilities.  Sen may be correct about the 
importance of being free to choose amongst different alternative lives, but this point is 
separate from the idea that everyone should have equal freedom in this regard.  There are 
many goods whose importance we recognize, but whose distribution we do not necessarily 
require to be equal.  For example, a libertarian might argue that, even though having food 
and water might be very important—even essential—for surviving, this is not enough to 
show that we should make sure everyone is equal with regard to these resources, especially if 
                                                 
239 See Rorty, 1993, pp. 111-34. 
 
240 See Nussbaum and Sen, 1989, pp. 229-325. Nussbaum, 2000b, pp. 34-59.   
 
241 A more interesting question is whether or not Sen and Nussbaum’s approach makes sense without the 
teleological assumptions that allow Aristotle to ask meaningful questions about functioning well as a human 
being. 
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doing so would violate the rights of others.  In response to this concern, Nussbaum (but not 
Sen) has argued that the requirement for equalizing capabilities springs from the Kantian idea 
that we respect human dignity (or treat each person as an end).242  Since dignity is a constant 
property across individuals, if we are going to work to improve the capabilities of any 
particular person or group out of respect for his/their dignity, we must do so equally for 
everyone else.  While this may help explain the grounds for equality of capabilities, it 
introduces a number of other questions including the nature of respect for persons and why 
changing capabilities is the appropriate way of expressing that respect.243 
Third, where health is concerned, the historical motivation for focusing on equality in 
access to the resources that promote good health is that ensuring equality in health is thought 
to be an inappropriate (and possibly unobtainable) social goal.244  Given Ruger’s focus on 
health as a valuable functioning that should be part of a person’s capabilities set, requiring 
equality in these sets may have undesirable consequences.  As I noted in Chapter 2, 
demanding equality in health would place a significant strain on the institutional resources 
that could be used to achieve other ends.  Because a certain level of health is necessary to 
have even a minimal range of choices within a capabilities set, requiring equality in 
capabilities entails that we work to ensure citizens do not fall below this threshold.  Putting 
aside cases where such efforts are frankly impossible—for example, there is no medical 
intervention that will make a neonate with anencephaly have even an approximation of the 
capability set of a normocephalic neonate—there are many diseases where the costs of 
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244 As Beachamp and Childress, 1994, note, egalitarian theories of justice, “propose that persons be provided an 
equal distribution of certain goods such as health care, but all prominent egalitarian theories of justice are 
cautiously formulated to avoid making equal sharing of all possible social benefits [like good health] a 
requirement of justice.”   
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providing a minimal capabilities set are prohibitive.  For example, patients with end-stage 
heart failure (i.e. symptoms at rest) could be given a dramatic increase in the freedom to 
choose among alternative lives (an expanded capabilities set) if they underwent heart 
transplants, but this does not mean that we are obligated to find the needed hearts, artificial or 
otherwise.  Patients are not entitled to whatever resources are necessary to maintain certain 
capabilities or even the resources needed to continue functioning at all. 
Again, Nussbaum has offered one response to this problem, which is to suggest that 
the threshold at which equality of capabilities is guaranteed is sufficient high enough to 
support basic medical care, but not so high that it demands the use of every possible 
resource.245  In the heart failure example, we may be obligated to provide access to inotropes, 
oxygen, diuretics, ventricular assist devices, and pacemakers but not to transplants.  More 
generally, Nussbaum argues that the threshold is best set for each individual government 
based on the current capabilities and resources of its population and how those are 
distributed.246  She does, however, leave it open as to whether justice might require further 
equalization above this threshold.247 
 Assuming that these more general criticisms can be adequately addressed, I suspect 
that a combined Ruger/Anderson account has the resources, if appropriately developed, to 
address many of the broader factors that create health disparities, including interpersonal 
                                                 
245 In her more recent work, Ruger has also adopted a threshold account, arguing that her approach, “supports 
the allocation of resources to those with health needs in efforts to bring them as close as possible to a threshold 
level of functioning as their circumstances permit.”  In dealing with the problem of “bottomless pits,” Ruger 
argues for an account of medically appropriate versus inappropriate or futile care that can be used to draw a line 
concerning the amount of resources we are obligated to provide a particular person.  She also adopts a 
“reasonable accommodation” standard when evaluating how much resources we are to devote to providing the 
disabled access to the threshold level of functioning.  Ruger, 2006, p. 441. 
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attitudes.  Like Daniels, however, these writers examine the distribution of goods and status 
through their effect on an independent state of affairs; namely, equality of capabilities.  I 
again want to emphasize—as I did at the beginning of Chapters 2 and 5—the basic structure 
of this kind of approach.   
Starting with the empirical premise that differences in socioeconomic status—
whether mediated through autonomy or otherwise—create health disparities, what is the 
appropriate normative response to these disparities?  For simplicity, let us focus on one 
aspect of SES gradients: suppose that differences in income are a leading cause of health 
disparities.  Daniels argues that health disparities translate into inequality of opportunity—an 
unjust and unjustified state of affairs—and that we should, therefore, reduce differences in 
income as a corrective.  He does, however, have to go back and investigate whether such a 
move is justified within the Rawlsian framework and, if so, on what grounds and to what 
extent.  As it turns out, Rawls’ discussion of the other primary goods does offer a reason to 
reduce differences in income (by way of the difference principle). 
Now, let us take the same empirical starting point—differences in income create 
health disparities—and examine how Ruger’s approach is structured.  She argues that health 
disparities translate into inequality of capabilities—an unjust and unjustified state of 
affairs—and that we should, therefore, reduce differences in income.  Like Daniels, Ruger 
has to go back and try to determine if such a move is justified within Sen’s approach.  Is 
having a certain degree of income a valuable functioning to which we should equalize 
access?  If it is a valuable functioning, the capabilities approach offers a reason to reduce 
differences in income. 
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Now consider a different empirical premise: persistent stigmatization through 
negative interpersonal attitudes creates health disparities.  Such disparities still lead to 
inequality of opportunity or capabilities, but now, when Daniels examines the Rawlsian 
framework for grounds on which we might address these attitudes, there is nothing to 
account for the impermissibility of adopting such attitudes, or so I have argued.  In contrast, I 
have suggested that, when Ruger looks for guidance in this regard from the capabilities 
approach, she is more successful.  Elizabeth Anderson has argued that we should be able to 
access functionings that would enable us to avoid the effects of oppressive social 
relationships (i.e. the stigmatizing effects of interpersonal attitudes).   
These are just two examples of the factors that create SES gradients, which in turn, 
lead to health disparities.  We can, as Ruger suggests, iterate a theory of justice across all of 
the things that work to produce SES (and health), but insofar as the focus is on equality of 
capabilities, only the determinants of SES that can be justifiably leveraged to reach this 
condition will fall under the domain of the theory.  As Anderson notes, however, the goal of 
Sen’s approach is not comprehensive equality in the space capabilities.  Thus it remains an 
open question as to whether, like Daniels, there will be some factors that shape SES and 
health that are not an appropriate focus of justice (conceived of as equality of capabilities) 
but are nevertheless morally relevant.  If our concern is with which health disparities are 
justified then it may be worth turning our attention directly to the forces that shape health 
without wondering how these factors fit into a space of equality or worrying about whether 
they fall under the domain of justice.  For the remainder of this dissertation I want to sketch a 
different option, which is to turn to theories that treat the creation and promulgation of 
socioeconomic status gradients as their primary concern.  
Chapter VII: A Theory of Socioeconomic Status 
 
In 1993, a group of social scientists conducted a study on the attitudes of women from 
Eastern North Carolina toward breast cancer.248  In particular, they were trying to understand 
why black women were significantly more likely than white women to present with advanced 
breast cancer.  Besides race, the factor they found to be most correlated with late presentation 
was a high degree of fatalism, which was closely tied to perceived control.249  One of the 
women in the study reported that, “When you know you have cancer, then there’s nothing for 
it but to turn it over to God.  If you have enough faith, He will heal it and you don’t need no 
operation.  Because there is nothing a doctor can do for you—only God has the power.”250  
The idea that these women’s lives were not under their control—that they were beholden to 
external forces, whether supernatural, in the form of God, or natural, coming from the 
demands of their families and the men around them—was a consistent theme in the study.  
Given that late presentation is closely related to mortality rates from the disease, this is 
another case in which perceived control—no doubt related to a lifetime of low 
socioeconomic status—directly impacts health.251     
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 Even when black women seek timely care, however, they still have worse outcomes 
than white women with breast cancer.  For example, the black women with breast cancer 
who come to the cancer clinic in North Carolina where I work are 1.2 times more likely to 
die than white women with similar demographics, cancer stage, and tumor characteristics.252  
In terms of overall cancer rates, blacks in the United States are more likely to develop cancer 
than other populations, with an incidence between 1992-1999 of 526 per 100,000 compared 
to 480 for whites and 330 for Hispanics.253  American blacks are also more likely to die from 
malignant tumors, with a 30% higher death rate than whites from all cancers.254  
I began this dissertation with a list of health inequalities like the cancer disparities 
between black and white patients in North Carolina and throughout the United States.  The 
central question has been whether it is morally acceptable for these disparities to exist, 
assuming that action could be taken to reduce them.  Based on new epidemiological data on 
health inequalities, I have suggested that this question is best understood as being about 
whether it is acceptable for there to be significant differences in socioeconomic status (or 
control, if that is how the effect is mediated), with the result being differences in health.  
Daniels and Ruger have argued that such arrangements are unacceptable because they are 
unjust and they are unjust because differences in health translate into significant disparities in 
opportunity/capabilities.  At the end of the last chapter I suggested an alternative approach, 
which was to directly ask—without first offering a theory of justice or an explanation of the 
injustice of poor health—whether it is acceptable for there to be significant differences in 
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socioeconomic status.  I will refer to a moral framework that attempts to address this question 
as a theory of socioeconomic status.   
A Theory of Socioeconomic Status 
 At the beginning of A Theory of Justice, Rawls suggests that the concept of justice 
concerns the distribution of rights, duties, and the advantages of social cooperation within the 
basic institutions of society.  In contrast, a conception of justice is a set of principles that 
specifies how we should arrange our institutions so as to appropriately apportion basic rights 
and duties and to weigh claims regarding the advantages of social life.255  Individual 
conceptions of justice give content to the concept ‘justice.’  For example, Rawls’ conception 
of justice as fairness gives us two distributive principles necessary for operating just, basic 
institutions.  Justice is not, however, the only attribute of social arrangements.  They can be 
efficient, stable, liberal, tolerant, or possess a range of other virtues.  Each of these concepts 
will have particular conceptions according to which we are to arrange our institutions so as to 
meet a certain standard of, for example, efficiency.  While this means that we need a further 
mechanism for weighing the various (conflicting) recommendations of these conceptions, 
when taken in sum, they form a conception of a social ideal or “a vision of the way in which 
the aims and purposes of social cooperation are to be understood.”256   
Consider the following analogy to Rawls’ discussion: first, the concept of 
socioeconomic status concerns the value individuals should have based on their social and 
economic characteristics, and the appropriate response to that value.  Second, a conception of 
socioeconomic status is a set of principles designed to identify the social and economic 
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features according to which we should value a person and how to respond to that value.257  
As with justice, a conception of socioeconomic status gives content to the concept 
‘socioeconomic status.’  Importantly, a conception of socioeconomic status is, in this sense, 
normative rather than descriptive.  It is not interested in whether, for example, level of 
education is adequately taken into account when evaluating the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and health disparities.  The question of what collection of features best 
measures socioeconomic status in a given environment is a descriptive task best left to 
epidemiologists.  In contrast, a normative conception of socioeconomic status is focused on 
whether, for example, level of education is an appropriate ground on which to value persons 
differently and, if so, how should we treat better (or worse) educated individuals.   
As justice is not the only attribute of institutions, however, socioeconomic 
characteristics are not the only attributes of persons.  Individuals can, for example, be more 
or less rational. 258  Various conceptions of rational status will identify the value we have 
based on our degree of rationality as well as how to respond to that value.  For example, 
creatures who display means-ends reasoning might warrant a different value and response 
compared to those who can reason about their ends compared to those who display no 
rationality whatsoever.  As is the case with the various aspects of institutions, we may need a 
further mechanism for weighing the (potentially conflicting) recommendations of these 
conceptions regarding our value.  Taken together, however, they represent a conception of 
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Ultimately I think that these economic characteristics can be reduced to ‘social’ features if we understand that 
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discussed in previous chapters, I will, however, continue to uses the term ‘socioeconomic status.’ 
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center of ethical theories, especially utilitarianism. 
 126
status, which covers the overall value we should have in the eyes of others and what the 
appropriate response should be to that value.   
At this point, it may be tempting to think that the right conception of rational status 
will settle the question of whether and to what degree we should value persons based on their 
social and economic characteristics, thus eliminating the need for a separate theory of SES.  
Ensuring that we respond appropriately to one another as rational agents may be our first 
responsibility—in the same way that establishing just institutions is our first obligation when 
producing social arrangements—but I do not believe that it exhausts the question of how we 
should treat one another.  This is especially true if we think that very little follows from the 
bare fact of personhood (or rationality) and that the more important question is how we 
should treat people given their social features.259  Just as there are still questions of efficiency 
or tolerance in the society governed by Rawls’ two principles, questions not settled by his 
conception of justice, there will still be the matter of how to esteem or disesteem persons 
based on their social and economic characteristics, even after we have adequately responded 
to them as rational agents.  Furthermore, insofar as a specific conception of rational status (or 
the status we have merely as persons, to put the point in a slightly less Kantian way) does 
make recommendations about how we should value one another’s social or economic 
characteristics, I believe that that part of the position should also be understood as providing 
a conception of socioeconomic status.   
Given that the question of what follows from the basic fact of personhood (or agency, 
rationality, etc.) is still open, there is a significant moral territory to be explored concerning 
the appropriate conception of socioeconomic status.  We should not assume in advance that 
the answer to the former debate will settle the latter, although it may lay the foundations for 
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what an adequate theory of socioeconomic status might look like.  My focus in this chapter, 
then, will be on the concept of socioeconomic status (SES).  I want to begin by examining 
several historical conceptions of SES as a way to explicate the more general concept.  My 
goal will be to illustrate how a moral framework focused on SES might think about health 
disparities and to contrast this approach with that offered by theories centered on justice.  In 
the next chapter I will discuss one particular conception of SES, based on the idea of a 
minimal threshold of status, and show how it might be used to generate specific 
recommendations regarding health disparities in the developed world.     
Conceptions of Socioeconomic Status 
Consider the system of hereditary entitlements in place for most of European history 
as one conception of SES.  The European feudal and, later, monarchial social structures were 
centered on the idea that the value a person should have in the eyes of others was, first and 
foremost, determined by the circumstances of his birth.  Individuals of noble heritage—kings 
and queens and their Court—were accorded the highest value.  People of increasingly 
‘common’ origin were seen as less and less valuable.  The Indian caste system, the feudal 
structure in Medieval Japan, and the Zhouh dynasty in China, which introduced the Mandate 
of Heaven, can all be understood as offering a conception of SES on this model.  It is 
important to note, however, that the hereditary conception is not merely descriptive—it does 
not just identify those features that in a particular social setting do, in fact, give individuals 
more or less value in the eyes of others—but it is prescriptive, telling us why we should view 
people as having a higher or lower value.   
For example, the Divine Right of Kings can be understood as a claim about why we 
ought to think of Kings as having a certain SES.  First espoused as part of a British legal 
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framework regarding the authority of the King, it reached its culmination under James I and 
Charles I in the context of the Counter-Reformation.260  The Divine Right of Kings 
established a close connection between theological and political power such that the English 
King was variously seen as God’s representative on Earth or even as a direct manifestation of 
God (“Kings are visible gods and God an invisible king” was the phrase that opened 
Parliamentary debates under James I).261  As God had attendants and subjects in heaven, 
arranged from the Archangels to the Choirs of Heaven to the ordinary souls, so did the 
English Kings on Earth.  The House of Lords, the House of Commons, the craftsmen, and the 
laborers—positions determined largely by the circumstances of one’s birth—represented the 
corresponding positions in his hierarchy.   
 The Divine Right of Kings, along with its broader hereditary framework, represents a 
conception of SES.  It identifies the social and economic grounds on which we are to 
evaluate one another—the kind of life, whether noble or ignoble, into which we are born—
and what the appropriate response is to that value.  In the case of the British King, his value, 
as predicated on his divine status, was such that he should be allowed to rule, other citizens 
should pay him taxes, he should be granted rights to land, etc.  In this context, the Divine 
Right of Kings created such legal fictions as the idea that the king could do no wrong; that he 
was immortal (“the king is dead, long live the king”), and that, just as God provided divine 
law, so the English King authored Earthly law.  By themselves, the things that the King was 
given—power, wealth, property—did not establish his SES, but were reflections of what 
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having a certain SES entails.262  Of course, not all high SES positions within hereditary 
frameworks have been associated with reactions we would consider beneficial.  For example, 
early Spanish observers of Aztec rituals noted that each year a young man would be chosen 
to represent the god Tezcatlipoca and would live a correspondingly high status life during 
that time.263  At the end of the year, he would be sacrificed in honor of the god.  In this case, 
the appropriate response to a highly valued individual was to kill him.   
 On the other end of the spectrum, the grounds on which someone is ascribed low SES 
also identify the appropriate reactions to him.  The position of the Untouchables in the Indian 
caste system was understood to reflect the (bad) karma they had acquired in a previous 
incarnation.  The Law of Karma justified the low SES of the Untouchables; they deserved 
this SES because of their actions in a past life.  As such, it was appropriate for them to work 
in occupations that would make them ‘contaminated’ like burying the dead; to be isolated 
from the rest of the community; to be forced to walk backward and sweep up their footprints 
so that high Caste individuals would not accidentally come into contact with any part of an 
Untouchable.  The Karmic underpinnings of their SES also made it inappropriate for the 
Untouchables to have access to resources like education that would help them have a ‘better’ 
life.   
 It should be obvious from these examples that the two parts of a conception of SES—
the value we should have based on our social and economic characteristics and the 
appropriate response to that value—are closely connected.  The characteristics by which our 
socioeconomic value is determined help set up, for example, the resources, goods, attitudes, 
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it.  For the sake of simplicity, however, I will put this point aside. 
 
263 See Sahagún, 1982.  
 130
and rights that accrue to such a value.  The SES of European Kings was predicated on their 
relationship to God, giving them a value that generated absolute rights of sovereignty.  In 
contrast, for the Untouchables, the way in which their value was ‘assigned’ through the 
Karmic wheel also provided the grounds on which others were not to work to improve their 
conditions.  Such efforts would represent an interference with the Karmic cycle and so 
nothing should be done, for example, to educate the Untouchables.  When political authority 
was taken away from the European Kings and social interventions were undertaken to 
improve the lives of the Untouchables, part of what allowed these changes to take place was 
a rejection of the conception of SES that underwrote the hereditary assignment of value.  
Kings were not God’s representatives on Earth, did not have absolute authority, and should 
not have a certain value merely because of the circumstances of their birth.  The 
Untouchables were not the victims of Karmic retribution but of pernicious social conditions 
that justified their being deprived of basic necessities.  In both cases, the rejection of the 
underlying conception of SES meant denying that value should be ascribed in certain ways.  
 In contemporary social systems, SES conceptions tend to be more meritocratic with 
lower or higher SES based on what goods and resources individuals have achieved using 
their talents and motivations.  Examples of this conception of SES might include Ayn Rand’s 
Objectivism and Milton Friedman’s version of laissez-faire markets developed in his 
Capitalism and Freedom.  Here, SES is not accorded because of the turns of Karma or 
because a certain arrangement fits with a divine plan but because it is the just desert of hard 
work and ability.  In contrast to the hereditary conception of SES, the perceived worth of 
goods like income, education, housing, occupational position, etc. do work to establish social 
position insofar as they have been earned appropriately (and not merely given because of the 
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circumstances of one’s birth).  While the specific goods that mark off high SES may vary 
depending on which meritocratic conception we endorse, in general, higher SES should be 
given to those who have used their talents and abilities to accumulate certain goods while the 
lazy and untalented deserve the low social position that comes with lacking such resources.  
The idea that value should be ascribed based on what we achieve with our talents and 
motivations also helps direct our response to high and low SES individuals.  Because those 
with high SES have earned certain goods and resources, it is not appropriate to take them 
away and give them to low SES people (who do not deserve them).  Furthermore, we are to 
esteem and emulate individuals who have earned their high SES and disesteem and avoid the 
others.  
Not all conceptions of SES support as steeply a structured hierarchy as the 
meritocratic and hereditary positions.  For example, a radical egalitarian conception of SES 
might hold that we ought to value one another equally regardless of differences in social and 
economic characteristics, including the circumstances of our birth or what goods we achieve 
with our talents and motivations.  Such a conception might be most closely linked with 
certain kinds of Communism (recall the use of ‘comrade’ amongst Marxist-Leninists, 
regardless of rank, or the replacement of the honorifics ‘Miss’ and ‘Mister’ with ‘citizen’ 
amongst French revolutionaries).  In its strongest form, this position would hold that there are 
no social or economic differences between people that should translate into their being more 
or less valued or subject to esteem or disesteem based on their perceived value.264  We 
should not support a hierarchy in which some individuals have higher or lower SES. 
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conception of socioeconomic status; instead, they may be better understood as holding that our status as persons 
(or rational agents) settles the question of whether or not we should use social or economic characteristics to 
evaluate one another (we shouldn’t).  In the case of Marxism, however, it is not clear to what extent their 
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A minimal threshold conception of SES, which I will discuss in more detail in the 
next chapter, might hold that, while it may be appropriate for some individuals to have higher 
SES than others, there is a certain level of SES below which the lowest members ought not to 
fall.  We might, for example, think that treating an individual or group with long-standing 
contempt is sufficient to lower their SES below this minimal level such that we ought not to 
adopt this attitude toward them.  A different way of expressing this point is that no one 
should have the SES that a person would have if she were the same person, only allowed to 
be treated with contempt.  We could iterate this sort of move across all or a range of the 
potential determinants of SES, depending on what we thought a minimal level should reflect.  
We might believe that a minimum of SES requires that individuals not be allowed to die from 
easily treatable diseases.  That is, no one should have the SES a person would have if it were 
permissible to allow her to die from easily treatable diseases.  A modified egalitarian 
conception of SES might be silent concerning what other features we ought to take into 
consideration when bestowing higher SES or it might recommend some social and economic 
characteristics that deserve higher SES—Hard work?  Attractiveness?  Diligent pursuit of 
self-interest?—and hold that all other factors should be irrelevant.  In this case, we mark out 
certain ways of determining SES as impermissible but allow that SES gradients can develop 
around other characteristics. 
 Each of the above conceptions also tells us which grounds are inappropriate for 
valuing other people.  For example, the hereditary conception of SES might say that we 
should not value a person based on his wealth—that money is not sufficient to give someone 
                                                                                                                                                       
redistributive conclusions came from facts about personhood; instead, the position was largely centered on a 
modified version of Ricardo’s labor theory of value.  In the case of other radical egalitarian positions—Ronald 
Dworkin’s work, possibly—I think that, insofar as it provides an answer to what social or economic features 
make persons more or less valuable, it should be thought of as offering a conception of SES even if it is built 
from a more basic conception of personhood. 
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high SES if he is not born into it.  In contrast, a meritocratic conception of SES might suggest 
that no one is to be accorded higher value based on characteristics that he did not earn, like 
noble birth.  Similarly, it would be inappropriate to treat people as having low SES based on, 
for example, race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.  For the radical egalitarian 
conception there are no grounds on which it is appropriate to assign higher or lower 
socioeconomic value; for the minimal threshold approach, there is a certain level of SES 
below which the lowest members ought not to fall. 
 It is important to note that I am not defending a particular conception of SES but 
illustrating the territory that a theory of SES would cover.  Once we have settled on a 
particular conception of SES, we can then consider how closely the way SES is determined 
in our world mirrors the way in which it should be accorded.  For example, a person with a 
meritocractic conception of SES would have extensive recommendations for change when 
confronted with a mid-17th century European SES system as would a person with a 
hereditary conception of SES when viewing contemporary America’s version of meritocracy.  
But how do we move from the ways in which we currently determine SES to appropriately 
distributing it according to the conception of SES we have chosen?  There are at least two 
mechanisms for changing SES gradients. 
 The first is to convince people to stop valuing each other in certain ways.  For 
example, if we want people to stop using race as grounds on which to treat people as having 
higher or lower SES, there are a number of options.  We can encourage a social climate in 
which people who evaluate SES based on race are, themselves, disesteemed.  This was (and 
is) a large part of the efforts to end race-based discrimination in the United Statues; namely, 
changing norms about how we view racists.  By subjecting these people to disesteem we 
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reinforce the idea that it is not appropriate to treat certain people as having low SES because 
of their race.265  Such an approach, whether it involves the use of disesteem or taking other 
valued possessions from a person willing to ascribe low (or high) SES based on an 
inappropriate characteristic, would, over time, affect the way SES is distributed.   
One only has to consider the impact that using certain slurs—Don Imus referring to 
the Rutgers women’s basketball team as “nappy-head hos”; Isaiah Washington calling T.R. 
Knight a “faggot”; George Allan referring to an Indian man as a “macaca”—has on a 
person’s career to see this process in action.  Not only were these individuals disesteemed 
because of the characteristics by which they (improperly) value others, but they were also 
threatened with the loss of other things they cared about.  Don Imus’ radio program was 
cancelled; Isaiah Washington was fired from the television series Grey’s Anatomy; George 
Allan lost his campaign for the Senate.  Given sufficient negative or positive incentives 
people will at least refrain from publicly expressing the idea that race or sexually orientation 
are appropriate grounds for treating someone as having low SES. 
 Some beliefs about the social and economic grounds on which people should be 
valued will undoubtedly be very resistant to change, even in the face of disesteem or other 
incentives.  More extreme efforts to alter these beliefs—for example, subjecting racists to 
prolonged public humiliation or even imprisoning them—may be inconsistent with the values 
at the center of the new conception of SES.  For example, a minimal threshold position might 
hold that only those mechanisms that would still acknowledge a certain level of value can be 
used to change a person’s beliefs about the low SES of others.  In this context, it might be 
                                                 
265 Brennan and Pettit have argued that the distribution of esteem can serve as an alternative mechanism to the 
invisible hand of the market and the iron hand of government for moderating social behavior.  By changing the 
way we esteem certain actions—for example, the expression of contempt toward minorities—we can discourage 
their continuation.  Brennan and Pettit, 2004.  
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inappropriate to imprison someone who refuses to renounce her own views on how people 
should be valued.  With regard to highly resistant beliefs about SES, the role of education 
becomes critical.  Even if one generation’s (inappropriate) conception of SES cannot be 
altered, steps can be taken to ensure that that conception is not passed on and the appropriate 
social and economic grounds for valuing persons is taught to the next generation.266 
 The second mechanism for bringing existing SES gradients into closer alignment with 
our chosen conception of SES is not to change what people value but to change how it is 
distributed.  For example, on the radical egalitarian conception of SES, given that there 
should be no difference between the highest and lowest members of the SES gradient, we 
should redistribute almost all the relevant determinants of SES.  If Gucci watches cement 
high SES in our world then everyone gets a Gucci watch; if differences in income affect the 
value we accord one another, then we should redistribute income; and similarly with 
education.  If everyone has the thing of value—what makes them warrant higher SES—then 
these things will, over time, cease to be grounds on which we different between one another 
since they are possessed by all.  For those determinants of SES that cannot be so obviously 
redistributed—for example, circumstances of birth, personal traits like beauty, or scare 
resources like diamonds—we would presumably rely on the first type of mechanism, 
changing what people value, in order to alter SES gradients. 
 Regardless of which conception of SES we adopt, once we have arranged a system so 
as to properly reflect the grounds on which we should value one another’s social and 
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economic traits, we will be left with a SES gradient of a certain degree.267  Depending on the 
particular characteristics identified as being appropriate determinants of higher SES and how 
widely shared these features are, the gradient will be more or less steep.  In some instances, 
like the hereditary system, there will be a marked difference in SES between the highest and 
lowest groups, between the king and the serfs.  In other cases, like the radical egalitarian 
system, there will be little, if any, SES differential between individuals.  Given the 
relationship between SES—whether mediated through control or otherwise—each 
conception of SES will also condone a certain degree of health disparities, directly correlated 
to the steepness of the gradient it permits.   
Importantly, because SES is only one aspect of an overall theory of status, a 
conception of SES will not completely answer the question of which health disparities are 
morally acceptable.268  It will have to be coupled with, for example, the appropriate 
conception of what we owe persons as rational agents (or merely as persons, outside of their 
social or economic features).  In the absence of a consensus on what follows morally from 
the fact of personhood, however, a conception of SES will still prove useful in assessing the 
moral status of health disparities.  As a first pass, with potential modifications to follow 
based on our final vision of overall status, differences in health in our world would be 
acceptable only if they would still exist in a world in which SES is distributed appropriately.  
In this way, we can begin to move from a conception of SES to a judgment about which 
health disparities are acceptable.    
                                                 
267 This raises a separate question, also of concern for various conceptions of justice, as to how we ought to 
arrange policies and institutions so as to best ensure the stability of the status (or, in the case of justice, the 
distributive institutions) of groups and individuals. 
 
268 This will not be true for theories that build their conception of SES out of a conception of rational agency 
(potentially like the radical egalitarian).  In this case, the whole system will hang together so as to spell out how 
we should treat one another both in terms of our status as persons (or agents, etc.) and as persons with such-and-
such social and economic features. 
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 To summarize, while a conception of justice tells us how to distribute basic rights and 
liberties and how to apportion the advantages of social cooperation, a conception of SES 
identifies the value we should have based on our social and economic characteristics and the 
appropriate response to that value.  Given a world in which some institutions are unjust, a 
conception of justice should also tell us how to remedy this situation and how to ensure the 
stability of the just institutions that emerge.  Similarly, given a world in which individuals are 
valued on inappropriate grounds, a conception of SES should identify how to change this 
situation.  I have suggested two possible mechanisms: altering peoples’ current beliefs about 
what characteristics give a person higher or lower SES or redistributing the (inappropriate) 
determinants of value such that everyone has access to them thus ceasing to be grounds on 
which we could distinguish between persons.  When these goals have been accomplished, the 
result will be a SES hierarchy of a certain steepness, depending on how widely the 
determinants of SES are distributed.  When coupled with an adequate theory of overall 
status, whatever health disparities this distribution produces are morally acceptable because 
they arise from morally acceptable ways of treating one another. 
Why Socioeconomic Status? 
I now want to highlight four reasons why we might prefer to approach health 
disparities through a theory of SES.  First, as I suggested at the end of the last chapter, 
Daniels and Ruger start with the moral standing of health disparities and work their way 
backward to the moral standing of the determinants of health.  In contrast, starting with a 
theory of SES, we do not have to worry about whether a particular socioeconomic 
determinant of health will fall under the domain of justice since we will be focusing directly 
on these factors.  As additional epidemiological literature on the broader determinants of 
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health becomes available, particular conceptions of SES will be able to directly address how 
these determinants should be distributed without first considering their relationship to just 
institutions.   
Second, starting from a theory of SES has the advantage of side-stepping the problem 
of health-care resources sinks.  Recall that, given Ruger’s focus on health as a valuable 
functioning that should be equally part of our capabilities set, she has to consider how many 
resources we are required to devote to ensuring a certain level of health.  In contrast, a theory 
of SES treats health disparities as an emergent phenomenon of whatever socioeconomic 
gradient is produced from the conception of SES we endorse.  The focus is on the slope of 
certain gradients rather than on the use health has for a particular individual in determining 
what she is capable of becoming.  Once the determinants of SES are distributed 
appropriately, it is justified for someone’s worse health to limit her opportunities or 
capabilities set and we are not required to spend excessive resources to bring her up to a 
certain minimum level of healthy functioning.   
A third advantage of this approach is that it allows us to draw on a wider array of 
mechanisms to address health disparities than are available within a theory of justice.  Recall 
that the concept of justice, as Rawls understands it, is focused on the appropriate arrangement 
of institutions.  Daniels’ expansion of the Rawlsian framework is concerned with how to alter 
social institutions (public and private) so as to reduce health disparities, but leaves out the 
role that individuals may have—independently of their role as agents of institutional 
change—in this regard.  Daniels mechanisms for addressing the broader determinants of 
health are all built around institutional revision, for example, in taxation and redistribution of 
income, the education system, public health provision, and health care access.  In contrast, a 
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theory of SES is not wedded to the idea that change in socioeconomic gradients must be 
conducted through institutional channels.  For example, a radical egalitarian conception of 
SES might hold that, while institutions should be arranged to redistribute certain resources—
for example, Prada sunglasses—so as to reduce SES gradients, it is incumbent on individuals 
to stop disvaluing one another based on certain attributes—for example, race.  In the latter 
case, the responsibility is on citizens not to change their institutions but to change the way 
that they treat one another.   
More generally, while a particular conception of SES will tell us which grounds are 
appropriate for valuing one another, it is not committed to any specific mechanism for 
encouraging the appropriate realization of that value.  In fact, institutions do not have to play 
a role at all; it may simply be a moral obligation for people to give part of their income to 
others or to work to ensure equality in educational opportunities as part of an overall duty to 
reduce SES gradients.  Putting aside the question of whether this reduction could actually be 
achieved without institutional arrangements to ensure that citizens fulfill their moral duties, it 
is still possible that a conception of SES would endorse entirely non-institutional 
mechanisms of change.  This flexibility has a number of promising features when it comes to 
thinking about health disparities.   
For example, the focus on non-institutional mechanisms for addressing health 
disparities emphasizes the role that individuals have in creating—and reducing—the SES 
gradients that generate differences in health.  There is a tendency to think about a problem as 
large and complex as, for example, the relative cancer mortality rates of blacks and whites in 
the United States as being solvable only through institutional change.  While this may be 
partially correct, such a view encourages citizens to distance themselves from the problem, 
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leaving it up to elected officials to create solutions.  And, when the political process fails to 
move forward or gets the institutional structure wrong, this can leave us with the impression 
that the problem is intractable and that we have minimal responsibilities to enact change 
ourselves.  If the government cannot adequately address health disparities, the thought goes, 
what chance do I have as just one person?  In contrast, a conception of SES that emphasizes 
the role interpersonal attitudes have in creating and reinforcing health disparities can make it 
clear that change must be mediated not merely through institutional rearrangements but by 
individual citizens in their daily lives.  One should not, for example, treat others as inferior 
because of their race or ethnicity, regardless of the current shape of our institutions.  
Ultimately, it is the way that individuals and groups value one another that creates 
differences in SES and health.  We do not necessarily have to appeal to political or 
institutional change—although this certainly may help—to alter such methods of valuing or 
their outcomes. 
The flexibility that the SES-based approach gives us reinforces the idea that merely 
changing access to health care is insufficient to adequately address health disparities.  As I 
mentioned in the first chapter, starting with the idea that certain disparities are unjust 
naturally leads one to the conclusion that the appropriate corrective measure is the 
redistribution of resources, since this is the focus of justice.  If we begin with the idea that 
health disparities arise from differences in the ways in which we value one another (i.e. 
differences in SES), it is much more difficult to assume that the solution lies solely in 
changing access to health care.  And this is consistent with the epidemiological data on the 
broader determinants of health.  Insofar as starting from a conception of SES reminds us that 
both institutional and non-institutional arrangements underlie health disparities, it makes it 
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more likely we will adequately address all of the relevant determinants of health without 
simply defaulting to changing access to care. 
The fourth advantage of starting with a theory of SES is that doing so opens up a 
wider moral territory than merely viewing health disparities through the lens of justice.  
While justice is an important virtue (and the first virtue of social institutions), it does not 
exhaust the domain of morality.  As should be obvious from the discussion thus far, the SES 
that we have and the SES we seek play as significant a role in our daily lives as the relative 
fairness of the institutions in which we find ourselves.  I have suggested that the most 
appropriate way to understand and evaluate this phenomenon is through a theory of SES.  To 
lend further support to this claim, I will, in the next chapter, present a more detailed a 
conception of SES—centered on the idea of a minimal threshold of status—and show how it 
might be used to generate specific recommendations about health disparities in the United 
States.      
 
Chapter VIII: Minimal Thresholds and Progress on Health Disparities 
 
 Six weeks into my first year of medical school, I was sent to shadow a family practice 
physician, Dr. P, in a small town in rural North Carolina.  Although he was a good 
diagnostician and had an impressive range of clinical knowledge, Dr. P was most memorable 
for being a model of how not to practice medicine.  His goal, he said when we first met, was 
to introduce me to an elite occupation—a “priesthood,” he called it—that was responsible for 
guiding the lives of the less elevated members of society.  Although affirmative action and 
the introduction of women to the profession had weakened its status, it still provided a place 
for people like us—white men—to occupy the position we deserved.   
 Although Dr. P presented his views about medicine in the privacy of his office, it was 
clear that his opinions spilled over into patient care.  He refused to treat Hispanics, arguing 
that if they couldn’t be bothered to learn to speak English, he couldn’t be bothered to see 
them.  He referred to the only black patient who came to the clinic as a “drug-seeker” and 
treated four white patients, all of whom had later appointment times, before him.  Dr. P’s 
views on Middle Easterners were largely parroted from Rush Limbaugh, whose voice drifted 
from the break-room radio tuned to his program.  Dr. P’s attitude toward his female patients 
and nurses was patronizing and dismissive.  At one point he rolled his eyes at me while a 
patient was recounting her symptoms; he patted her on the hand before walking out halfway 
through one of her questions.  He also made disparaging comments about gays and patients 
he considered to be “fairies.”  After two days I switched to another practice.  
 Dr. P’s actions inside and outside of his clinic probably contributed to health 
disparities in his community.  All of these were cases in which people were treated 
inappropriately and, as a likely consequence, their health suffered.  They were not, however, 
victims of unjust basic institutions or policies, at least not directly.  Instead, they were treated 
with something less than the full consideration they deserved.  They were ignored, made to 
wait, mocked, berated, and refused to be seen.  What explains the wrongness of my Dr. P’s 
behavior?  At bottom, his actions represent a failure to accord the appropriate status to 
individuals.  Blacks are not all drug-seekers who should wait in examination rooms until they 
learn not to bother the doctor; women are not all bored housewives who have no real 
problems and just need someone to talk with; the fact that someone does not speak English is 
hardly grounds on which he should be denied health care.  Each of these actions—and the 
attitudes that frame them—represents a mistaken view about how we should treat one 
another. 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that, because differences in socioeconomic status 
(SES) tend to drive health disparities, we should be asking questions about the value 
assumptions that underlie these gradients.  SES hierarchies are built around conceptions of 
which social and economic characteristics are appropriate grounds for valuing individuals 
and how we should respond to those features.  If we want to know whether, for example, the 
health disparities that Dr. P created because of his treatment of blacks, Hispanics, women, 
and gays were justified, we have to ask whether he treated them with the appropriate status.  
We can pose a similar question regarding health disparities formed on a larger scale like 
those between blacks and whites in North Carolina or rich and poor families across the 
United States. 
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 As I have argued, there are a number of conceptions of SES that could answer this 
question.  Here, I want to focus on a version that supports a minimal level of SES below 
which individuals should not fall.  I will provide a rough sketch of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this approach and make an initial suggestion as to how we might set that 
minimal level.  I will then provide a few specific applications of the conception to 
contemporary American health disparities, focusing especially on policy recommendations 
that I believe are not as easily generated from within a theory of justice.  Like Daniels and 
Ruger, my overall aim is to use a more abstract moral theory to generate concrete solutions to 
health disparities. 
Starting Points 
 
 The kind of moral theory I am interested in exploring is one that sets a minimal level 
of SES.  It provides a threshold of status that establishes what counts as minimally acceptable 
behavior between individuals.  Such a theory takes certain characteristics of persons—race 
and gender, for example—to be an inappropriate basis on which to assign low status.  By 
restricting the grounds on which we should evaluate one another, this approach guarantees a 
minimal level of status; no one will be treated in the harmful way they would be if race or 
gender were appropriate reasons for disvaluing them.  When my preceptor assumed that all 
blacks are drug seekers, he was treating his black patient as having a kind of status (in virtue 
of being black) that is below this minimal level, or so I will argue.   
 Before I endorse any specific proposal for where to set a minimal level of SES, I want 
to discuss the relationship between this general approach to SES and the reduction of health 
disparities.  Figure 1 illustrates one possible effect of establishing a minimal level of SES on 
health disparities.  World A represents conditions before the introduction of a minimal level 
 145
of socioeconomic status (SES).  SES and health are correlated in a way familiar from the 
discussion in Chapter 3 such that each individual has, on average and other things being 
equal, better health than the people below him in SES and worse health than those above.  
World B represents conditions where behaviors, attitudes, institutions, etc. have been 
changed to reflect a minimal level of SES.  If we assume that the status of the highest group 
stays constant between the two worlds, the difference in health between the top and the 
bottom in World B is not as large as it is in World A (x2<x1).  Thus, while the steepness in 
the health/status gradient is the same in both worlds (y1/x1=y2/x2), World B nevertheless 
represents a reduction in health disparities compared to World A.   
 
Figure 1: Health disparities (y1 vs y2) decrease in World B compared to World A if the status of the highest 
individuals stays constant between the two. 
 
Importantly, the minimal threshold approach to SES cannot guarantee a reduction in 
current health disparities.  If the implementation of a minimal level of SES results in an 
increased drive for better status amongst those who already have high status, health 
disparities will remain constant or even worsen (see Figure 2).  Again Worlds A and B are 
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pre- and post-implementation of the minimal level of SES.  If we assume that the status of 
the highest group increases between the two worlds, the difference in health between the top 
and the bottom in World B will be the same as World A (x2=x1) or worse (x2>x1) depending 
on how much the status of the highest group increases.      
 
Figure 2: Health disparities (y1 vs y2) are the same in World B compared to World A if the status of the 
highest individuals increases in World B. 
 
I do not think that we can guarantee in advance that the scenario in Figure 1 will 
occur compared to Figure 2.  If it turns out that health disparities are worse after we 
implement a minimal level of SES, this may be grounds on which to prefer a different 
conception of SES or to combine the minimal threshold approach with a more specific 
position on the maximal allowable difference in status from top to bottom.  Since my overall 
goal in this dissertation is to argue that we should explore moral territory outside of a theory 
of justice in thinking about health disparities, I do not think it would be devastating if it 
turned out that one specific approach proved inadequate.  As I lay out my particular method 
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for setting a minimal level of SES, however, I will argue that it should constrain health 
disparities in a way akin to the first scenario.  Before I turn to that task, I want to make two 
additional observations.  
First, because SES and health are closely correlated, it may be tempting to think that 
establishing a minimal level of SES also helps to set a minimal level of health for those with 
the lowest SES.  But SES and health are not completely correlated; we all get sick and die but 
we do not all drop in status.  As such, this approach should not be interpreted as a 
guaranteeing a level of health akin to a right to health.  In addition to reintroducing the 
problem of what to do with chronically unhealthy persons who are ‘resource sinks,’ this way 
of conceptualizing the minimal threshold approach misses that the focus is on health as an 
emergent phenomenon of SES gradients, not a primary center of moral attention.  That 
implementing a minimal level of SES might reduce the difference in life expectancy between 
the top and bottom of the SES gradient because of improvements in the age-adjusted life 
expectancy of the worst off does not mean that any specific person of low SES should be 
guaranteed a certain length of life.   
 Second, when explaining why an individual or group should not be treated in a 
certain way or why certain attitudes should not be adopted toward them, the minimal 
threshold approach should not refer back to facts about personhood or rationality.  If it is 
wrong to treat female patients with contempt because they are rational agents then the theory 
would be concerned with rational status, not socioeconomic status.  What is required for a 
conception of SES is that it provides a threshold based on social feature of persons.269  For 
                                                 
269 It is possible that a minimal threshold might be developed around an economic feature of persons—for 
example, the fact that we all are capable of participating in a market might set certain limits on what we can do 
to one another—but I find it much more plausible that such a threshold would spring from our social 
characteristics and so will not pursue the economic possibilities. 
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example, we might hold that SES should be based on circumstances of birth but that no one 
should have the status that peasants or the Untouchables had within the feudal or caste 
systems.  Such a conception would support a relatively steep socioeconomic gradient based 
on one’s lineage, but would have a bottom threshold below which individuals of ‘common’ 
birth should not fall.  The people with the lowest SES should still have a higher status than, 
for example, the Untouchables, such that it would not be appropriate to require them to 
sweep up their footprints or deny them access to education.  In general, regardless of the 
specific content, a minimal threshold must be set in virtue of or in accordance with a specific 
social characteristic of individuals. 
Discourse Ethics 
 
 Although there are several possible candidates for a social feature of individuals that 
could delineate a minimally acceptable set of behaviors and attitudes, here I want to focus on 
the idea that we are all participants in communicative discourse. 270  In exploring how facts 
about our involvement in discourse can help establish a minimal level of SES, I will draw on 
the work of the philosopher Jurgen Habermas, from whom the epigraph of this dissertation is 
taken.  Of necessity, I will take many of his starting points for granted, without offering 
significant justification for them.  While I believe that his approach to moral theory is highly 
defensible, my goal here is to take the later step and show how a reasonably developed 
version of it might be applied to a practical problem like health disparities. 
                                                 
270 A different starting point might be to focus on T.M. Scanlon’s claim that we are all involved in justifying 
ourselves to others on grounds that they cannot reasonably reject.  I have chosen to focus on communicative 
discourse because it is unclear whether this activity is true of us simply in virtue of our being reason-responsive 
agents.  If this is right, Scanlon’s starting point would be better associated with a theory of rational rather than 
socioeconomic status.  See Scanlon, 1998. 
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 In contrast to the anti-rationalist, anti-universalist Continental philosophers (Rorty, 
Gadamer) with whom he is often associated, Habermas is actually better understood as 
developing a universalist moral theory that has its roots in the Kantian tradition.  In this 
regard, he has a number of commitments in common both with Kant and contemporary 
Kantian constructivists like John Rawls, Onora O’Neill, and Thomas Hill.  Here I want to 
focus on three specific areas of overlap with these philosophers as a way of explicating 
Habermas’ starting assumptions, methodology, and substantive conclusions.271   
Starting Assumptions 
 
Habermas is primarily interested in defending a picture of morality that focuses on 
our obligations—what is required and prohibited for us to do as members of a community of 
interacting agents—as opposed to questions of character or virtue.  In this regard, he is best 
understood as developing a theory of the right rather than, as with classic utilitarians, a 
theory of the good that generates a secondary account of the right.  Like Kant, Habermas 
treats moral obligations as having a categorical force such that they apply to us whether or 
not they work toward our self-interest or desire fulfillment; there are some actions we ought 
to perform even if the thought of doing so currently ‘leaves us cold.’  In the same vein, 
Habermas rejects familiar anti-universalist claims that there is a pluralism of mutually 
incompatible value orientations that cannot be rationally adjudicated.  Part of his goal is to 
identify high-level, abstract principles that both explain the categorical status of morality 
                                                 
271 I will be focusing on Habermas’ work in his essay, “Discourse ethics: Notes on a program of philosophical 
justification,” but I also draw on more recent writing to identify substantial changes in his thinking, where 
relevant.  Habermas, 1999, pp. 43-109. 
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(recall the Kantian question, how is a categorical imperative possible?) and can be used to 
adjudicate inter-cultural debates about our specific obligations.272   
Methodology 
 
Habermas constructs his moral theory through a series of arguments against an 
imagined opponent, who variously endorses ethical non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and 
cultural relativism.  Habermas begins by drawing attention to the moral phenomena of 
resentment, an idea that he borrows from Strawson.273  When we feel indignation or 
resentment at another person who has wronged us, we are not just responding to our specific 
situation but to the more general fact that that individual has ignored a norm meant to be 
valid for all competent agents.  What makes resentment a distinctly moral emotion is its 
connection with the idea that an impersonal behavioral norm has been violated.  For 
Strawson and Habermas, when we consider whether resentment or reproach is appropriate in 
a given situation, we are implicitly asking whether a particular interpersonal norm is, in fact, 
valid.  Habermas writes, “When employing normative utterances in everyday life, we raise 
claims to validity that we are prepared to defend against criticism.”274  These utterances 
constitute communicative discourse. 
Communication, for Habermas, includes any interaction (primarily, although not 
limited to, speech acts) in which “one actor seeks rationally to motivate another.”275  The 
                                                 
272 Unsurprisingly, Habermas also identifies himself as a cognitivist about moral sentences, arguing that their 
truth can be determined by reviewing the criteria for what would count as a good reason in favor of believing 
those sentences.  Habermas, 1999, p. 56. 
 
273 See Strawson, 1974 and Habermas, 1999, pp. 45-9. 
 
274 Habermas, 1999, p. 56.   
 
275 Habermas, 1999, p. 58.  Elsewhere, Habermas endorses a stronger claim; namely, that the meaning of speech 
acts can only be understood with relation to reason-giving.  He writes, “We understand a speech act when we 
know the kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is entitled in the 
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communicative discourse that occurs over moral norms involves participants introducing 
reasons for accepting or rejecting particular norms.  This project is similar to what we do in 
science when we ask which one of a number of propositions is true.  Although Habermas 
believes that the evidential standards are different when considering whether descriptive 
sentences are true or false versus whether a moral norm is valid or invalid, he argues that 
both factual and moral inquiry have at least one commonality.  Just as arguments in science 
involve certain formal rules—for example, principles of induction to move from particular 
observations to a general hypothesis—for assessing the truth of a propositional sentence, 
arguments in morality require formal rules if we are to identify which norms are valid.  
Habermas tentatively offers the following principle for determining whether a norm that 
governs behavior, attitudes, or institutional structures is valid: 
(U) “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects [the norm’s] general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these 
consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) [emphasis 
his].”276 
 
As Habermas understands it, (U) places a number of constraints on communicative 
discourse.  For example, he argues that fulfilling the conditions of (U) entails that discourse 
can only produce valid norms when: 1) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has 
been excluded; 2) participants have equal voice; 3) they are internally free to speak their 
honest opinion without deception or self-deception; 4) there are no sources of coercion built 
into the process and procedures of discourse.277  In his earlier work, Habermas talked about 
(U) as setting out an ideal speech situation that real discourse must meet in order to generate 
                                                                                                                                                       
given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance.” Habermas, 1998, 232.  I do not think that this stronger 
linguistic thesis is necessary to support Habermas’ position on the communication that occurs in discourse over 
moral norms. 
 
276 Habermas, 1999, p. 65. 
 
277 Habermas, 2005, p. 89. 
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valid norms.278  More recently, however, he has argued that the requirements (U) imposes are 
better understood as checks or reminders on actual discourse to ensure that there are no 
obvious violations of 1-4, granting that it may be impossible to guarantee that these 
conditions are met.279   
After suggesting a possible candidate for assessing the validity of the moral norms 
under debate in communicative discourse, Habermas considers the skeptical argument that 
(U) merely represents a “hasty generalization of moral intuitions peculiar to our own Western 
culture.”280  A critic voicing this complaint, Habermas suggests, is casting doubt on whether 
there can be any principle for adjudicating between competing moral norms that is not, itself, 
just another moral norm in need of validation.  There are not, according to this position, any 
standards for regulating discourse that are not themselves up for debate.  Habermas’ response 
to this challenge is to show that a skeptic expressing such an argument is implicitly 
committed to (U).  He writes, “Every argumentation, regardless of the context in which it 
occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions from whose propositional content the principle of 
universalism (U) can be derived.”281  In other words, (U) does not just delineate the minimal 
requirements for validating a moral norm, but is also an underlying presupposition in any 
communicative argument. 
This approach—providing a transcendental argument that aims to show that, by 
arguing against a particular claim, the skeptic is already committed to that claim—has a long 
pedigree tracing back at least to Descartes’ cogito.  The useful historical comparison in ethics 
                                                 
278 Habermas, 1993, pp. 54-5.  Habermas, 1999, p. 88. 
 
279 Habermas, 2005, p. 91. 
 
280 Habermas, 1999, p. 76. 
 
281 Habermas, 1999, p. 82. 
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is with Kant, who thought that, given the connection between rationality and morality, 
anyone who could ask the question ‘Why should I be moral?’ already had sufficient reason to 
be moral.  In contrast to Kant, whose argument focused on the commitments that spring from 
having a rational will (a property he thought the skeptic and the defender of morality had in 
common), Habermas is interested in the commitments we take on when we communicate 
with one another (a social feature of persons).  The skeptic who argues that (U) is simply 
another norm in need of validation is also involved in communicative discourse.  He is, 
Habermas argues, committed to providing reasons for his position.  But the process of giving 
and receiving reasons is itself a rule-governed activity.  If it turns out that one of these rules 
is (U), then, the skeptic, like the defender of morality, is already committed to the principle 
of universalism.  
Thus Habermas’ transcendental approach aims to identify the presuppositions of 
communicative discourse—arguments in which reasons are exchange—and to show that (U) 
is among these presuppositions.  He suggests that, at the most basic level, argumentation is 
only intelligible as reasoned discourse if participants follow a ‘minimal logic’; for example, 
they do not contradict themselves, they do not use the same expressions with different 
meaning, etc.  Speakers who violate these rules—which do not have yet have recognizably 
ethical content—are not, for Habermas, engaging in argument.  They cannot be understood to 
be offering reasons for their position if they are, for example, willing to contradict 
themselves.  Similarly, participants in discourse who exclude or coerce or who misrepresent 
their opinions, either directly or through self-deception, in order to convince others to adopt 
their position are not actually engaged in reasoned discourse.  Torturing your critics is one 
way to get them to agree to your position, but you have not won them over through reasoned 
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argument.  Once you have decided to stop offering reasons and start shooting, you are no 
longer involved in argument, and, once you accept argument as a way to settle a question like 
whether (U) is an appropriate test for validating moral norms, violent, exclusionary tactics 
are off the table.  You are committed to reasoning with everyone who has a stake in these 
norms and this is exactly what (U) demands.  Thus Habermas suggests that the imagined 
critic who argues against (U) as delineating a procedure for validating norms is, at the same 
time, committed to (U).  He writes, “The principle of universalization, which acts as a rule of 
argumentation, is implied by the presuppositions of argumentation in general.”282            
 To summarize Habermas’ argument: moral debate occurs within the realm of 
communicative discourse.  When we argue about what we ought to do, we are asking 
whether there are reasons for supporting one moral norm or another.  This is a question about 
which norms are valid.  Habermas tentatively suggests one criterion for assessing the validity 
of proposed norms: can everyone affected by the norm accept the consequences and the side 
effects that its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone’s interests.  This is the principle of universalism (U).  Habermas then argues that 
(U) is also a formal principle of argumentation in general such that anyone involved in 
communicative discourse over the status of (U) must implicitly accept the principle.  Thus 
the moral skeptic, insofar as he provides reasons for his position, is also committed to (U).   
There are a number of places to press this argument.  Most importantly we might 
wonder whether Habermas’ imagined critic is committed to communicative discourse merely 
by voicing his concerns about the validity of (U).  Is there a meta-discourse in which the 
skeptic could express his argument without thereby taking on the requirements of standard 
communicative discourse?  We might also wonder how Habermas would respond to the 
                                                 
282 Habermas, 1999, p. 86. 
 155
person who refuses to enter discourse at all.283  Although he has tentative replies to these 
problems, this debate is of less interest here.  Instead, I want to turn to Habermas’ final 
project, which is to show how discourse ethics can generate practical content.284   
Substantive Conclusions 
 
Habermas uses principle (U) as the foundation for a general procedure for validating 
proposed, substantive moral norms, a variation on an approach familiar from contemporary 
Kantian constructivists like Rawls.285  For Habermas, like the constructivists, the validation 
of subsidiary moral principles must come from a process rather than from mind-independent 
facts, as for some moral Realists, or facts about pleasure/pain, as in classical utilitarianism.  
That a certain moral principle emerges from or would be validated by a constructivist 
procedure serves as (partial) justification for that principle.  In Habermas’ case, this 
procedure is communicative discourse taking place under the constraints of (U).   
The analogy to Rawls should be clear at this point.  Rawls starts with a conception of 
persons as mutually disinterested with a capacity for a sense of justice, a capacity for a 
conception of the good, and the goal of maximizing their share of primary goods and then 
asks what principles of justice they would accept given that they do not know what place 
they will occupy in the resulting society.  He argues that they would agree to a society whose 
basic institutions are structured by the liberty and difference principles.  Habermas starts with 
a conception of persons as communicate agents and argues that that commits them to a 
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285 Habermas, 1999, pp. 92-4.   
 156
process in which each individual has an equal, non-coerced, non-self-deceived voice in 
considering which moral norms/principles are valid.    
Unlike Rawls, however, Habermas does not speculate as to what specific principles 
agents situated in this context would endorse.  This is because he is not interested in which 
rules a hypothetical group of agents under idealizing conditions would or could agree to; 
rather, he is concerned with what principles actual persons agree to once they are operating 
under a reasonable approximation of (U).  Thus Habermas rejects a ‘top down’ approach to 
identifying and applying the most abstract principles whereby we generate secondary rules 
based on increasing amounts of empirical information.286  Instead, moral principles (norms) 
are validated when they are proposed and accepted by participants in the actual 
conversations that take place under the constraints of (U).   
It would be a mistake, however, to think that Habermas has identified a completely 
formal constraint on our behavior or attitudes, a lá certain criticisms of Kant’s Formula of 
Universal Law.  Like that much-maligned principle, (U) has substantive implications for how 
agents should treat one another.  Granting that any practical application of discourse ethics 
will be somewhat speculative, what kinds of policies/principles might agents engaged in this 
enterprise endorse?287  I think that the most obvious candidates are practices that would work 
to sustain the communicative discourse itself as well as reinforce the idea that we are all 
equal participants in this activity.  Such policies should attempt to ensure that actual 
discourse approximates the conditions of (U) as closely as possible.   
                                                 
286 He writes, “Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for testing 
the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption.”  Habermas, 1999, p. 
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287 It may, in fact, be inappropriate for any single agent (like this author) to try to determine in advance what the 
outcome of (U)-constrained discourse might be, given Habermas’ emphasis on the essential role of dialogue.  A 
better way to think about what follows might be to consider it a proposal open to further modification by 
participants in discourse ethics. 
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This requires a commitment to non-exclusion such that discussions of moral norms, 
whether regulating individual behavior or broader questions about the arrangements of 
institutions, involve, as much as possible, all those people who may be affected by the 
outcome.  Participants in these conversations should be given equal voice where that may 
require both respectful attitudes from others and the self-respect necessary for believing that 
one is entitled to express one’s point of view.  The discourse should have mechanisms 
designed to prevent coercion and deception, where that may involve limiting the amount of 
power any given individual can hold over the outcome of the conversation.  These are only a 
few examples; a full specification of these sorts of policies is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but it seems relatively straightforward that individuals committed to 
communicative discourse—a description that, Habermas argues, even characterizes someone 
who doubts he is involved in that form of communication—would endorse practices that 
would maintain discourse in a version as close as possible to the ideas expressed in (U). 
Supposing that these sorts of recommendations would be validated within the 
framework (U) establishes, we can explain the wrongness of Dr. P’s attitudes and behaviors.  
In treating his patients—and, potentially, his wider community—the way that he did, he was 
essentially denying them the ability to participate as equal agents in a communicative 
discourse.  In some cases, he simply excluded them from conversation altogether, as with the 
Hispanics he refused to treat.  In other cases, his attitudes—contempt for the women he saw; 
distrust of blacks; denigration of gays—worked to ensure that these patients lacked an equal 
voice in their care.288  The only people Dr. P counted as having something worth considering 
                                                 
288 As with many of the ideas I introduce here, we will need a further discussion of what counts as exclusion and 
inclusion in conversations about the norms that affect multiple individuals.  In some cases, a political process 
like direct or representative democracy will fulfill the obligations of inclusion; in other cases, like the doctor-
patient relationship, inclusion may require that each party be more substantively involved. 
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in communicative discourse was other educated, white men, a fact that was repeatedly 
illustrated by the way he actively engaged with this sort of patient.  Other patients simply did 
not merit this status, a view that, I believe, is unjustified under the demands of discourse 
ethics. 
 Let us now turn to the broader question of how Habermas’ work on communicative 
action might set a minimal level of SES.  Recall that a conception of socioeconomic status is 
charged with identifying those social and economic features of persons that are appropriate 
grounds for treating them with higher or lower status.  A minimal threshold approach will 
pick out a characteristic of persons that establishes the most basic set of behaviors, attitudes, 
and responses we should have toward one another.  For Habermas, this social feature is our 
ability to engage in communicative discourse.  According to a conception of SES built 
around discourse ethics, no one should be treated in ways that would violate his or her status 
as participants in communicative discourse.  A useful way of understanding what this 
threshold of status establishes is to consider the kinds of behaviors that would be permissible 
toward us if we were not creatures capable of participating in communicative discourse.  It 
would be appropriate to exclude us from decisions that affect our lives; to coerce us into 
following policies that we had no role in developing; or to suppress our activities.  As the 
kinds of creatures able to engage in communicative discourse, however, (U) rules out 
activities, behaviors, or attitudes that would treat us in these ways.  For example, excluding a 
person because of her skin color, gender, or sexual orientation from participating in political 
processes that impact her life is a violation of (U).  Similarly, treating an individual with 
long-standing contempt— whether because of his income level, place of birth, ethnicity, 
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etc.—insofar as this would be destructive to his or her self-respect and ability to present her 
opinions, is also impermissible.    
It is a further question—left up to the participants in actual discourse—as to whether, 
once we ensure that everyone has been given the status (U) guarantees, it is permissible for 
us to treat one another with higher esteem based on characteristics like education or earned 
income.  As long as everyone is granted a minimal level of consideration, there is no reason, 
on Habermas’ account, why it would be inappropriate to allow some people to accumulate 
more education or wealth than others or to treat the wise, the rich, or even those of noble 
birth with esteem, so long as this did not result in decreasing the status of individuals without 
these characteristics below the level (U) guarantees.  If it turned out that unequal distribution 
of resources like education or wealth always translates into the marginalization of some 
groups from communicative discourse or always leads to one party adopting coercive 
policies, then (U) would limit the development of disparities in education and wealth.   
With this point in mind, if we draw on discourse ethics to set a minimal level of SES, 
should we expect an outcome like the scenario in Figure 1 where health disparities decrease 
or the scenario in Figure 2 where they stay the same or worsen?  I think that Habermas’ 
emphasis on equalizing the ability of individuals to participate in communicative discourse 
would work to constrain or stabilize the status-seeking efforts of the highest status 
individuals.  The minimal level of SES will always help ensure that the lowest members of 
society are given an equal voice with those at the top, especially where moral norms—
ranging from the shape of basic institutions to the attitudes that are appropriate when 
individuals of different social strata confront one another—that affect both groups are 
concerned.  It is unlikely, given the strong notion of equality between participants in 
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communicative discourse, that the conclusion of these conversations will function in such a 
way as to drive up the status of the highest groups.  There is, of course, no a priori argument 
that the scenario in Figure 2 will not occur; if health disparities worsen under a discourse-
ethics derived minimal level of SES, this may be a reason to prefer a different approach. 
So far I have talked about relatively abstract constraints on the shape of SES 
gradients.  I now want to speculate as to what secondary policies individuals committed to 
maintaining communicative discourse might endorse.  If we were to structure our institutions 
and behaviors in such a way as to reflect the minimal level of SES discourse ethics 
establishes, what sort of changes might we expect to the current state of affairs?  And to what 
extent would health disparities be reduced as a result?  In answering these questions, I want 
to focus on policy change in the current American health-care system as well as the potential 
for broader social transformation.          
Changes within the Health Care System 
 
 It may seem odd, given this dissertation’s central emphasis on the disconnect between 
expanding health care and reducing health disparities, to start a discussion of policy change 
by focusing on medical care.  While I continue to endorse the idea that addressing the 
broader determinants of health is a more useful way to decrease health inequalities than 
altering how and to whom medical care is delivered, because theories of justice have focused 
so much on this area, it will provide a useful contrast for applications of the minimal 
threshold approach.  To a certain extent, the two types of theories will share similar 
recommendations.  Thus, rather than focusing on, for example, questions about universal 
access to health care, I want to identify two areas—cultural competency training for 
physicians and the use of patient navigators in clinics—where changes could be made to 
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potentially effect health disparities.  I will argue that these policies are more easily justified 
within the minimal threshold approach, centered on the commitments of discourse ethics, 
compared to theories of justice.  
 In Chapter 3 I briefly noted that the Institute of Medicine (IOM), in a report titled 
Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare, suggested that 
discrimination (conscious or unconscious) or bias on the part of health care providers causes 
a portion of racial/ethnic health disparities.  One policy-based response to the IOM report 
was to emphasize cultural competency training for physicians.   The idea of cultural 
competency in medicine is to help health care providers develop a set of “academic, 
interpersonal, and clinical skills” to increase their understanding of cultural differences 
between racial and ethnic groups.289  Such training is not, however, limited to improving 
cultural awareness or sensitivity but involves being able to bridge cross-cultural barriers to 
adequate delivery of medical care.  As Brach and Fraser note, cultural competency includes: 
“A set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, 
agency, or amongst professionals and enables that system, agency or those professionals 
to work effectively in cross-cultural situations [emphasis added].”290 
 
Hospitals and medical schools have implemented a wide variety of programs as part of 
their commitment to culturally competent health care provision.  Examples include: 
interpreter services, as spelled out in the Office of Minority Health’s Culturally and 
Linguistically Appropriate Service Standards; cultural competency tests and training as a 
requirement for physician licensure, which is mandated in California and Washington; 
and efforts to recruit and retain minority health care staff to create a hospital and clinic 
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environment that is more welcoming and appreciative of the needs of minority 
communities.  These policies aim to alter discriminatory behaviors and attitudes that 
may function in the medical environment to create health disparities. 
 Data on the effects of cultural competency programs, particularly the 
commitment to bridging language barriers through interpreter services, have 
demonstrated some reduction in health disparities.  A 2007 review of 28 studies 
investigating the impact of professional interpreters on the care patients with limited 
English proficiency (LES)—a group with significant health disparities compared to 
native speakers—concluded that the availability of such services increased utilization of 
medical care (both outpatient and emergency) among LES patients.291  A 1999 study in 
Australia showed that the availability of a professional interpreter eliminated differences 
in Cesarean section rates for LES (primarily Southeast Asian) versus native-speaking 
patients.  A 1998 study in America showed a similar reduction in differences in 
hemoglobin A1C, lipid, and creatinine values between LES and native speakers with 
type II diabetes.292  Little data exist, however, on the impact of other aspects of cultural 
competency—for example, physician training—on health disparities, although there is a 
growing research interest in this area.     
Coming at health disparities from a different direction, in 2004, the National Cancer 
Institute, as part of an effort to reduce the disparities in morbidity and mortality that occur 
after cancer diagnosis in minority groups, made 25 million dollars available to pilot Patient 
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Navigator Programs (PNP).293  Patient navigators are individuals from the community who 
are familiar with cancer diagnosis and treatment—either through their own experiences or 
that of families or friends—and have been hired and trained to help newly-diagnosed patients 
negotiate the treatment system.  Within a PNP, individuals are matched with a navigator of a 
similar background.  This process ideally includes variables such as race and ethnicity and 
community location. 
 The goal of navigation services is to reduce barriers to treatment including language 
differences, emotional worries, travel and distance concerns, difficulty communicating with 
care providers, financial support, and misinformation about medical options.  Patient 
navigators might arrange for translation/interpretation services, help organize transportation 
to and childcare during appointments, coordinate services among different providers and 
ensure the availability of medical records, identify forms of financial support, and correct 
misinformation about cancer prognosis, diagnostic testing, and treatment interventions.  
Perhaps most importantly, the navigator offers minority patients a member of the care team 
with whom they may be more comfortable communicating and who can advocate on their 
behalf.   
 Since PNP are a relatively new strategy for reducing health disparities, there is 
limited data on their effectiveness.  Preliminary studies, however, suggest some benefit to 
including patient navigators on the treatment team.294  Randomized control trials are also 
underway to examine the effect of navigators on health disparities in cancer treatment and 
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follow-up.295  More generally, the use of patient navigators has been shown to increase 
minority participation in screening programs for breast, prostate, and colon cancer, which 
may impact relative morbidity and mortality from these diseases.296     
 Both cultural competency training (CCT) for physicians and patient navigator 
programs (PNP) represent attempts to equalize the communicative positions in medical 
discourse.  CCT aims to help physicians approach their patients with a set of attitudes and 
behaviors that make it more likely that patients will participate in the medical process and 
comply with treatment recommendations.  This training is designed to bridge the often 
substantial communicative gap between physicians and patients, who may come from very 
different cultural backgrounds.  PNP, in contrast, work to make patients more familiar with 
the clinic or hospital experience, empowering them to be active participants in their care.  By 
understanding what they can expect and by having someone on the health care team with 
whom they can more comfortably communicate, patients are likely to have better health 
outcomes. 
 I believe that both of these programs would be endorsed (and, therefore, validated) by 
participants in communicative discourse, under the commitments expressed in (U).  But can a 
Rawlsian-style theory of justice make similar recommendations?  If we assume that the 
absence of CCT or PNP leads to health disparities, which impacts equality of 
opportunity/capabilities, then there is an obvious argument for implementing these programs.  
The inequality of opportunity/capabilities that health disparities create is unjust; therefore, we 
should implement PNP and CCT to fix this state of affairs.  As I have emphasized in earlier 
chapters, however, it is unclear whether theories of justice like Rawls’ can make this sort of 
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recommendation.  A central goal of CCT and PNP is to change the attitudes physicians and 
patients have toward one another.  CCT aims to foster an environment of respect for cultural 
difference and diversity among physicians, and PNP try to combat stereotypes and untrusting 
attitudes some patients may have about the medical profession.  If theories of justice are in 
the business of adjusting the basic institutions of society rather than directly altering the 
attitudes of citizens living under those institutions, then it is unclear whether such a position 
can offer appropriate justification for CCT or PNP. 
Changes in a Broader Policy Context 
 
As with recommendations regarding health care provision, there is likely to be a 
degree of overlap between a minimal threshold approach to SES and theories of justices 
where broader policy questions are concerned.  This is in part because conceptions of SES 
are also focused n the redistribution of goods (or equalizing access to them) insofar as the 
ownership of these things affects status.  Theories of SES are also interested in basic 
institutional structures insofar as these institutions are vehicles through which SES gradients 
are constructed, preserved, and altered.  Again, however, since the more useful contrast is 
with recommendations that cannot be as easily generated from a theory of justice, I will focus 
on one specific policy change—centered on the idea of a public sphere—that the minimal 
threshold approach to SES better supports.   
Habermas discusses the public sphere as a concrete example of how actual discourse 
might best approximate the idealizing (or counterfactual criteria) (U) requires.297  He defines 
the public sphere as follows: 
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“The sphere of private people come together as public . . . to engage [public authorities] 
in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor.”298 
 
The conversations in the public sphere range over areas of “common concern,” including the 
norms that regulate interpersonal behavior and attitudes in social and market transactions.299  
Prior to the development of the public sphere in the18th century, state or church authorities 
were the principle forces in the development, promulgation, and enforcement of these norms.  
One function of the public sphere, then, was to make such decisions dialogical—coming 
from discourse among many affected individuals—rather than monological—imposed 
unilaterally from a central authority.  Thus, while Habermas spends a considerable amount of 
time discussing the scope of the public sphere and identifying its boundaries, more important 
for our purposes is how he characterizes the interactions between people in this environment.   
 First, the public sphere represents a context in which “far from presupposing the 
equality of status, [participants] disregarded status altogether.  The tendency replaced the 
celebration of rank with a tact befitting equals.”  As Habermas notes, this idea was not 
always realized in earnest, but it was at least instutionalized early on within the structure of 
the public sphere.  For example, discussions in 18th century coffee houses—one historical 
example of a public sphere—often involved participants from classes—the sons of the 
nobility and the sons of shopkeepers—whose relative social standing would otherwise 
preclude interaction.  Within the confines of the coffee house or salon “opinion became 
emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence.”300  And, we might add, social rank.  
In this context, reasoned debate amongst participants settles questions that arise in discourse 
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and not economic coercion or appeal to an individual’s social standing as providing a trump 
that ends argument.  Second, the public sphere is a fundamentally inclusive space: “it could 
never close itself off entirely . . . for it always understood and found itself immersed within a 
more inclusive public of all private people.”  The issues of concern to participants in the 
public sphere are, by definition, those that affect citizens in their social and economic 
interactions with one another; thus it should be possible that everyone so affected can 
participate.301     
The connection with (U) should be clear at this point: the public sphere represents an 
area where the commitments that this principle requires, while not always met, have the best 
chance of being approximated in the structure of actual discourse.  The public sphere is a 
communicative environment governed by the exchange of reasons; it is inclusionary; 
participants are entitled to an equal voice; and coercion and deception are minimized 
(secondary to the way that social and economic standing outside of the public sphere is de-
emphasized).  As such, the public sphere is a ‘real world’ example of an environment that 
could produce valid norms through communicative discourse.  Given this possibility, part of 
Habermas’ project is to explain why preserving the public sphere—in the face of threats from 
late capitalism—is so important.  Suppose that we accept that the public sphere is worth 
protecting or reinstituting.  How would this fit in with the broader idea of a minimal level of 
SES and what would be the expected impact on health disparities? 
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 168
Unlike with the health policy examples, I have no specific epidemiological evidence 
that preserving the public sphere would reduce health disparities.  As I have suggested, 
however, there is a theoretical reason to think that, insofar as having a public sphere 
constrains the development of SES gradients through its support for a minimal level of SES, 
it would work to reduce health disparities.  It is difficult to imagine that participants in the 
public sphere would endorse stigmatizing or exclusionary norms toward HIV positive 
individuals (or cancer patients, for that matter), which would potentially affect their health-
care seeking behavior.  Furthermore, the inclusionary nature of the public sphere would 
likely work against the internalization of negative interpersonal attitudes and the way that 
that translates into SES and level of control over one’s life.  All of this is, of course, 
speculative, although it is important that there is a theoretical link between the public sphere 
and the reduction of health disparities.  Ultimately, I believe that the creation and 
preservation of the public sphere is an activity that participants in (U) would endorse, not 
because of its potential effect on health disparities, but because it would work to sustain the 
broader commitments of discourse ethics and reinforce the idea that we are all equal 
participants in this activity.  Any resulting reduction in health disparities would be a welcome 
side effect.     
As with cultural competency training and patient navigator programs, we can ask if a 
theory of justice (either of the Rawlsian or Sen-ish variety) could support the development 
and preservation of a Habermasian public sphere.  Again, there is an obvious argument: if the 
absence of a public sphere leads to health disparities and health disparities lead to inequality 
of opportunity/capabilities, we should take steps to develop and preserve a public sphere.  
How plausible is this argument given the constraints on the domain of justice?  Since one of 
 169
 170
the central roles of the public sphere is to create a space that works to equalize status 
relations by requiring participants to approach one another with a certain set of attitudes, 
theories of justice may have difficulty justifying its creation.  An individual’s attitudes are 
not a central focus of justice.  If, however, we think of the public sphere as an institution that 
would be particularly useful, for example, in ensuring the stability of a society that the 
Rawlsian principles of justice structure, then there might be grounds within a theory of 
justice to argue for its implementation.  Alternatively, a Rawlsian might argue that the public 
sphere is necessary for solving certain political disagreements in a society where justice as 
fairness serves as a point of overlapping consensus.  In both cases, however, we do not want 
the public sphere merely because it is useful for social stability or solving certain kinds of 
disagreement; rather, it plays an essential role in reinforcing our status as participants in 
communicative discourse and it is this status that is worth preserving.   
 There is room here for an extended debate about the ways in which theories of justice 
can be shaped to either directly or indirectly account for the relationship between 
interpersonal attitudes, status judgments, and health.  Sparking this debate has been a central 
aim of this dissertation.  If we are to expand theories of justice to cover the broader 
determinants of health—as Daniels and Ruger have suggested—then we must make sure that 
they are equipped to do so.  While I suspect that we will have more luck using a set of 
theories directly focused on those determinants, I do not want to preclude a conversation that 
may potentially clarify the requirements of justice in this area.  Thus the policy 
recommendations I have presented here represent a challenge to theorists of justice.  If we 
think their implementation is morally appropriate (or required), can we explain how they 
could be grounded within a framework focused on justice? 
Chapter IX Conclusions: Political Change 
 In September 2007 Congress passed the SCHIP expansion bill by substantial 
majorities in both Houses.  President Bush vetoed the legislation on the grounds that, “I 
happen to believe that what you're seeing when you expand eligibility for federal programs is 
the desire by some in Washington, D.C. to federalize health care. I don't think that's good for 
the country.”302  Bush’s veto was applauded by several legislators from North Carolina, the 
country’s leading producer of tobacco products, who argued that it was unfair that the 
economy of the state should bear the brunt of the tax increase necessary to provide the 
funding for the health insurance expansion.  Again, an underlying question in the debate was 
whether justice required allocation of resources to children from poor families so that they 
could have improved access to health care.  In mid-October, Congress unsuccessfully 
attempted to overrode the presidential veto.  The legislature and the President will likely 
compromise, continuing funding for existing SCHIP enrollees, but not increasing the number 
of eligible participants.   
 The debate over SCHIP is both good and bad news.  On the positive side, it shows a 
political commitment to improving the health of poor Americans, a central aim of the bill’s 
supporters.  Unfortunately, it also illustrates that any significant change in this area is likely 
to take the form of expanding health insurance coverage.  In fact, all of the candidates for the 
2008 presidential election have endorsed some plan for expanding health insurance coverage, 
whether through tax credits (Giuliani), an expanded government- sponsored health-care  
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system (Edwards), or a mixed public-private insurance program (Obama) coupled with 
coverage mandates (Clinton).  The impact of these programs on American health disparities 
is hard to predict, although experiences with universal coverage in Europe have not been 
encouraging.  Despite the growing epidemiological evidence that differences in 
socioeconomic status may be more important for health than access to care, it seems unlikely 
that there will be legislation specifically targeting the broader determinants of health at any 
point in the foreseeable future.  Rather than seeing the expansion of health care access as an 
occasion for hand-wringing, however, it is probably better viewed as one step in a shift 
toward addressing the broader determinants of heath, a task now occupying the health agenda 
of several European countries.   
 Putting aside the question of where practical change will occur, on what grounds and 
to what extent might we seek to reduce the socioeconomic status gradients that work to 
produce health disparities?  Ultimately, this dissertation is about a shift in emphasis.  The 
historical debate over the moral status of health disparities has taken place as a special topic 
within the domain of distributive justice.  The central question has been whether it is unfair 
that health is distributed unevenly.  I have tried to suggest that this is an incomplete way to 
argue about health disparities.  A broader moral perspective is helpful in guiding our 
response to the social determinants of health, especially the way that stigma and negative 
interpersonal attitudes can create health disparities.  As I have argued, theories of justice 
have, at best, a derivative concern with many of the broader determinants.  I have, therefore, 
advocated theories of socioeconomic status as an alternative approach to thinking about the 
moral status of health disparities.  
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 If distributive justice is focused on how we should organize the basic institutions of 
society, theories of socioeconomic status are concerned with which social and economic 
characteristics of persons are grounds for valuing them differently—for giving them higher 
or lower SES.  When confronted with SES gradients in which status is accorded 
inappropriately, these theories make recommendations for altering our current beliefs about 
what characteristics give a person higher or lower SES and redistributing or deemphasizing 
the (inappropriate) determinants of value.  When these goals have been accomplished, the 
result will be a SES hierarchy of a certain steepness, depending on how widely the 
determinants of SES are distributed.  Since health disparities correlate with SES, a 
conception of SES—when coupled with an account of overall status—will identify what 
constitutes an acceptable difference in health between different members of a social system.   
 As an example of this kind of theory, I have suggested that Habermas’ discourse 
ethics can help us set a minimal level of SES below which the lowest members of society 
ought not to fall.  A minimal threshold approach picks out a social characteristic of persons 
that establishes the most basic set of behaviors, attitudes, and responses we should have 
toward one another.  For Habermas, this social feature is our ability to engage in 
communicative discourse.  According to a conception of SES built around discourse ethics, 
no one should be treated in ways that would violate his or her status as a participant in 
communicative discourse.  If we did not have this status it would be appropriate to exclude 
us from decisions that affect our lives; to coerce us into following policies that we had no 
role in developing; and to suppress our activities.  As creatures able to engage in 
communicative discourse, however, the principle of universalism (U) rules out activities, 
behaviors, or attitudes that would treat us in these ways.  I have argued that, once this 
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minimal level of SES is established, the result will be a reduction in health disparities.  
Whether we take this approach to SES or another, we will have to think about the ways in 
which factors beyond distributable goods shape health. 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, J. Discourses on Davila: A Series of Papers on Political History. Boston: Russel  
and Culter, 1805. 
 
Adler, N.E., Boyce, W.T., Chesney, M.A., Folkman, S., and S.L. Syme. “Socioeconomic  
inequalities in health. No easy solution.” Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 269(24)(1993): 3140-5.  
 
American Cancer Society. Cancer facts and figures 2003. [internet].   
Available from: http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/CAFF2003PWSecured.pdf 
[Cited 27 Aug 07]. 
 
American College of Cardiology Foundation. Racial/Ethnic Differences in Cardiac Care:  
The Weight of the Evidence. Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2002. 
 
Anand, S. and F. Peter. “Equal opportunity.”  In Is Inequality Bad for Our Health?  
Eds. Cohen, J. and J. Rogers. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.  
 
Anderson, E. “What is the point of equality?” Ethics, 109(2)(1999): 287-337.   
 
Arneson, R. “Perfectionism and politics.” Ethics, 111(1)(2000): 37-63. 
 
Arpaly, N. Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2003.   
 
Arrow, K. “Some ordinalist-utilitarian notes on Rawls’s theory of justice.” Journal of  
Philosophy, 70(9)(1973): 251-4. 
 
Baker, D., Shapiro, M., and C. Schur. “Health insurance and access to care for  
symptomatic conditions.” Archives of Internal Medicine, 160(9)(2000): 1269-74. 
 
Balshem, M. “Cancer, control, and causality: Talking about cancer in a working-class  
community.” American Ethnologist, 18(1)(1991): 152-72. 
 
Barkow, J.H. “Beneath new culture is old psychology: gossip and social stratification.” In  
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Eds. 
Barkow, J.H., Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Bartley, M. and I. Plewis. “Does health-selective mobility account for  
socioeconomic differences in health?  Evidence from England and Wales, 1971  
to1991.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38(1997): 376-86. 
 
Beauchamp, T.L. and J.F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th Edition. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1994.  
 
 175
Berkam, L.F. and M. Melchior. “The shape of things to come: How social policy impacts  
social integration and family structure to produce population health.” In Social 
Inequalities in Health: New Evidence and Policy Implications. Eds. Siegrist, J. and 
M. Marmot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Bigler R.S., Averhart C.J., and L.S. Liben. “Race and the workforce: occupational status,  
aspirations, and stereotyping among African American children.” Developmental 
Psychology, 39(3)(2003): 572-80. 
 
Blane, D., Harding, S., and M. Rosato. “Does social mobility affect the size of the  
socioeconomic mortality differential?” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series 
A: Statistics in Society, 162(pt 1)(1999): 59-70. 
 
Boorse, C. “Health as a theoretical concept.” Philosophy of Science, 44(4)(1972): 542- 
73. 
 
Boorse, C. “On the distinction between disease and illness.” Philosophy and Public  
Affairs, 5(1)(1975): 49-68. 
 
Bosma, H. “Socio-economic differences in health: are control beliefs fundamental  
mediators?” In Social Inequalities in Health: New Evidence and Policy Implications. 
Eds. Siegrist, J. and M. Marmot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Bosma, H., Van Jaarsveld, C.H.M., Tuinstra, J., Sanderman, R., Ranchor, R.V., Van Eijk,  
J.M. and G. Kempen. “Low control beliefs, classical coronary risk factors, and socio-
economic differences in heart disease in older persons.” Social Science and Medicine, 
60(4)(2005): 737-45. 
 
Brennan, G. and P. Pettit. The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political   
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.        
 
Britton, A., Shipley, M., Marmot, M., and H. Hemingway. “Does access to cardiac  
investigation and treatment contribute to social and ethnic differences in coronary 
heart disease? Whitehall II prospective cohort study.” British Medical Journal, 
329(7461)(2004): 318. 
 
Brody, D.J., Pirkle, J.L., Kramer, R.A., Flegal, K.M., Matte, T.D., Gunter, E.W., and  
D.C. Paschal. "Blood lead levels in the US population. Phase 1 of the Third National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III, 1988 to 1991)." Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 272(4)(1992): 277-83. 
 
Buchanan, A. “The right to a decent minimum of health care.” Philosophy & Public  
Affairs, 13(2)(1984): 55-78. 
 
 
 
 176
Burstin, H., Lipsitz, S., and T. Brennan. “Socioeconomic status and risk for  
substandard medical care.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 
268(17)(1992): 2383-7. 
 
Bush, G.W. “SCHIP legislation.” [public speech]. Lancaster, PA. 3 Oct 07. 
 
Butler, J. Five Sermons. Ed. Darwall, S. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,  
1983. 
 
Campanelli, R.M. “Addressing racial and ethnic health disparities.”  American Journal of  
Public Health, 93(10)(2003): 1624-6. 
 
Caputo, R. “SES and other correlates of health in a youth cohort: Implications for social  
justice.” Journal of Poverty: Innovations on Social, Political, and Economic 
Inequalities, 7(3)(2003): 85-112. 
 
Center for Disease Control. “Estimated life expectancy at birth in years, by race and sex:  
Death-registration States, 1900–28, and United States, 1929–2001.” National Vital 
Statistics Report, 52(14)(2004): 33.   
 
Center for Disease Control. “Update: trends in AIDS incidence-United States.” Morbidity  
and Mortality Weekly Report, 46(1997): 861-7. 
 
Center for Disease Control State Cancer Registries. Age adjusted death rates for North  
Carolina, 1998-1992. Breast. [internet]. Available from: 
http://statecancerprofiles.cancer.gov [Cited 31 Mar 06].   
 
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. Japan. [internet]. Available from:  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html [Cited 28 Dec 05]. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. United States. [internet]. Available from:  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html [Cited 28 Dec 05].   
 
Chambers, E.C., Tull, E.S., Fraser, H.S., Mutunhu, N.R., Sobers, N., and E. Niles. “The  
relationship of internalized racism to body fat distribution and insulin resistance 
among African adolescent youth.” National Medical Association, 96(12)(2004): 
1594-8. 
 
Chaturvedi, N. Rai, H., and Y. Ben-Shlomo. “Lay diagnosis and health-care-seeking  
behaviour for chest pain in south Asians and Europeans.” Lancet, 350(9091)(1997): 
1578-83. 
 
Coetzee J. Disgrace. New York: Viking, 1999. 
 
Cohen, J. and J. Rogers, eds. Is Inequality Bad for Our Health? Boston: Beacon Press,  
2000. 
 177
Coleman, J. “Efficiency, utility, and wealth maximization.”  Hofstra Law Review,  
8(3)(1980): 509-511. 
 
Crocker, D. “Functioning and capability: The foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s  
development ethic.” Political Theory, 20(4)(1992): 584-612. 
 
Daniels, N., Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Daniels, N. “Justice, health, and health care.” American Journal of Bioethics,  
1(2)(2001): 3-15. 
 
Daniels, N. “Equity and population health: Toward a broader bioethics agenda.” Hastings  
Center Report 36(4)(2006): 22-35. 
 
Daniels, N., Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
University Press, 2007. 
 
Daniels, N., Kennedy, B., and I. Kawachi. “Health and inequality, or, why justice is  
good for our health.” Daedalus, 128(3)(Winter 1999): 215-51. 
 
Daniels, N., Kennedy, B., and I. Kawachi. “Justice is good for our health.” In Is  
Inequality Bad for Our Health? Eds. Cohen, J. and J. Rogers. Boston: Beacon Press, 
2000a.  
 
Daniels, N., Kennedy, B., and I. Kawachi. “Reply.” In Is Inequality Bad for Our Health?  
Eds. Cohen, J. and J. Rogers. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000b.  
 
Daniels, N., Kennedy, B., and I. Kawachi. “Health and inequality, or, why justice is  
good for our health.” In Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Eds. Anand, S., Peter, F., 
and A. Sen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Das, J. and P. Gertler. “Variations in practice quality in five low-income countries: A  
conceptual overview.” Health Affairs, 26(2006-2007 Supp.): 296-309. 
 
de Botton, A. Status Anxiety. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004. 
 
de Vogli, R., Brunner, E., and M. Marmot. “Unfairness and the social gradient of  
metabolic syndrome in the Whitehall II Study.” Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 
63(2)(2007): 413-19. 
 
Deaton, A. “Health, inequality, and economic development.” Journal of Economic  
Literature, 41(112)(2003): 113-58. 
 
DeNavas-Walt, C., Proctor, B., and R. Mills. “Income, poverty, and health  
insurance coverage in the United States: 2003.” US Census Bureau: Current  
Population Reports, Aug(2004): 14. 
 178
Devito, S. “On the value-neutrality of health and disease: Unto the breach again.” Journal  
of Medicine and Philosophy, 25(5)(2000): 539-67. 
 
Didion, J. Slouching Towards Bethlehem. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968.  
 
Drever, F. and M. Whitehead. Health Inequalities: Decennial Supplement. Series DS No. 15,  
1-257. London, Stationery Office, Office for National Statistics, 1997. 
 
Drummond R. and B. Fontanarosa. “Theme issue on access to health care: Call for  
papers.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 295(18)(2006): 2182-83. 
 
Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
 
Elster, J. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
University Press, 1985. 
 
Emanuel, E. The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity. Cambridge,  
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Emberson, J.R., Whincup, P.H., Morris, R.W., and M. Walker. “Social class differences  
in coronary heart disease in middle-aged British men: implications for prevention.” 
International Journal of Epidemiology, 33(2)(2004): 289-96. 
 
Englehardt, Jr., T. “Freedom and moral diversity: The moral failures of health care in the  
welfare state.” Social Philosophy and Policy, 13(2)(1997): 180-96. 
 
Erikson, R. “Why do graduates live longer? Education, occupation, family and mortality  
during the 1990s.” In Cradle to Grave: Life-Course Change in Modern Sweden. Ed. 
Jonsson, J.O. and C. Mills. Durham, NC: Sociology Press, 2001. 
 
Ezzati, M., Lopez, A.D., Rodgers, A., Hoorn, S.V., Murray, C.J.L., and the Comparative  
Risk Assessment Collaborating Group. “Selected major risk factors and global and 
regional burden of disease.” Lancet, 360(9343)(2002): 1347-60. 
 
Field, T.S., Buist, D.S., Doubeni, C., Enger, S., Fouayzi, H., Hart, G., Korner, E.J.,  
Lamerato, L., Bachman, D.J., Ellis, J., Herrinton, L., Hornbrook, M.C., Krajenta, R., 
Liu, L., and J. Yao. “Disparities and survival among breast cancer patients.” Journal 
of the National Cancer Institute Monographs, 2005(35)(2005): 88-95. 
 
Fiscella, K. and D.R. Williams. “Health disparities based on socioeconomic inequities:  
implications for urban health care.” Academic Medicine, 79(12)(2004): 1139-47. 
 
Flic, D. “The liberal grounding of the right to health care: An egalitarian critique.”  
Theoria, 54(112)(April 2007): 51-72. 
 
 
 179
Forum on Child and Family Statistics. America’s children: Key national  
indicators of well-being 2005: Infant mortality. [internet].  Available from:   
http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/hea6.asp [Cited 25 Nov 05]. 
 
Frankfurt, H.G. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Frist, W.H. “Overcoming disparities in US health care: A broad view of the causes of  
health disparities can lead to better, more appropriate solutions.” Health Affairs 
(Millwood), 24(2)(2005): 445-51. 
 
Gallo, L.C. and K.A. Matthews. “Understanding the association between socio-economic  
status and physical health: Do negative emotions play a role?” Psychological Bulletin, 
129(2003)(1): 10-51.   
 
Green, R.M. “Healthcare and justice in contract theory perspective.” In Ethics and Health  
Policy. Eds. Veatch, R. and R. Branson. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishers 
Company, 1976. 
 
Green, R.M. “Access to healthcare: going beyond fair equality of opportunity.” The  
American Journal of Bioethics, 1(2)(2001): 22-3. 
 
Gruskin, S and P. Braveman. “Addressing social injustice in a human rights context.” In  
Social Injustice and Public Health. Eds. Levy, B.S. and V.W. Sidel. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a  
Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Burger, T. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1991. 
 
Habermas, J. Justification and Application. Trans. Cronin, C. Cambridge, MA: The MIT  
Press, 1993. 
 
Habermas, J. On the Pragmatics of Communication. Trans. Fulter, B. Cambridge, MA:  
The MIT Press, 1998. 
 
Habermas, J. “Discourse ethics: Notes on a program of philosophical justification.” In  
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. Lenhardt, C. and S. 
Nicholsen. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Habemas, J. Between Naturalism and Religion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005. 
 
Hammelman, T. “Gay and lesbian youth: contributing factors to serious attempts or  
considerations of suicide.” Journal of Gay and Lesbian Psychotherapy, 2(1)(1993): 
77–89 
 
 180
Hemingway, H., Shipley, M., Brunner, E., Britton, A., Malik, M., and M. Marmot. “Does  
autonomic function link social position to coronary risk? The Whitehall II study.” 
Circulation, 111(23)(2005): 3071-7. 
 
Herek, G.M., Capitanio, J.P., and K.F. Widaman. “HIV-related stigma and knowledge in  
the United States: prevalence and trends,1991-1999.” American Journal of Public 
Health, 92(3)(2002): 371-7. 
 
Hessler, K and A. Buchanan. “Specifying the content of the human right to health care.”  
In Medicine and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution of Health Care. Eds. 
Rhodes, R., Battin, M.P., and A. Silvers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Hill, T.E. Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Horton, R. “Rediscovering human dignity.” Lancet, 364(9439)(2004): 1081-5. 
 
Institute of Medicine Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic  
Disparities in Health Care.  Unequal treatment: confronting racial and ethnic 
disparities in health care.  Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001.   
 
James, W. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover, 1950.  
 
Jarvis, M.J. and J. Wardle. “ Social patterning of individual health behaviours: The case  
of cigarette smoking.” In Social Determinants of Health. Eds. Marmot, M. and R. G. 
Wilkinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.   
 
Kamm, F. “Health and equality of opportunity.” American Journal of Bioethics,  
1(2)(2001): 17-9. 
 
Karliner, L., Jacobs, E., Chen, A., and S. Mutha. “Do professional interpreters improve  
clinical care for patients with limited English proficiency? A systematic review of the 
literature.” Health Services Research, 42(2)(2007): 727-54. 
 
Kawachi, I. and B. Kennedy. “Income inequality and health: Pathways and mechanisms.”  
Health Services Research, 34(1 pt 2)(1999): 215-27. 
 
Kawachi, I. Kennedy, B., and R. Wilkinson, eds. Income Inequality and Health: A  
           Reader. New York: The New Press, 1999. 
 
Kennedy, B., Kawachi, I., Lochner, K., and D. Prothrow-Stith. “Social capital, income  
inequality, and mortality.” American Journal of Public Health, 87(9)(1997): 1491-8. 
 
Kennedy, B., Kawachi, I., and D. Prothrow-Stith. “Income distribution and  
mortality: Test of the Robin Hood Index in the United States.” British Medical 
Journal, 312(7037)(1996): 1004-8.   
 
 181
Kennedy, E. “The role of the federal government in eliminating health disparities.”  
Health Affairs, 24(2)(2005): 452-8. 
 
Kilewo, C., Massawe, A., Lyamuya, E., Semali, I., Kalokola, F., Urassa, E., Giattas, M.,  
Temu, F., Karlsson, K., Mhalu, F., and G. Biberfeld. “HIV counseling and testing of 
pregnant women in sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences from a study on prevention of 
mother-to-child HIV-1 transmission in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.” Journal of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 28(5)(2001): 458-62. 
 
Kitcher, P. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York:  
Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
 
Kivimaki, M., Elovainio, M., and J. Vahtera. “Workplace bullying and sickness absence  
in hospital staff.” Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 57(10)(2000): 656-60.   
 
Kivimaki, M., Elovainio, M., Vahtera, J., and J.E. Ferrie. “Organizational justice and  
health of employees: prospective cohort study.” Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine, 60(1)(2003): 27-33. 
 
Kivimaki, M., Ferrie, J., Head, J., Martin, S., Vahtera, J., and M. Marmot.  
“Organisational justice and change in justice as predictors of employee health: the 
Whitehall II study.” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 58(11)(2004): 
931-37.   
 
Kivimaki, M., Virtanen, M., Vartia, M., Elovainio, M., Vahtera, J., and L. Keltikangas- 
Jarvinen. “Workplace bullying and the risk of cardiovascular disease and depression.” 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 60(10)(2003b): 779-83. 
 
Klein, R. “Health inequalities: Bringing the hidden assumptions into the open.” Health  
Economics, 9(7)(2000): 569-70. 
 
Korsgaard, C. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,  
1996. 
 
Kunst, A.E., Groenhof, F., Andersen, O., Borgan, J.K., Costa, G., Desplanques, G.,  
Filakti, H., Giraldes Mdo, R., Faggiano, F., Harding, S., Junker, C., Martikainen, P., 
Minder, C., Nolan, B., Pagnanelli, F., Regidor, E., Vagero, D., Valkonen, T., and J.P. 
Mackenbach. “Occupational class and ischemic heart disease mortality in the United 
States and 11 European countries.” American Journal of Public Health, 89(1)(1999): 
47-53. 
 
Lantz, P.M., House, J.S., Lepkowski, J.M., Williams, D.R., Mero, R.P., and J. Chen.   
“Socioeconomic factors, health behaviours, and mortality: results from a nationally 
representative prospective study of US adults.” Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 279(21)(1998): 1703-8.   
 
 182
Lurie, N. and T. Dubowitz. “Health disparities and access to health.” Journal of the  
American Medical Association, 297(10)(2007): 1118-21. 
 
Lynch, J., Davey Smith, G., Hillemeier, M., Shaw, M., Raghunathan, T., and G. Kaplan.   
“Income inequality, the psychosocial environment, and health: comparisons of 
wealthy nations.” Lancet, 358(9277)(2001): 194-200. 
 
McDonough, P., Duncan, G.J., Williams, D., and J. House. “Income dynamics and adult  
mortality in the United States, 1972 through 1989.” American Journal of Public 
Health, 87(9)(1997): 1476-83. 
 
McLeod, J. and R. Kessler. “Socioeconomic status differences in vulnerability to  
undesirable life events.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 31(2)(1990):  
162-72. 
 
Mackenbach, J.P. “Socioeconomic inequalities in health in Western Europe: From  
description to explanation to intervention.” In Social Inequalities in Health: New 
Evidence and Policy Implications. Eds. Siegrist, J. and M. Marmot. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Malyutina, S., Bobak, M., Simonova, G., Gafaroy, V., Nikitin, Y., and M. Marmot.  
“Education, marital status, and total and cardiovascular mortality in Novosibirsk, 
Russia: A prospective cohort study.” Annals of Epidemiology, 14(4)(2004): 244-9. 
 
Marchand, S., Wikler, D., and B. Landesman. “Class, health, and justice.” The  
Milbank Quarterly, 76(3)(1998): 449-67. 
 
Marmot, M. The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and  
Longevity. New York: Times Books, 2004. 
 
Marmot, M. “Status syndrome: A challenge to medicine.” Journal of the American  
Medical Association, 295(11)(2006): 1304-7. 
 
Marmot, M., Banks, J., Blundell, R.m Lessof, C., and J. Nazroo. Health, wealth and  
lifestyles of the older population in England: The 2002 English longitudinal study of 
ageing. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2002. 
 
Marmot, M. and E. Brumer. “Cohort profile: The Whitehall II study.” American Journal  
of Epidemiology, 34(2)(2005): 251-6. 
 
Marmot, M.G., Shipley, M., Brunner, E., and H. Hemingway. “Relative contribution of  
early life and adult socioeconomic factors to adult morbidity in the Whitehall II 
study.” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 55(2001)(5): 301-7. 
 
Marmot, M. and G. Smith. “Why are the Japanese living longer?” British Medical  
Journal, 299(6715)(1989): 1547-51.   
 183
Marmot, M. and R.G. Wilkinson. Social Determinants of Health. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1999. 
 
Mason, M. 2003. “Contempt as a moral attitude.” Ethics, 113(2)(2003): 234-72. 
 
Matthews, H., Lannin, D.R., and J.P. Mitchell. “Coming to terms with advanced breast  
cancer: Women’s narratives from North Carolina.” Social Science and Medicine, 
38(6)(1991): 789-800. 
 
Mays, V. and S.D. Cochran. “Mental health correlates of perceived discrimination  
among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States.” American  
Journal of Public Health, 91(1)(2001): 1869-76.  
 
Mean Girls. Dir. Mark Waters. Perfs. Lorne Michael. Paramount Pictures, 2004.   
 
Mele, A. Autonomous Agency: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2001. 
 
Meyer, I. and L. Dean. “Internalized homophobia, intimacy, and sexual behaviour among  
gay and bisexual men.” In Stigma and Sexual Orientation. Ed. Herek, G. Sage: 
Thousand Oaks, 1998. 
 
Miller, G.F. The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human  
Nature. New York: Doubleday, 2000. 
 
Moffit, R.E. and C. Smith. “The House SCHIP bill: Cutting medicare, undercutting  
private coverage, and expanding dependency.” The Heritage Foundation, 1 Aug 07 
WebMemo #1580. 
 
Morgan, E.S. Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and  
America. New York: WW Norton & Company, 1988. 
 
Morland, K., Wing, S., Roux, A.D., and C. Poole. “Neighborhood characteristics  
associated with the location of food stores and food service places.” In Race, 
Ethnicity, and Health: A Public Health Reader. Ed. LaVeist, L.A. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2002. 
 
Muntaner, C. and J. Lynch. “Income inequality, social cohesion, and class relations: A  
critique of Wilkinson’s neo-Durkheimian research program.” International Journal of 
Health Services, 29(1)(1999): 59-81. 
 
Muntaner, C., Lynch, J., and G. Oates. “The social class determinants of income inequality  
and social cohesion.” International Journal of Health Services, 29(4)(1999): 699-732.   
 
National Cancer Institute. Patient navigator research program. [internet]. Available from:  
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CA-05-019.html [Cited 31 Mar 06]. 
 184
National Center for Health Statistics. Vital statistics of the United States, 2002.  
[internet]. Available from: www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr50/nvsr50_09.pdf [Cited 
1 April 05].  
 
National Institutes of Health. What are health disparities? [internet]. Available from:  
http://healthdisparities.nih.gov/whatare.html [Cited 25 Nov 05]. 
 
National Statistics Online. Great Britain, interim life tables, 1980-82 to 2003-05.  
[internet]. Available from: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=14459 [Cited 1 Sep 2007]. 
 
Nicholson, A., Bobak, M., Murphy, M., Rose, R., and M. Marmot. “Socio-economic  
influences on self-rated health in Russian men and women--a life course approach.” 
Social Science & Medicine, 61(11)(2005): 2345-54. 
 
North Carolina Office of Minority Health and Health Disparities and State Center 
for Health Statistics. Racial and ethnic health disparities in North Carolina: Report 
card.[internet]. Available from: 
http://www.ncminorityhealth.org/omhhd/OMH_Documents/Report%20Card/Final%2
0Report%20Card%20&%20Cover.pdf [cited 16 Nov 05]. 
 
Novello, A.C. “Cancer, minorities, and the medically underserved: A call to action.”  
Journal of Cancer Education, 21(1 Suppl)(2006): S5-8. 
 
Nussbaum, M. “Aristotle, politics, and human capabilities: A response to Antony,  
Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan.” Ethics, 111(1)(2000a): 102-140. 
 
Nussbaum, M. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000b.  
 
Nussbaum, M. “Capabilities and human rights.” In The Philosophy of Human Rights.  
Ed. Hayden, P. St. Paul: Paragon House, 2001. 
 
Nussbaum, M. Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen. “Internal criticism and Indian nationalist traditions.” In  
Relativism, Interpretation, and Confrontation. Ed. Krauss, M. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.  
 
Oliver, M.L. and T.M. Shapiro. Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial  
Inequality. London: Routledge, 1995.  
 
Pappas, G., Queen, S., Hadden, W., and G. Fisher. “The increasing disparity in  
mortality between socioeconomic groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986.” New 
England Journal of Medicine, 329(2)(1993): 103-9. 
 185
Partenheimer, D. Race has powerful effects on children’s perceptions of occupations, study  
finds. [internet]. Available from: http://www.apa.org/releases/race_jobs.html [Cited 
11 Aug 2007]. 
 
Paul, J.P., Catania, J., Pollack, L., Moskowitz, J., Canchola, J., Mills, T., Binson, D., and R.  
Stall. “Suicide attempts among gay and bisexual men: lifetime prevalence and 
antecedents.” American Journal of Public Health, 92(6)(2002): 1338–1345. 
 
Peter, F. “Health equity and social justice.”  In Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Eds.  
Anand, S., Peter, F., and A. Sen. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Peterson, J. Genetic Turning Points: Ethics of Human Genetic Intervention. Grand  
Rapids: Willaim Erdmans Publishing Co., 2001. 
 
Physicians Working Group for Single Payer National Health Insurance. “Proposal of the  
physicians working group for single payer national health insurance.” Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 290(6)(2003): 798-805. 
 
Plato. Republic. Ed. and Trans. Reeve, C.D.C. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,  
2004. 
 
Popkin, B.M., Duffey, K., and P. Gordon-Larsen. “Environmental influences on food  
choice, physical activity, and energy balance.” Physiology and Behavior, 
86(5)(2005): 603-13. 
 
Rawls, J. A Kantian concept of equality. Cambridge Review, 96(2225)(1975): 94-9. 
 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press, 1999. 
 
Redelmeier, D.A. and S.M. Singh. “Survival in Academy Award-winning actors and  
actresses.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 134(1)(2001): 955-62. 
 
Rhodes, R. “Justice, medicine, and medical care.” American Journal of Bioethics,  
1(2)(2001): 32-3.   
 
Rofes, E. I Thought People Like That Killed Themselves: Lesbians, Gay Men and  
Suicide. San Franciso: Grey Fox, 1983.   
 
Rorty R. “Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality.” In On Human Rights: Oxford  
Amnesty Lectures. Eds. Hurely, S. and S. Shute. New York: Basic Books, 1993.  
 
Ruberman, W., Weinblatt, E., Goldberg, J.D., and B.S. Chaudhary. “Psychosocial  
influences on mortality after myocardial infarction.” New England Journal of 
Medicine, 311(9)(1984): 571-9. 
 
 186
Ruger, J. “Ethics of the social determinants of health.” Lancet, 364(9439)(2004a): 1092- 
7.   
 
Ruger, J. “Health and social justice.” The Lancet, 364(9439)(2004b): 1075-80. 
 
Ruger, J. “Health, capability, and justice: Toward a new paradigm of health ethics, policy 
and law.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 15(2)(2006): 403-82. 
 
Sahagún, B. Florentine Codex: History of the Things of New Spain. Trans. and Eds.  
Anderson, J.O. and C. Dibble. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1982. 
 
Samuelson, PA. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
University Press, 1947.   
 
Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University  
Press, 1998. 
 
Savulescu, J. “Consequentialism, reasons, value, and justice.” Bioethics, 12(3)(1998):  
212-35. 
 
Savulescu, J. “Justice and health care: The right to a decent minimum, not equality  
of opportunity.”  American Journal of Bioethics, 1(2)(2001): 39-41. 
 
Scanlon, T.M. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  
1998. 
 
Schaffner, K.F. “Biopyschosocial foundations.” American Journal of Bioethics,  
1(2)(2001): 26-7. 
 
Schrijvers, C.T.M., Stonks, K., Mheen, H., and J.P. Mackenback. “Explaining  
educational differences in mortality: The role of behavioral and material factors.” 
American Journal of Public Health, 89(4)(1999): 535-40. 
 
Schulman, K.A., Berlin, J.A., Harless, W., Kerner, J.F., Sistrunk, S., Gersh, B.J., Dubé,  
R., Taleghani, C.K., Burke, J.E., Williams, S., Eisenberg, J.M., and J.J. Escarce. “The 
effect of race and sex on physicians' recommendations for cardiac catheterization.” 
New England Journal of Medicine, 340(8)(1999): 618-26. 
 
Scott, J. “Life at the top in America isn't just better, it's longer.” The New York Times, May  
16, 2005 Section A; Column 1; National Desk; pg. 1 
 
Sen, A. “Behaviour and the concept of preference.” Economica, 40(159)(1973): 241-59. 
Sen, A. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1982 
 
Sen, A. “Justice: Means versus freedoms.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(2)(1990):  
111-121.   
 187
 
Sen, A. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Shibuya, K., Hashimoto, H., and E. Yano. “Individual income, income distribution, and  
self rated health in Japan: cross sectional analysis of nationally representative sample. 
British Medical Journal, 324(7328)(2002): 16-9. 
 
Simbayi, L.C., Kalichman, S., Strebel, A., Cloete, A., Henda, N., and A. Mqeketo.  
“Internalized stigma, discrimination, and depression among men and women living 
with HIV/AIDS in Cape Town, South Africa.” Social Science Medicine, 64(9)(2007): 
1823-31. 
 
Skinner, E.A. “A guide to constructs of control.” Journal of Personality and Social  
Psychology, 71(3)(1996): 549 - 570.   
 
Skinner, E.A., Chapman, M., and P.B. Baltes. “Control, means-ends, and agency beliefs:  
A new conceptualization and its measurement during childhood.”  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54(1)(1988): 117-33.   
 
Small, R., Rice, P., Yelland, J. and J. Lumley. "Mothers in a new country: The role  
of culture and communication in Vietnamese, Turkish and Filipino women's 
experiences of giving birth in Australia." Women and Health, 28(1999): 77–101. 
 
Smith, A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments; or, An Essay Towards an Analysis of the  
Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, 
First of Their Neighbors, and Afterwards of Themselves. Philadelphia: Anthony 
Finley, 1817. 
 
Smith, G.D. “Introduction: Lifecourse approaches to health inequalities.” In Health  
Inequalities: Lifecourse Approaches. Ed. Smith, G.D. Bristol: The Policy Press, 2003.  
 
Smith, G.D., Dorling, D., Mitchell, R., and M. Shaw. “Health inequalities in Britain:  
continuing increases up to the end of the 20th century.” Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 56(6)(2002): 434-5.   
 
Smith, G.D. and S. Harding. “Is control at work the key to socioeconomic gradients in  
mortality?” Lancet, 350(9088)(1997): 1369-70 
 
Smith, G.D. and C. Hart. “Socioeconomic factors as determinants of morality.”  
Journal of the American Medical Association, 280(20)(1998): 1744-5. 
 
 
Smith, G.D., Neaton, J.D., Wentworth D., Stamler, R., and S. Jeremiah. “Socioeconomic  
differentials in mortality risk among men screened for the Multiple Risk Factor 
Intervention Trial: Part I—results for 300,685 white men.” American Journal of 
Public Health, 86(4)(1996): 486-96. 
 188
Sorlie, P.D., Backlund, E., and J.B. Keller. “US mortality by economic demographic, and  
social characteristics: the National Longitudinal Mortality Study.” American Journal 
of Public Health, 85(7)(1995): 949-56. 
 
Spolsky, R.M. “Social status and health in humans and other animals.” Annual Review of  
Anthropology, 33(2004): 393-418.  
 
Stall, R., Hoff, C., Coates, T., Paul, J., Phillips, K., Ekstrand, M. Kegeles, S., Catania, 
J., Daigle, D., and R. Diaz.. “Decisions to get HIV tested and to accept antiretroviral 
therapies among gay/bisexual men: Implications for secondary prevention efforts.” 
Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 11(2)(1996): 151–160. 
 
Staunton, J. Honda joins Senate, House leaders to fight health disparities: Announces  
plan to introduce health disparities legislation. [internet]. Available from: 
http://www.house.gov/list/speech/ca15_honda/Senate_House_Fight_Health_Dispariti
es.html [Cited 19 Nov 06]. 
 
Stern, L. “Opportunity and health care: criticisms and suggestions.” Journal of Medicine  
and Philosophy, 8(4)(1983): 339-62. 
 
Strawson, P.F. “Freedom and resentment” In Freedom and Resentment and Other  
Essays. London: Methuen, 1974. 
 
Sugden, R. “Welfare, resources, and capabilities: A review of Inequality Reexamined by 
 Amartya Sen.” Journal of Economic Literature, 31(4)(1993): 1947-62. 
 
Taylor, J., Henderson, B., and B. Jackson. “A holistic model for understanding and  
predicting depression in African American women.” Journal of Community 
Psychology, 19(4)(1991): 306–20. 
 
Taylor, J. and B. Jackson. “Factors affecting alcohol consumption in black women. Part  
II.” International Journal of Addiction, 25(12)(1990): 1415–27. 
 
The Simpsons. Episode no. 21, first broadcast 20 April 1997 by Fox. Directed by  
Kirkland, M. and written by Swartzwelder, J. 
 
The Black Report, 1980. “Report of the working group on inequalities in health.” In  
Inequalities in Health. Eds. Townsend, P., Davidson, N., and M. Whitehead. London: 
Penguin Books, 1992. 
 
 
Tull, S.E., Wickramasuriya, T., Taylor, J., Smith-Burns, V., Brown, M., Champagnie, G.,  
Daye, K., Donaldson, K., Solomon, N., Walker, S., Fraser, H., and O.W. Jordan. 
“Relationship of internalized racism to abdominal obesity and blood pressure in Afro-
Caribbean women.” Journal of the National Medical Association, 91(8)(1999): 447-
52. 
 189
United Health Foundation. America’s health rankings: 2005 edition. [internet]. Available  
from: http://www.unitedhealthfoundation.org/shr2005/Findings.html#introduction  
[Cited 18 Oct 06]. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report, 2003. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
United States Census Bureau. “Profiles of general demographic characteristics: 2000.”  
(2001): 1. 
 
United States Census Bureau. Housing vacancies and homeownership. [internet].  
Available from: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histt14.html 
[Cited 26 Dec 06]. 
 
United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. International Comparisons of  
Administrative Costs in Health/ Care, BP-H-135. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1994. 
 
Van Rossum, C.T.M., Shipley, M.J., Van de Mheen, H., Grobbee, D.E., and M. Marmot.  
“Employment grade differences in cause specific mortality. A 25-year follow up of 
civil servants from the first Whitehall study.” Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 54(3)(2000): 178-84. 
 
Van Ryn, M. and J. Burke. “The effect of patient race and socioeconomic status on  
physicians’ perceptions of patients.” Social Science and Medicine, 50(6)(2002): 813-
28. 
 
Veugelers, P.J. and A.M. Yip. “Socioeconomic disparities in health care use: Does  
universal coverage reduce inequalities in health?” Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 57(6)(2003): 424-8. 
 
Wadsworth, M.E.J. “Serious illness in childhood and its association with later-life  
achievement.”  In Class and Health. Ed. Wilkinson, R.G. London: Travistock 
Publications, 1986. 
 
Wakefield, J. “The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts  
and social values.” American Psychologist, 47(3)(1992): 373-87. 
 
 
 
Wang, L.Y., Kick, E., Fraser, J., and T.J. Burns. “Status attainment in America: the  
roles of locus of control and self-esteem in education and occupational outcomes.” 
Sociological Spectrum, 19(3)(1999): 281-98. 
 
Waymack, M.H. “Daniels on justice and healthcare: Laudable goals— 
questionable method.” American Journal of Bioethics, 1(2)(2001): 28.   
 190
 191
West, P. “Rethinking the health selection explanation for health inequalities.” Social  
Science and Medicine, 32(4)(1991): 373-84. 
 
Wilkerson, I. “Middle-class blacks try to grip a ladder while lending a hand.” The New York  
Times. Nov 26, 1990, A1. 
 
Wilkinson, R. Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality. London: Routledge,  
1996. 
 
Wilkinson, R. “Health inequalities: relative or absolute material standards?” British  
Medical Journal, 314(7080)(1997): 591-5.   
 
Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett. “Income inequality and population health: A review and 
explanation of the evidence.” Social Science and Medicine, 62(7)(2005): 412-7.  
 
Williamson, I.R. “Internalized homophobia and health issues affecting lesbians and gay  
men.” Health Education Research, 15(1)(2001): 97-107. 
 
Wolfe, T. I am Charlotte Simmons. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004 
 
World Health Organization. The world health report 2004—changing history. [internet].  
Available from: http://www.who.int/whr/2004/en [Cited 21 Nov 06]. 
 
Zoloth, L. “Justice as cardiovascular therapy.” American Journal of Bioethics,  
1(2)(2001): 24-5. 
 
